VZCZCXRO2395
RR RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0944/01 0811234
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221234Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6985
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3793
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000944 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM EAIDAF ECON
MASS, SOCI, AF 
SUBJECT: PRT GHAZNI: SIX MONTH REPORT ON SECURITY, 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Security and governance in Ghazni 
have improved over the last six months due to an 
increase in troops and a change in governor. 
Reconstruction and development appear to be moving 
forward, but there is still no prioritized provincial 
development plan.  Ghazni's citizens are experiencing greater 
optimism and higher expectations.  However, 
given problems with provincial development and 
Governor Patan's threats to return to the U.S. if his 
operational funds are not soon released, it is unclear 
how long such optimism can be sustained.  The next six 
months will be critical to keeping the momentum going 
in the right direction.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
Security Situation 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU)  In mid-2006, the increase in the number of 
Coalition/ISAF troops and offensive operations with the ANSF, 
as well as the dispersion of troops around Ghazni province 
forced the Taliban and other anti-government forces to leave 
the 
province or remain underground.  Towards the end of 
2006, the onset of winter further contributed to the 
reduction of anti-government attacks.  IEDs and direct 
fire attacks continue but with less frequency. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Police operations remain an issue.  Under the 
leadership of former Governor Sher Alam, there was an 
aggressive effort to recruit and deploy 'arbakei,' or 
privately hired security forces.  Many former militia 
men were hired as arbakei to supplement or replace police 
throughout problematic districts.  It is believed that they 
were paid by Governor Sher Alam's operational funds.  In 
the Summer of 2006 there was an effort to legitimize and 
formalize the arbakei by putting them under the 
control of regular ANP and paid by the MOI. 
 
¶4. (SBU) When Sher Alam was replaced in September, 
most of the arbakei left with him.  (Sher Alam had 
tried to forestall his departure by threatening to 
take 'his' arbakei with him, leading some in the 
Coalition Forces (CF) to argue that his departure 
should be delayed.)  Ultimately, the break-up of the 
undisciplined and corrupt arbakei proved a 
boost to security.  Current efforts to supplement the 
police force with ANAP continue; however, there is 
some evidence that the ANAP vetting process was 
inadequate or incomplete, so there are undoubtedly 
some former arbakei with questionable loyalties in the 
ANAP. 
 
¶5. (SBU) One source of the weakness of the ANP has 
been the revolving door at the office of the 
provincial police chief.  In the last six months there 
have been four provincial chiefs of police.  This has 
allowed corruption and inefficiency at the hands of 
other senior police officers to continue.  The most 
recently appointed Chief of Police, Ali Sha Amendzai, 
appears to be the most honest of the bunch and is 
committed to rooting out corruption and corrupt police 
officials. 
 
Governance and Development 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Under Sher Alam, all power 
was centralized in his office, and line ministers 
rarely met with the governor.  Sher Alam appeared to 
regularly shuffle district administrators and district 
chiefs of police.  In fact, in most districts the 
chief of police and the district administrator were 
the only government officials in power; they were 
 
KABUL 00000944  002 OF 004 
 
 
thereby able to run their districts with little 
accountability.  Sher Alam allowed Hazara Member of 
Parliament General Qasimi and his Hazara deputy 
governor to control the Hazara districts of Ghazni. 
 
¶7. (SBU) While the PRT made efforts to get Sher Alam 
out to visit districts, those visits may have been 
counterproductive since he was widely seen as corrupt 
and inefficient.  Sher Alam did not accept criticism 
from local elders and usually lectured district 
officials and residents about corruption and 
cooperation with the Taliban.  With the replacement of 
Sher Alam by Governor Patan in September, things 
started to change.  Governor Patan (who will only 
travel outside Ghazni City with CF protection) has 
more visiblity in the districts than his predecessor. 
Over the past four months, he has become comfortable 
attending district shuras, acknowledging problems and 
accepting criticism from local citizens. 
 
¶8. (SBU) With the arrival of Governor Patan, ministry 
directors seemed to become energized.  The Provincial 
Development Council (PDC) now meets regularly and is 
developing lists of development needs.  There is no 
prioritized list and it is unclear how needs will be 
prioritized.  With mostly USG funding (CERP and 
USAID) development projects are proceeding.  The lead 
time for project development and completion as well as 
the overwhelming needs will always disappoint local 
residents who are fond of saying "neither the 
government nor the international community has ever 
done anything for me." 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) One chronic problem is the seemingly constant 
shuffling of district administrators and the lack of 
ministry representatives in most of the districts. 
Recent efforts to build district centers and improve 
security should allow more officials to reside in or 
regularly visit districts, but it will be difficult to 
convince those comfortable in Ghazni City to relocate. 
Governor Patan seems to be placing more competent and 
honest people as district administrators.  He is also 
reevaluating ministry representatives and the deputy 
governor and should be making changes in the coming 
months. 
 
¶10. (SBU) In all areas of Ghazni the people's demands 
for development are consistent:  water for drinking 
and irrigation, clinics, schools and roads.  Most 
districts have clinics; the principal problem appears 
to be the lack of staff, especially female doctors, 
and medical supplies.  Most schools do not have 
buildings and security concerns have made some 
schools, especially schools for girls, unable to 
operate.  The USG building of retention dams 
should help increase the water available in the karess 
system, but the long term trend appears to be an 
ever-declining water table. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Without contingency funds, Governor Patan 
has no way of financing additional security or local 
development.  In September, he had discussed plans to 
collect tolls from local roads as a means of 
generating funds, but he did not want to turn the 
funds over to the central government.  (Note: Such 
action would be illegal.  End note.)  It is 
currently unclear if and how these tolls are actually 
collected.  If collected, there seems to be no 
consistency in location or frequency. 
 
 
Economic Situation 
------------------ 
 
KABUL 00000944  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) Following a poor snowfall during last year's 
winter and heavy flooding this past August, weather 
conditions severely stunted growth in Ghazni's 
agricultural economy.  Large snowfalls over the last 
three months, however, have generated optimism for the 
coming agricultural year.  Ghazni City, areas along 
the Ring Road, and some Hazara areas of the province 
appear to be prosperous.  The bazaars are well-stocked 
and there is building going on in most areas. 
 
 
Cultural/Social Situation 
------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Schools were open in many parts of Ghazni. 
In some areas locals supplemented the salaries of 
teachers.  Demand for education in all areas is 
strong.  There is a lack of well-qualified teachers, 
supplies and school equipment.  In Hazara areas the 
majority of girls attend school.  In Pashtoon areas 
schooling of girls presents security problems and the 
priority for most families is educating their sons. 
In August, a local school headmaster was gunned down 
for his refusal to stop educating girls. 
 
¶14.  Ghazni has four female ministry directors: 
education; social services; health; and women's 
affairs.  The director of education is well-qualified 
but does not appear to have a coherent provincial plan 
and may be replaced in the coming months.  During the 
past six months, she has received several death 
threats, although it is unclear whether these threats 
were directed towards her because she is a woman or 
because she is Hazara. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The Ghazni City Women's Center, with outside 
support, is active in literacy, English and computer 
training. 
 
Prognosis 
--------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Governor Patan says he's using the winter to 
plan reconstruction efforts and promises visible 
changes in Ghazni over the spring and summer.  Such 
improvements would be enhanced if coupled with efforts 
to eliminate police corruption and if the ANSF has 
sufficient forces to mitigate the promised Taliban 
Spring offensive. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Another uncertainty is how long 
Governor Patan will remain in Ghazni.  A U.S. citizen, 
Governor Patan was already making plans to return to 
his family in the US, when he was tapped for the 
position in Ghazni. He has told the PRT that if his 
operational funds (not received for several months) do 
not start to flow by the Afghan new year (March 21), 
he will resign.  In addition, it is unclear if the 
ongoing investigations by Attorney General Sabit into 
Patan's involvement in a land distribution deal in 
Khost Province (where he previously served as 
governor) will lead to charges against him that may 
force - or provide an opportunity for - him to quit. 
In Khost, Patan was accused of misappropriating public 
land that was designated for refugee resettlement. 
 
18.(SBU) EMBASSY COMMENT:  The budget presented to 
parliament does not contain a line item for governors' 
discretionary funds.  There may be a small 
"operational" budget provided to governors for travel 
and representational expenses ($5-7000/month) that 
will also have new accountability requirements.  We 
will see if receipt of these funds will satisfy 
 
KABUL 00000944  004 OF 004 
 
 
Governor Patan.  END EMBASSY COMMENT. 
NEUMANN