VZCZCXRO0942
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #1050/01 0901251
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 311251Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7184
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3900
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3569

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001050 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 
TAGS: MARR SNAR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PAG MARCH 18: TENSIONS BETWEEN ISAF AND  MOD 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MILITARY COUNSELOR CAROL RODLEY FOR REASONS 1. 
4 (B) AND (D). 
 
Classification:  SECRET 
TAGS: MARR SNAR PGOV AF
 
ADDRESSEES: 
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 
INFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE 
NATO EU COLLECTIVE 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNSIL WASH DC 
CIA WASH DC 
DIA WASH DC 
OSD WASH DC 
SECDEF WASH DC 
JOINT STAFF WASH DC 
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFG FL 
COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFG 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USMISSION USNATO 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
 
Subject:  (C)PAG March 18: Tensions between ISAF and 
MoD 
 
 1.(S) Summary: The March 18 Policy Action Group 
(PAG) chaired by Minister of Defense Wardak resulted 
in a disagreement regarding the conduct of counter- 
insurgency operations in Helmand.   Discussion between 
General McNeill (Commander, International Security 
Assistance Force) and Wardak also highlighted the 
necessity of rapidly building political support for 
the counter-insurgency operations that commenced on 
March 21st.  (Note.  The start of Operation "Now Roz" 
coincided with the Afghan New Year and was designed to 
engage the enemy prior to their expected Spring 
Offensive.  End note).  The discussion clearly 
underscored a difference of opinion between Wardak and 
McNeill regarding the short-term focus and results 
expected of this operation.  End Summary. 
 
Disagreement between Wardak and McNeill 
 
2.(S) During a discussion about Operation "Now Ruz" 
and its desired effects, Wardak startled most 
international observers by stating that the focus of 
Operation "Now Ruz" must be to "quickly regain 
control of several districts in Helmand that are no 
longer under the control of the GoA."  He added that 
the people are losing confidence in ISAF and the 
GoA, expect quick results, and will not wait until 
the summer for positive results.  Wardak,s primary 
complaint was that Operation "Now Ruz" plan did not 
satisfy this requirement to retake districts now 
held by the Taliban and should be changed as any 
failure to quickly regain control of the districts 
in question will result in the loss of support for 
the GoA,s efforts.  General McNeill rebutted this 
statement by declaring that ISAF will conduct 
operations in Helmand throughout the spring and 
summer.  He also stated that Operation "Now Ruz" 
will set the conditions for success by initially 
conducting operations in Northern Helmand, after 
which operations would shift to the South.  The 
kinetic operations would facilitate reconstruction 
efforts conducted in cooperation with the ANA 
throughout the province.  Wardak ended the 
discussion by stating that "there is a need to 
 
KABUL 00001050  002 OF 002 
 
 
achieve results quickly to restore the public,s 
confidence.  Many districts are out of our control. 
That is the whole point."  Gen. McNeill pointedly 
reminded Wardak that President Karzai had been 
briefed on and concurred with the concept of 
Operation Now Ruz.  He stated, "if the GoA has 
now changed its position, he would need to 
consult further with the President." 
 
UNAMA Defuses the Situation 
-------------------------- 
 
3.(S)  UNAMA,s representative Chris Alexander 
attempted to smooth over the dispute and emphasized 
UNAMA,s perception that the situation in Helmand was 
"more upbeat than is commonly portrayed" based upon 
the ability of coalition forces to capture Taliban 
leadership.  He observed that the political 
leadership in Helmand was weak due to the lack of an 
actively engaged governor.  He submitted that there 
was no sense re-launching a military offensive if 
appropriate governance was not in place.  However, 
he stressed that there was a need to continue 
efforts against the enemy in Northern Helmand. 
 
Comment 
----------- 
 
4.(S)  Wardak,s comments clearly depicted a fault 
line between ISAF and some parts of the GOA.  The 
failure to regain control of districts, such as Musa 
Qala, in their view will only serve to undermine the 
credibility of the GoA. This will likely lead to 
increased passive support of the insurgency 
throughout the nation and a subsequent increase in 
the insurgent,s capabilities.  Responding quickly to 
this concern, ISAF is already working on two fronts: 
to brief key GoA officials more thoroughly on the 
plan and to revise the plans to address these 
issues. 
NEUMANN