VZCZCXRO0935
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #1049/01 0901229
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 311229Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7179
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3895
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3564

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 001049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 
TAGS: MARR SNAR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: ANAP EXPANSION IN EAST AND CENTRAL 
 
REF: A. REF A. KABUL 255 
     ¶B. REF B. KABUL 855 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MILITARY COUNSELOR CAROL RODLEY FOR REASONS 1. 
4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.(C/REL ISAF) Summary:  During recent visits to 
Kunar and Nangarhar to access the Afghan National 
Auxiliary Police (ANAP) program, an Embassy-led 
team identified several problems with the 
program, including the Ministry of Interior,s 
(MOI) failure to provide adequate oversight of 
the vetting process, a misunderstanding of the 
vetting process at the provincial level, and a 
current lack of training facilities. 
Uncorrected, these deficiencies could lead to an 
ANAP in which the patrolmen are more loyal to a 
local militia commander than to the GOA.  This 
would detrimentally affect the nation-wide 
security situation and hinder GoA efforts to 
enforce the rule of law or provide security to 
the citizens of Afghanistan. These challenges 
were identified early and Post, the international 
community and CSTC-A are committed to correcting 
the deficiencies by providing additional 
mentoring to the MoI and engaging the 
international community to provide significantly 
greater oversight of the ANAP vetting process. 
The consolidation of recruiting, vetting and 
training to ANAP Training Centers of Excellence, 
located at Jalalabad and Gardez Regional Training 
Centers, will allow closer supervision and better 
mentoring by the Dyncorps civpol professionals. 
 
 
ANAP Current History 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
2.(C/REL ISAF) The Afghan National Auxiliary Police 
(ANAP) was designed to bolster security in 121 
high risk districts by recruiting, training, and 
deploying 11,271 patrolmen to 21 provinces. The ANAP 
was initially focused on providing 
patrolmen in six priority provinces (Ghazni, 
Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul). 
Since the first ANAP graduation, which occurred 
in October 2006 in Zabul Province, approximately 
4,500 patrolmen have completed training. 
 
3.(C/REL ISAF) A new problem arose last fall when 
the MoI, without PAG approval or international 
community concurrence, accelerated the program 
and commenced simultaneous ANAP recruiting 
efforts in 21 provinces.  This failure to apply 
the mutually agreed upon terms of reference 
resulted in the acceptance of recruits not fully 
qualified to serve as patrolmen.  Also the number 
of recruits significantly exceeded the capacity 
of the training facilities, resulting in a 
backlog of recruits who were forced to wait for a 
space at one of the training centers.  In order 
to regain control of the recruiting effort, in 
early November 2006, the PAG at the request of 
the international community, explicitly ordered 
the cessation of all recruiting and training 
outside six priority provinces.  This PAG 
direction also required the MoI, prior to 
initiating any future actions, to brief and 
receive approval for the expansion of all future 
recruiting and training efforts.  This briefing 
would ensure that previously approved efforts 
would not be negatively impacted by the 
 
KABUL 00001049  002 OF 005 
 
 
recommended expansion and that a plan was in 
place to pay the recruits the appropriate salary 
(Note.  When a patrolman is initially recruited, 
he is paid 800 afs, approximately $16.  However 
after the completion of training, the patrolman 
receives 3500 afs which equates to approximately 
$70. End Note).  In mid January 2007, based upon 
an expected increase of insurgent violence, the 
PAG endorsed the expansion of ANAP recruiting and 
training to eight provinces in the eastern region 
and Herat (Ref A). 
 
4.(S/REL ISAF) In order to support this expansion, in 
December 2006, the MoI in coordination with CSTC- 
A and Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF-82), 
developed a plan in which the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Regional Training 
Centers (RTCs) would conduct limited ANAP 
training.  Every month, each of the eight PRTs 
would train 50-100 recruits while two RTCs 
located at Jalalabad and Gardez would train 
approximately 240 patrolmen.  This training was 
initially set to commence not later than March 1, 
¶2007.  However, due to logistics challenges 
including a lack of training facilities, only the 
RTCs have initiated training.  PRT orchestrated 
training has not yet started, and is not likely 
to begin until late June 2007. 
 
5.(C/REL ISAF) Shortly after the initiation of the 
ANAP program last fall, a US Embassy led 
assessment team was formed to assess the MoI,s 
adherence to the vetting process, progress on 
training, and quality and loyalty of the 
recruits.  This team, which includes 
representation from the Embassy,s Pol Mil, 
INL/NAS, and DAO sections, as well as the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 
CSTC-A and United Nations Assistance Mission to 
Afghanistan (UNAMA), earlier conducted reviews of 
the ANAP programs in the Southern Command region. 
 
Assessment visits in RC East 
---------------------------- 
 
6.(C/REL ISAF) Following the decision of the PAG to 
expand ANAP to the east, the team visited 
Nangarhar and Kunar provinces and will visit 
Paktia and Ghazni in the near future.  The team 
visited both PRT and RTC facilities and discussed 
the ANAP program with Provincial Governors, 
Provincial Police Chiefs, and senior 
representatives from the MoI.  The team also 
conducted approximately 100 short interviews and 
several in-depth 45 minute interviews with 
individual recruits in order to verify the 
vetting process used by the MoI.  In an attempt 
to understand more thoroughly the vetting 
process, a Shura was conducted with over 50 
village leaders from Watah Pur district in Kunar. 
During this conversation, the elders identified 
their role as nominating good individuals to 
serve as ANAP and also acknowledged the 
importance of a national vetting procedure to 
ensure the quality of future patrolmen. 
 
 
Issues and actions 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
7.(C/REL ISAF)The assessment team,s trips 
identified  several elements that will be 
 
KABUL 00001049  003 OF 005 
 
 
critical to the success or failure of the ANAP 
program, to include: 
 
- (C/REL ISAF) Vetting and adherence to the terms 
of reference.  In RC East, the MoI is not 
adhering to the agreed terms of reference. 
(Note. The terms of reference are the process 
used to ensure the quality of each recruit and 
include a requirement that each recruit receive a 
recommendation from two district tribal elders, 
undergo an NDS background check and complete 
medical screening.  This process attempts to 
ensure that the patrolmen will be loyal to the 
Government of Afghanistan vice a local militia 
commander and that the ANAP is tribally and 
ethnically representative of the district from 
which the patrolmen are recruited. End Note). 
The interviews conducted clearly showed that 
background checks were not being properly 
completed, recruits were not receiving any type 
of medical screening and the MoI recruiting teams 
and Provincial Police Headquarters personnel were 
not properly supervising the vetting process. 
This has led to the recruitment of questionable 
individuals with suspect loyalties. 
 
- (C/REL ISAF) Facilities.  PRTs currently lack the 
facilities required to train and billet the 
recruits.  Although the requirement was 
previously identified in December 2006, the 
allocation of funding coupled with the facility 
approval process has greatly delayed any 
construction efforts.  The estimated cost of 
$400k per training facility is significant and 
the size of this fiscal investment must be 
carefully balanced against the relatively small 
benefit of the capability to train only 
approximately 50-100 ANAP per month at each site. 
Although a temporary solution (tents and heaters) 
is being investigated, a more feasible and 
realistic approach, which is discussed in detail 
below, involves using the Jalalabad and Gardez 
RTCs to train only ANAP for a period of two 
months (other INL training programs focused 
on justice and corrections will continue). 
 
- (C/REL ISAF) Pay.  The payment of ANAP salaries 
is still problematic and there are reports from 
PRT Officers of ANAP patrolmen not being paid on 
a predictable and regularly scheduled basis; 
CSTC-A is working to address these claims.  A 
second problem stems from the previously-noted 
MOI decision to recruit before training was 
available.  The MoI now claims that each 
patrolman should receive backpay from the time of 
recruitment. After much discussion, the 
international community, through the Law and 
Order Trust Fund Afghanistan, recommended to the 
PAG that each recruit from the 6 priority 
provinces receive payment of $16 per month from 
the date of recruitment.  This recommendation was 
recently accepted by both the PAG and MoI.  The 
decision whether to provide backpay to the 
recruits from other regions is pending an 
assessment of three provinces in the East to 
determine whether the recruits were adequately 
vetted. 
 
- (C/REL ISAF) Ethnic Balance.  There are 
indications that the ethic balance of the ANAP 
may not be completely representative of the 
districts.  If ANAP units are not representative 
 
KABUL 00001049  004 OF 005 
 
 
of the district ethnic balance, there is the 
potential the ANAP could serve as a coercive 
asset, directly or indirectly furthering the 
ambitions of Afghan warlords or other power 
brokers, or even of an individual or unit 
intending to undermine the GoA. 
 
The Way Ahead 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶7.  (C/REL ISAF) Post in coordination with the 
MoI, CSTC-A and international community is 
already developing and implementing solutions to 
the previously identified deficiencies that 
include: 
 
- (C/REL ISAF) Vetting and adherence to the terms 
of reference. Due to identified deficiencies and 
the lack of MoI supervision of previous vetting 
efforts, all ANAP recruits will be revetted at 
the RTC,s to ensure that they meet the 
requirements outlined in the terms of reference. 
The Jalalabad RTC developed a process that is now 
being used by other facilities which includes 
completion of a personal interview and 2-page 
biographical information sheet, medical screening 
and background check.  During the interview, 
tribal ethnicity will be recorded and the recruit 
will also be questioned about past militia 
affiliations. This process will be run by the MoI 
and Provincial Police Headquarters personnel with 
strict oversight by the international community 
and Dyncorps civpol mentors.  This process will 
be accomplished at the RTC,s prior to the 
recruits being allowed to start training and will 
include representatives from the MoI, Provincial 
Police Headquarters recruiting and CID 
departments, and medical personnel.  Another 
important safeguard is UNAMA,s agreement to 
conduct future spot checks of the vetting process 
and willingness to continue to monitor the tribal 
balance of the district ANAP forces.  The US 
Embassy led assessment team will also continue to 
periodically visit the RTCs to ensure compliance 
with the agreed upon vetting procedures and 
verification of training standards. 
 
-(S/REL ISAF) Facilities / training.  In order to 
train the numbers of ANAP required prior to an 
expected increase in insurgency-related violence, 
we have agreed that all other police training 
programs will be suspended at the Jalalabad RTC 
for a period of at least 2 months.  This will 
allow a concentrated focus on ANAP training and 
should result in the graduation of approximately 
1800 ANAP from the Jalalabad RTC by June 2007. 
The Gardez RTC will be used in the same fashion. 
When the Gardez RTC concentrates solely on ANAP 
training, an additional 1500 patrolmen will 
graduate by the end of July. ANAP focused 
training started at the Jalalabad RTC on March 
24th while the training at the Gardez RTC will 
commence in early May.  The Jalalabad RTC is 
currently training 154 ANAP and will increase to 
its maximum capacity of 350 ANAP every two weeks 
in the near future.  Gardez RTC will continue 
to train approximately 150 ANAP patrolmen per 
month until early May at which time it will 
start training approximately 500 ANAP recruits 
per month. While this initiative will result 
in the temporary suspension of other police 
training at the RTCs, training of justice 
and corrections programs will continue and 
 
KABUL 00001049  005 OF 005 
 
 
will not be impacted. 
 
- (C/REL ISAF) Pay. Post, in cooperation with the 
MoI, international community and CSTC-A, will 
continue to monitor this situation to ensure that 
all recruits receive the appropriate amount of 
backpay as expeditiously as possible.  The 
Embassy-led team interviews individual ANP and 
ANAP Patrolmen to ascertain when they last 
received their salaries, the month that they 
enlisted and the first time they received any 
payment.  The Dyncorp civpol mentors are also 
involved in evaluating the scope of the problem 
and mentoring the MoI to correct the situation as 
quickly as possible. 
 
-(C/REL ISAF)  Ethnic Balance.  Due to the 
importance of maintaining a representative tribal 
balance, Post continues to remain engaged with 
the international community to verify the ethnic 
composition of the ANAP.  Additional efforts that 
ensure the proper ethnic balance is recruited and 
deployed include the Embassy and UNAMA commitment 
to conducting spot checks and Task Force 
Phoenix,s effort to count the police forces 
nation-wide (Ref B). 
 
 
Comment. 
------------------------------------ 
¶10. (C/REL ISAF) The ANAP is not only vital to 
bolstering the security forces within the nation 
but is an essential part of President Karzai,s 
plan to enhance national security.  Although 
patrolmen are only hired for a one year period, 
if MoI fails to adhere to the agreed upon terms 
of reference or properly vet the patrolmen, the 
consequences will be serious.  Additionally, if 
this force is not ethnically representative of 
the districts or is loyal to militia commanders 
rather than the GoA, there is the potential of 
creating a hollow force that will undermine 
national security and alienate the Afghan 
citizens from their national leaders.  Moreover, 
lack of oversight and unreliable vetting will 
impact the GoA,s ability to counter the 
insurgency this year; the local people will 
continue to feel unprotected by the government; 
and the enforcement of the rule of law and 
ability of the ANP to provide security to the 
citizens will remain mimimal.  The importance of 
this program necessitates constant, vigilant 
oversight.  We are determined not to recuit a 
hollow, unreliable force.  The Embassy will 
continue to work closely with MoI, CSTC-A, ISAF 
and UNAMA to identify discrepancies at early 
stages and develop solutions that will help 
ensure the success of this essential initiative. 
 
 
NEUMANN