VZCZCXRO1994
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0009/01 0601617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 011617Z MAR 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0063
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0031
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0058
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0056

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR HAUGEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/21/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR ECON
SUBJECT: RAFSANJANI ISOLATING AHMADINEJAD? 
 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000009  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional 
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(S/NF) Summary:  A well-connected Iranian professor criticized 
the Ahmadinejad's government for gross mismanagement and claimed 
that large portions of the population had turned against him.  A 
clear Rafsanjani supporter, he claimed the Expediency Council is 
the one person in Iranian politics who can act as a 
counterweight to the Supreme Leader.  The contact appeared to 
have a good understanding of Western perspectives of Iran, based 
on his years studying in the US and the UK.  His insights into 
Rafsanjani are useful, and his claims of Rafsanjani activism are 
shared by others.  His assessment of Rafsanjani as the sole 
counterweight to the Supreme Leader, however, seems exaggerated. 
 End summary 
 
2.(S/NF) An engineering professor from Sharif University shared 
February 26 his assessment of the current situation in Iran. 
Although clearly pro-Rafsanjani, he was not particularly 
politically active, although he came from a prominent family. 
His views seemed to have been shaped by three important factors. 
 He is reportedly related by marriage to Rafsanjani and has met 
him on a number of occasions.  He is from a reportedly prominent 
bazaari family, although he says he clashes with his father's 
traditionalist views.  And his years spent studying in the US 
and UK appeared have allowed him to understand the Western 
perspective on Iran and given him some fairly pro-Western views. 
 (For instance, he said his non-objection to his daughter 
studying abroad is relatively rare in Iran.)  He repeatedly made 
clear his views were his own and that he did not have first-hand 
access to information, although he mentioned he and his family 
go to Rafsanjani's house once a year or every other year to pay 
respects.  He also claimed that his father is one of chief 
informal advisors to the regime on commercial matters and as 
such serves as the principal liaison between the bazaaris and 
the government.  (Note: this assertion has not been 
independently confirmed. Endnote)  His father was reportedly 
imprisoned and tortured by the Shah, accused of funding 
Islamists against the government, and held several years in Evin 
prison.  He later held a high level position at the Ministry of 
Ershad when Khatami was minister. 
 
Ahmadinejad: a bad manager 
-------------------------- 
 
3.(S/NF) The professor said his traditionalist father supports 
President Ahmadinejad because he thinks he is honest, but the 
son disagrees and is very critical of the president's 
performance.  In the professor's view, the Iranian government's 
worst enemy is its bad management.  Anyone qualified has left 
public service or been fired.  He also claimed most bazaaris 
have turned against Ahmadinejad because of his economic 
mismanagement of the country, a view echoed by other contacts. 
Another contact claimed that the bazaaris are actively trying to 
undermine Ahmadinejad by creating artificial shortages of goods 
to increase pressure on the government.  A different contact 
claimed Rafsanjani is directing such meddling. 
 
4.(S/NF) After a year and a half in office, Ahmadinejad has also 
alienated wider swaths of the population by not keeping his 
economic promises, the professor said.  In a separate 
conversation, an Iranian economist said that that the roughly 30 
percent of the population who either a) directly benefited from 
oil dollars in the past; or b) were staunch conservatives in 
support of Ahmadinejad are turning against him as their pockets 
become lighter.  Another contact commented that Ahmadinejad's 
weakness is that his major economic priority from the beginning 
was redistribution of wealth, not economic development, but in 
any case has failed in his efforts. 
 
Private sector complaints 
------------------------- 
 
5.(S/NF) The professor, who also owns a publishing company, said 
he has had to lay off 20 employees since the economy started 
plummeting.  Other business contacts have also said they've been 
forced to lay off large numbers of employees.  The professor 
echoed others' comments that they are unsure how to make 
decisions regarding their privately owned businesses in light of 
undefined possible sanctions coming down the pike. 
 
Lessons learned? 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000009  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
---------------- 
 
6.(S/NF) In a view shared by many of our contacts, the professor 
believes Ahmadinejad's win resulted from two factors: 1) an 
order from the Supreme Leader to the head of IRGC to use IRGC 
and Basij to mobilize votes for him; and 2) votes from 
uneducated people who believed his promises of economic support. 
 One source claimed that the Supreme Leader thought that 
Ahmadinejad would be a humble, pliable man of the people and was 
surprised by his antagonistic posturing.  He heard that in the 
December 2006 elections, the Supreme Leader instructed IRGC not 
to work against Rafsanjani.  He is also hearing that large 
portions of the IRGC and Basij no longer support Ahmadinejad, a 
view shared by some other contacts.  The professor said the 
silver lining may be that this election will act as a maturing 
experience for the Iranian electorate, who will learn from the 
"worst mistake they have ever made." 
 
Rafsanjani moves to counter the president 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7.(S/NF) The professor said he thought one of Rafsanjani's most 
significant recent statements was his speech for anniversary of 
the revolution, in which he claimed to have advised Ayatollah 
Khomeini that then President Bani-Sadr was not the right person 
for the job, prior to Bani-Sadr's ouster.  The professor said 
this comment was believed to have been a veiled threat that he 
could do the same with Ahmadinejad. 
 
8.(S/NF) The professor claimed that Rafsanjani has a good 
relationship with the grand ayatollahs and has persuaded them 
not to meet Ahmadinejad.  He claimed the grand ayatollahs are 
generally suspicious that Ahmadinejad is dragging the country 
into conflict and specifically peeved that the president took it 
upon himself to write a letter to the Pope.  Another source also 
mentioned that the grand ayatollahs are shunning the president, 
but for the more selfish reason in that they believe he is 
jeopardizing their interests. 
 
His view of Rafsanjani 
---------------------- 
 
9.(S/NF) The professor asserted that Rafsanjani genuinely cares 
about Iran, wants a better relationship with West, and can make 
it happen.  He called him the only counterweight to the Supreme 
Leader in Iranian politics.  Without indicating how many times 
he has met Rafsanjani, he indicated at least several occasions 
of family gatherings.  He described the Expediency Chair as 
honest in his politics, though he quickly qualified that perhaps 
he is less honest in other ways, alluding to the rampant rumors 
of corruption.  He said Rafsanjani is very intelligent, with an 
IQ of 170.  He also said he has the knack of remembering details 
about people.  The first time he met him, he said, they 
discussed the Internet.  When they met again years later, 
Rafsanjani recalled the conversation. 
 
10.(S/NF) The professor said Rafsanjani made a lot of mistakes 
as president, although he claimed he was the only person who 
would give the Supreme Leader realistic assessments of the 
situation during the Iran-Iraq war.  The professor felt that 
then President Khatami and the reformers made a mistake by 
humiliating Rafsanjani instead of bringing him onboard to help 
them fight their battles.  He said Rafsanjani's two electoral 
humiliations sent him into a state of depression but that his 
landslide win in December had reenergized him.  When asked about 
the rumor that the Supreme Leader may be replaced by a council, 
he didn't answer, simply saying Rafsanjani has the ability to 
energize any institution with which he is associated. 
 
Differing views of Supreme Leader's current take on Ahmadinejad 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------ 
 
11.(S/NF) The professor believes that unlike Rafsanjani, the 
Supreme Leader changes his opinion frequently, according to 
whoever gets his ear.  The professor believes the Supreme Leader 
dropped support for Ahmadinejad briefly in the time around the 
December election but has given him back his support in the past 
few weeks.  He argued that although the leader knows he made a 
mistake by bringing Ahmadinejad in, cutting him loose will 
undermine the leader's authority.  On the other hand, a 
Tehran-based businessman disputed this assessment and said he 
did not think Ahmadinejad had returned to the leader's good 
graces, citing his absence at several recent meetings the leader 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000009  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
had with cabinet members. 
 
US-Iran relations 
----------------- 
 
12.(S/NF) Regarding relations with the US, the professor 
understood the US need to forcefully counteract Iranian 
aggression in Iraq, but he thought it was necessary to find a 
way for the two countries to talk.  He was very worried that the 
countries were drifting into war, predicting disastrous results. 
 He said there was little understanding of the US position on 
the nuclear issue inside Iran because of the spin the regime 
puts on the news.  Specifically, he said there was little 
knowledge of what P5-1 is offering Iran, little understanding of 
the US position on civilian energy, and little recognition of 
the symbolic importance of the offer that Secretary Rice would 
conduct the negotiations herself. 
 
13.(S/NF) He maintained that the US now sees itself as a father 
figure in the world, and it should therefore deal with Iran as 
an errant son, assuring him that acceptance back in the fold is 
possible, rather than like someone who will always be an 
outsider.  He said acts of "kindness" go a long way and 
applauded efforts such as the recent travel to Iran by the US 
wresting team.  He believed that President Bush should offer a 
meeting with no preconditions, but only with the Supreme Leader 
or Rafsanjani.  There would be enormous pressure from Iran to 
accept.  The leader would likely refuse, but Rafsanjani would 
find a way to do it. 
 
14.(S/NF) Comment:  While his statements to a US official may 
have been colored by the fact that his son was applying for a US 
student visa the next day, he repeatedly stressed that these are 
simply his views and what he is hearing others say, and didn't 
claim any firsthand access to knowledge.  Both he and the 
Iranian-American who introduced him to IRPO Director are clear 
supporters of Rafsanjani, who they pitch as the key to solving 
the Iranian problem.  Given our limited access to the Iranian 
population, it is difficult to assess the general sentiment on 
Rafsanjani at this time, although Rafsanjani's December election 
results would seem to indicate significant popularity in Tehran. 
 Several contacts claim that Rafsanjani is actively working to 
isolate Ahmadinejad and influence decision-making, in 
cooperation with Khatami.  On the other hand, calling Rafsanjani 
the only counterweight to the Supreme Leader seems to run 
counter to the predominant view of Iranian politics as dominated 
by multiple spheres of influence. 
BURNS