VZCZCXRO6486
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0015/01 0861427
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271427Z MAR 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0077
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY 0070
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0072
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0043
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/IR, LONDON FOR GAYLE, BAKU FOR HAUGEN, BERLIN FOR 
PAETZOLD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/27/2017 
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET PGOV IR
SUBJECT: GASOLINE SUBSIDIES:  IS IRAN FEELING THE HEAT? 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000015  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence 
Office - Dubai, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(C) Summary:  Despite the unpopularity of cutting subsidies at 
a time of high inflation, the parliament has set May 22 as the 
date to raise gasoline prices by 25 percent.  Parliament also 
put an annual cap on gasoline subsidies of USD 2.5 billion. 
Judging from Iranian press, general Iranian opinion toward the 
measure appears generally negative, with some economists 
forecasting "massive shockwaves" and others simply predicting 
increased corruption in the energy sector.  Some details of the 
plan are still unclear.  Contacts reported that there has been 
limited distribution of "smart cards" - although wide-scale 
rationing through fuel cards does not seem to be on the table at 
this time.  It will be interesting to gauge public reaction when 
the increase takes effect.  Reducing gasoline subsidies is a 
positive step for Iran's macro-economic health, but it appears 
to fly in the face of President Ahmadi-Nejad's populist promises 
of redistributing oil wealth.  It also comes at a time when Iran 
is likely looking to shore up domestic support for its nuclear 
policies in the face of international pressure through UNSC 
resolutions.  However, the Iranian government may be moving now 
to address a structural weakness in its economy and reduce its 
dependence on other countries in order to lessen the impact of 
any future gasoline embargo on the country.  End Summary. 
 
2.(C) Fixed pump prices for the last three years boosted Iranian 
gasoline consumption well beyond domestic refining capabilities 
- forcing the government to import 40 percent of its gasoline 
needs.  Environmentalists bemoan the impact of this high 
consumption, including leaded gasoline, while Iranian 
parliamentarians bemoan the impact that subsidies have on the 
federal budget.  The Majles threatened to implement a fuel 
coupon system and/or to decrease gasoline subsidies last year, 
but until recently appeared reluctant to touch gasoline, as 
inexpensive fuel is widely viewed as an entitlement in the 
world's fourth oil producer.  However, in early March, in a time 
of heightened discontent with the economy and in direct 
contradiction to Ahmadi-Nejad's promised populist spending, the 
Majles passed legislation limiting Iranian gas subsidies and 
raising fuel costs at the pump. 
 
Growing pressure 
-------------------- 
 
3.(C) Riding high on popular support for his campaign promises 
to bring the country's oil wealth to the people's tables, 
President Ahmadi-Nejad ignored former President Khatami's 
counsel to him to invest in industry, particularly energy sector 
infrastructure.  He also failed to react seriously to a June 
2006 letter by 50 economists on the worrisome state of Iran's 
economy.  His  policy of placating the people with populist 
spending appeared to falter when some of his unfulfilled 
promises started eroding his popularity.  At the same time, his 
overspending sparked criticism from academics and elites, in the 
run-up to the December 2006 municipal elections.  Since 
December, public debate on Ahmadi-Nejad's economic mismanagement 
has dominated news sources and the minds of many Iranians. 
(Note: An overview of the state of the Iranian economy to be 
reported septel. Endnote.) 
 
Hard decision by the Majles 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.(C) In this time of public discontent with the state of the 
economy, the Majles passed a very unpopular two-part bill:  1) 
placing a USD 2.5 billion annual cap on gasoline subsidies; and 
2) increasing gasoline prices, which are set by the government, 
from roughly 8 cents to 11 cents a liter.  The changes are to go 
into effect May 22.  (Note:  The Majles has postponed action on 
this unpopular issue before, it could do so again.  Endnote) 
There is discussion of further price increases after subsidies 
are used up, but no clarity as to how much.  In addition to 
curbing fuel subsidies, the Majles has also discussed rationing 
.  In the run-up to the Majles decision to curb subsidies, the 
idea of utilizing "smart" fuel ration cards, possibly with a 
two-tiered pricing schedule, was debated by decision makers and 
in the media.  Some contacts reported in January that the 
government was beginning to hand out ration cards, although it 
does not appear that legislation regarding ration cards has been 
passed.  The current thinking on utilizing such cards in 
conjunction with the subsidies is unknown. 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000015  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
New bill:  insufficient or overly ambitious? 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.(C) Public reaction to subsidy caps and price increases, 
albeit consistently pessimistic, runs the spectrum from 
believing the measures to be insufficient to perceiving them as 
overly ambitious.  According to a March 8 Financial Times 
article, Majles deputy Mahmoud Abtahi warned that a 25 percent 
hike in pump prices would cause a "severe shock because petrol 
is the life blood of the economy."  Abtahi urged parliament to 
help off-set the financial hit to low-income groups.  The same 
article cited Iran Economics editor Heydar Pourian as saying 
that a 25 percent price increase was "psychologically bearable 
and not much above inflation."  Business newspaper Sarmayeh 
carried an editorial March 8 indicating that the subsidy cap was 
a good first step, but not enough.  It argued that the problem 
facing Iran is two-fold, low-prices and high consumption, and 
that the bill only addresses the former.  An  economist contact 
predicted to IRPOff that any increase in gas prices, 
particularly any form of rationing or two-tier pricing, will 
result in greater corruption in the energy sector, similar to 
"the last time the government tried rationing."  (Note:  A 
rationing system used during the Iran-Iraq war was reportedly 
heavily exploited by those with close government ties.  Endnote) 
 
 
6.(C) Comment:  The Majles is finally taking difficult steps 
that will provide long-term economic benefits to combat Iranian 
economic mismanagement and end the substantial drain on foreign 
reserves caused by the gasoline subsidy.  This is a positive 
step in economic terms, whatever the motivation.  The driving 
factor for taking such an unpopular measure at this sensitive 
time, however, may be to insulate the country from a possible US 
or UN gasoline boycott for Iran, given that the idea has already 
circulated in the media and in the US Congress.  Iran can reduce 
its vulnerability to such a future step by reducing gasoline 
imports now, while at the same time reducing  Iran's dependence 
on foreign countries, long a foreign policy priority.  As part 
of this policy, it is also planning to bring new refineries 
on-line, but of course, this is a longer-term solution.  As long 
as US policy remains to try to target the impact of sanctions on 
the Iranian government and not the Iranian people, a gasoline 
boycott is probably not a good option.  While it would have a 
significant impact on Iran, it is difficult to gauge its impact 
on popular opinion and may have the reverse impact as the one we 
desire.  Although it is difficult to generalize, a rise in 
gasoline prices by the Iranian government could increase its 
unpopularity in the minds of the Iranian people; a rise in 
gasoline prices triggered by a foreign-imposed boycott could 
boost solidarity with the government.  IRPO will continue to 
monitor both public reaction to and implementation of the new 
gasoline policy. 
BURNS