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P R 230958Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3389
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0884
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0834
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0943
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0769
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0685
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0642
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0491
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0079
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2748

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000120 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS,IO,INL 
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/23/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO UN TT
SUBJECT: SECURITY SECTOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
REF: DILI 119 
 
DILI 00000120  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Major Ron Sargent, US Defense Representative, US 
Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of Defense. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Summary: As detailed in reftel, Post has become 
increasingly concerned regarding the direction of developments 
in the security sector, including both the East Timorese armed 
forces (F-FDTL) and the East Timorese National Police (PNTL). 
In light of these concerns, we have reviewed our policy on the 
security sector and recommend the policy guidance outlined 
below. Issues relating to the security sector must be kept on 
the front burner in Post's ongoing dialogue with the United 
Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), the GOET, and 
diplomatic counterparts. We will convey to both UNMIT and the 
GOET that we regard both the expansion of F-FDTL operations in 
Dili, the rearming of PNTL, and similar developments as 
important policy decisions that cannot be regarded as routine 
operational calls.  Additionally, Post plans to request a 
formalized way in which the donor and diplomatic communities be 
both consulted and informed on security sector matters, and on 
the progress of the Security Sector Review (SSR) by emphasizing 
its importance and priority relative to true reform efforts. In 
addition to these messages, we believe that targeted assistance 
to the PNTL through INCLE (International Narcotics Control and 
Law Enforcement) funding can help the institution get on the 
right track and ensure that we have a seat at the table in 
determining policy direction for the PNTL in the long term. End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Post plans to request that regular security sector 
updates be provided to relevant members of the diplomatic 
community from either Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG) Atul Khare or Deputy SRSG Eric Tan. 
 
SIPDIS 
These updates should also be viewed as opportunities for UNMIT 
to brief the diplomatic community on the status of the SSR. 
Separately, Post will request that the RSO be included in the 
weekly Security Operations Center updates which are currently 
limited to UNMIT agencies.  This is vital in abilty to optimally 
understand the security environment which we inhabit, and we 
view exclusion as detrimental to our safety.  In other UN 
missions, it is the norm for there to be information sharing at 
this level, and in this volatile environment it does not serve 
the interests of either the American or the UN mission to be 
exclusionary. 
 
¶3. (C) Within this context, Post will endeavor to use this as an 
opportunity to identify a specific role where it can apply 
targeted resources to the development of the East Timorese 
National Police (PNTL) through use of approximately $1.5 million 
of still available Fiscal Year 2006 INCLE funds.  Post is in the 
process of consulting with PNTL leadership, the UN Police 
(UNPOL), and other interested parties regarding the long-term 
training plan for the PNTL, which has necessarily changed 
significantly following last year's crisis and the concurrent 
disintegration of the PNTL in the capital.  We intend to use 
this consultation process to identify the areas where US INCLE 
assistance could have the most leverage. We can have a 
significant impact on the direction of the PNTL through INCLE 
assistance; moreover, by being directly involved in PNTL 
development we will have a seat at the table in important policy 
decisions.  Specific proposal on this will be conveyed septel 
once consultations are complete. 
 
¶4. (C) While Post recognizes that there are extraordinary 
sensitivities at play in terms of the East Timorese national 
election cycle, we will persist in emphasizing that clear 
progress be made by the GOET regarding the UN Commission of 
Inquiry's (COI) recommendations.  (Note: The COI recommended 
several security sector officials for prosecution relating to 
crimes committed during the 2006 crisis period.)  Additionally, 
UNMIT must continue to leverage all of its influence upon the 
achievement of an outcome which best reflects the fullest 
possible accounting on behalf of all parties.  True security 
sector reform in East Timor hinges upon this end.  The fullest 
qualitative engagement of the East Timor Defense Force (F-FDTL) 
can only occur once the recommendations of the COI have been 
satisfactorily considered and acted upon by the GOET.  While 
Post is sincerely interested in working to professionalize 
F-FDTL and to better integrate it within Pacific Command's 
 
DILI 00000120  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Theater Security Cooperation Plan, all efforts will remain 
obstructed until appropriate steps have been taken. 
 
¶5. (C) As for other specific security-related issues, Post will 
maintain its support of collaborative GOET, International 
Stabilization Force (ISF), and UNMIT efforts to apprehend 
dissident leader Alfredo Reinado.  We recognize that he and his 
close supporters are destabilizing factors, and that it is in 
East Timor's best interest to see them brought to justice 
swiftly.  Post also sees the prompt resolution of the military 
"petitioner" (soldiers dismissed in 2006 following allegations 
of discrimination in the military) issue as being vital to 
renewing much of civil society's confidence in the rule of law, 
and to reinvigorate dialogue in matters of justice.  While 
ex-Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato's conviction struck a 
significant chord in these regards, the petitioner episode - 
which has arguably been the trigger for much of the strife of 
the past year - must be met with a satisfactory outcome if true 
closure is to be achieved. 
HARSHA