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Viewing cable 07DILI119, SECURITY SECTOR CONCERNS INTENSIFY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DILI119 2007-03-22 10:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO2250
PP RUEHLMC RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0119/01 0811043
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 221043Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3384
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0879
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0829
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0938
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0764
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0680
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0637
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0486
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0074
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2743
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DILI 000119 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/22/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO AU UN TT
SUBJECT: SECURITY SECTOR CONCERNS INTENSIFY 
 
REF: DILI 007, 044 
 
DILI 00000119  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Stanley Harsha, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy, 
Dili, East Timor, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
1. (C/NF) Summary:  Recent decisions made by both the Government 
of East Timor (GOET) and the United Nations Integrated Mission 
to Timor-Leste (UNMIT) have possibly made the security 
environment in Dili more problematic in advance of national 
elections next month.  Dili is now a city where armed 
International Stabilization Force (ISF) soldiers, United Nations 
police (UNPOL) and National Police of East Timor (PNTL) 
officers, and East Timorese Defense Force (F-FDTL) soldiers 
share common operating space.  Within this context, Post has 
specific concerns about the conduct of F-FDTL in a number of 
incidents in the capital city recently - incidents which appear 
to exceed set limits that had been communicated originally by 
the GOET.  Because of such incidents, which demonstrate F-FDTL's 
largely undisciplined nature, an apparent lack of will on the 
part of UNMIT to constructively engage and leverage their 
influence with relevant East Timorese players, and the specter 
of a national election cycle which promises to be actively 
contested, it appears that Dili may be moving closer to seeing 
the type of dangerous tensions that were prevalent in April and 
May of 2006.  On the other hand, sources told us that during a 
March 21 trilateral consultations meeting between GOET, ISF and 
UNMIT, that F-FDTL commander Taur Matan Ruak acknowledged that 
the F-FDTL had exceeded their mandate due to miscommunications 
down the chain of command, that the infractions were serious and 
that he was taking strong action to bring his troops back to 
their mandated static positions. End Summary. 
 
F-FDTL Unleashed 
----------------- 
 
2. (C) Both ISF and senior UNMIT and diplomatic community 
sources have recently expressed to Post extreme concern 
regarding the heightened F-FDTL presence in Dili.  The decision 
to expand the F-FDTL presence in Dili to encompass a number of 
static facilities was reportedly taken during a March 6 weekly 
meeting with Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta attended by PNTL 
leadership, the Minister of Interior Alcino Barris, the UNPOL 
Commissioner Rodolfo Tor, Deputy Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG) Eric Tan, and the Commander of F-FDTL, 
 
SIPDIS 
Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak.  A PNTL source who was at 
this meeting said that it was actually Tor who raised the issue 
of using F-FDTL in Dili in light of the deterioration of 
security that accompanied and followed the ISF operations 
against dissident military leader Alfredo Reinado on March 4. 
The source reported that Tor's request was for 60 F-FDTL to be 
assigned to several specific positions in Dili as static 
security. 
 
3. (C) On March 19, an ISF source reported that F-FDTL elements 
are now regularly operating in excess of the rules of engagement 
(ROE) previously spelled-out by Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta 
to Emboffs, other members of the diplomatic community, ISF, and 
UNMIT during separate meetings.  This ROE had identified the 
following as the parameters in which F-FDTL would have to 
operate within the context of their expanded role: provide a 
static presence at sensitive sites known to the ISF and UNMIT; 
no foot or vehicle patrolling; use of non-lethal munitions 
first, with live ammunition used only when the lives of F-FDTL 
members are threatened; and that F-FDTL would only be considered 
the "first line of defense" in any situation.  In the event of a 
threat, F-FDTL would contact UNPOL which would have a response 
element on the scene within 10 minutes.  However, on March 19 
ISF sources shared with Post the following list which details 
the known scope of recent F-FDTL transgressions: 
 
a. On March 6, F-FDTL members were called upon by either friends 
or relatives living near the Taibesse Market area to scare off 
or intimidate attackers who were from a nearby village; during 
this incident, F-FDTL soldiers fired at least 30 rounds of live 
ammunition.  There were no injuries. 
 
b. On March 8, the first night of F-FDTL's static missions in 
Dili, it is believed that their elements fired one or two live 
 
DILI 00000119  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
warning shots in response to two separate incidents where rocks 
were thrown at F-FDTL vehicles in both Colmera and Bairro Pite. 
 
c. On March 11, there was a report of an F-FDTL foot patrol on 
the Beach Road stopping individuals. 
 
d. On March 12, there was a report of an F-FDTL element firing 
rounds near the Comoro Bridge. 
 
e. On March 13, between six and ten F-FDTL members were involved 
in a revenge-tinged incident where they allegedly ransacked 
several homes near the national hospital, and fired a number of 
rounds.  Two bullets were found by ISF investigators embedded in 
a neighborhood tree at about chest level, or head level for many 
East Timorese.  This incident apparently took place in the 
aftermath of a killing which occurred on March 11 that did not 
involve F-FDTL members directly, but may have involved family 
members or acquaintances.  UNPOL is investigating this incident, 
and UNMIT SRSG Atul Khare has voiced his concerns directly to 
Ramos-Horta.  Additionally, Khare told CDA on March 22 that 
F-FDTL commander, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, is denying 
that it was his forces which were involved in the incident. 
 
f. On March 14 in Dili, an ISF element asked some F-FDTL members 
about their involvement in some of the actions mentioned above; 
F-FDTL members responded that "those problems are being caused 
by military petitioners wearing F-FDTL uniforms."  "Petitioners" 
refers to hundreds of F-FDTL soldiers dismissed last year 
following allegations of discrimination within F-FDTL.  (Note: 
Neither the ISF nor Post gives any veracity to that statement.) 
 
g. On March 16 at about 11 p.m., F-FDTL soldiers in a static 
position at the Ministry of Education detained approximately ten 
people.  The following morning five individuals from the 
original group of ten, all exhibiting signs of having been 
beaten, were turned into the UNPOL Comoro Station by F-FDTL 
members.  Prior to being brought to Comoro, detainees had been 
inexplicably taken to F-FDTL Headquarters in Tasi Tolu.  It is 
not yet clear how soldiers in a static posture could detain 
these individuals.  Additionally, SRSG Atul Khare told CDA on 
March 22 that he knows of no physical evidence which indicates 
conclusively that the five aforementioned individuals were in 
fact beaten by F-FDTL members, explaining that they did not 
appear to have signs of having been beaten.  This comment runs 
counter to ISF assertions. 
 
h. On March 18 F-FDTL soldiers fired an estimated four warning 
shots at individuals who were known to them as being off-duty 
PNTL officers.  Allegedly the PNTL officers were on motorbikes 
and were taunting the soldiers. 
 
i. Last week, the Dili Water Storage Facility, which is only 
supposed to have an F-FDTL guard force of six to twelve soldiers 
on site, had a total of about 40 F-FDTL members present.  ISF 
sources report that F-FDTL may be using this location as a 
patrol base in which they can launch 'threat and intimidation' 
operations into the Bairo Pite area, and possibly elsewhere in 
Dili. 
 
j. Western (Loro'monu) commercial security guards working at 
both the Pertamina Oil Facility and the Dili Power Station have 
begun to encounter 'problems' with F-FDTL soldiers from the 
eastern (Lorosa'e) districts. 
 
k. Lastly, there have been multiple confirmed sightings of 
F-FDTL members with loaded magazines in their M16A2s containing 
ball ammunition. 
 
4. (C) Additionally, President of the National Unity Party, 
Fernanda Borges, informed the diplomatic community on March 21 
that F-FDTL soldiers entered the Becora Terminal area on March 
17 at about 6:30 p.m., pointed their loaded and charged M16A2s 
at several civilians in the area, and destroyed a large mural 
that local youth had painted of dissident military commander 
 
DILI 00000119  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
Major Alfredo Reinado.  Emboff confirmed that the mural has in 
fact been destroyed, but the incident as related by Borges has 
yet to be corroborated. 
 
5. (C) An UNMIT source reported to Emboff on March 16 that 
F-FDTL is possibly considering forming a company-sized 
quick-reaction force within its one operational battalion in 
Baucau.  While this would certainly be within F-FDTL's rights, 
it is not certain why the national leadership would feel this is 
necessary, what the operational releasing criteria would be in 
deploying such a force, and how their deployment would be 
coordinated with the ISF. 
 
6. (C/NF) However, there are clear indications that F-FDTL is 
moving forward at this time to coordinate its operations more 
closely with the ISF and UNPOL.  Australian sources confirmed 
today that senior and middle management level F-FDTL officers 
are in direct liaison with UNPOL and the ISF.  SRSG Khare also 
told CDA on March 22 that F-FDTL lieutenants who are in command 
of the static posts have exchanged cell phone numbers with local 
area UNPOL patrols who would be able to respond to any calls 
within 10 minutes.  However, Ruak stated during a meeting on 
March 20 attended by Ramos-Horta, ISF Commander Brigadier Mal 
Rerden, and Khare that while the agreed-upon ROE is understood 
at the higher echelons within F-FDTL, "there had been mistakes 
made in passing instructions down" to the operator level, 
according to a source who was briefed by someone in the meeting. 
 This acknowledgement would appear to be a very positive 
development, but this hardly removes concerns regarding F-FDTL 
operations, particularly in light of the recent demonstrated 
behavior of those who may not yet have a clear understanding of 
what Ruak's intent is.  According to an ISF source, the ISF 
Commander has issued an ROE which states that if ISF elements 
encounter an incident in which F-FDTL is behaving 
inappropriately, they are to attempt to position themselves 
between the F-FDTL members and other parties.  Further, 
according to the same source, the ISF Commander has also told 
both Ramos-Horta and President Xanana Gusmao that he is very 
concerned about such circumstances, and that if his forces are 
threatened by F-FDTL members, ISF elements will shoot to kill. 
Obviously, if such an occurrence were to take place, the 
ramifications would likely be profound nationwide. 
 
Analysis of underlying F-FDTL dynamics 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Post believes that it is possible that the above 
transgressions may not necessarily be the result of orders being 
issued by F-FDTL leaders, and that they could be the result of 
actions taken by F-FDTL versions of the "strategic corporal." 
Within the Timorese context, the junior leaders - whether they 
be corporals, sergeants, or even lieutenants through majors - 
make independent decisions which have consequences that can 
ultimately benefit or undermine senior commanders, particularly 
in an environment that is weighted by extensive scrutiny, in 
this case by UNPOL, the ISF, the diplomatic community, and some 
media influence.  Within F-FDTL, a defense force that is still 
mired in the roots of its 24-year struggle against the 
Indonesians - a struggle which created a sense of strong, 
undisciplined, and often times stubborn independent-mindedness 
on the part of many of its soldiers - its leadership is 
constantly having to manage actors who are liable to act in ways 
which challenge the recognition of central authority.  So what 
could be playing out is an instance where a defense force that 
was called upon to meet the specific requirements of a 
particular mission instead achieved or contributed to some 
unintended consequences because of its inherent nature. 
 
8. (C) There is no evidence which would support that Ruak feels 
that his defense force is in the wrong as it relates to any of 
the above reported incidents.  He stated only that there had 
been "misunderstandings" in some of the incidents and even 
denied that two of the incidents mentioned above involved F-FDTL 
soldiers, even though one was observed by Australian diplomats. 
 
DILI 00000119  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
Additionally, there is no information which supports that either 
Ramos-Horta or Gusmao are considering acting to place limits on 
F-FDTL's operations in light of these reports.  However, in the 
past Ramos-Horta has been known to be deferential to Ruak, that 
Ruak is fearful of some of the members of his own defense force 
- Chief of Staff Colonel Lere Anan Timur in particular - and 
that Gusmao has lost much sway over F-FDTL as a result of his 
lack of leadership and indecisiveness during last year's crisis. 
 It is possible that these dynamics are currently at play in 
recent lack of restraint exhibited in F-FDTL operations. 
 
PNTL Normalization 
------------------ 
 
9. (C/NF) With the increasing operational tempo of F-FDTL in 
Dili, and the risks both the ISF and the UN face with trying to 
place limits upon them, it appears that the GOET, with UNMIT 
agreement, may have found a way to make its domestic security 
situation even messier.  About two weeks ago around 200 East 
Timorese National Police (PNTL) officers deemed by the UN as 
being "the best and most professional" were given authorization 
to begin carrying their sidearms again, and approximately 134 
have already been rearmed.  Post believes that the UNMIT 
hierarchy is under tremendous pressure from the GOET to 
normalize PNTL operations in advance of the rapidly approaching 
national elections, and sources within both the ISF and the 
diplomatic community have reported that Minister of Interior 
Barris has tremendous influence over the decision-making of 
UNPOL Commissioner Tor.  But as a specific note of concern, a 
highly reliable UNPOL source who worked closely with Barris in 
the past states that the Interior Minister thinks in sound-bites 
only, and rarely if ever considers strategic consequences. 
Therefore, if Tor is in fact taking his cues from Barris, this 
could serve to complicate the security environment further, 
particularly if the focus remains on short-term security fixes 
that could possibly have far-reaching negative consequences. 
 
10. (C) It should be emphasized that such decisions regarding 
PNTL, and the increased F-FDTL operational tempo, are coming in 
advance of guidance that has yet to emerge from the Security 
Sector Review (SSR) - a major component of the UNMIT mandate. 
(Note: Of import is the fact that UNPOL currently has 
operational control over PNTL, and will continue to hold it 
until PNTL has been deemed to be sufficiently reconstituted. 
However, in light of what appears to be greater GOET reach into 
UNPOL's decision making, we could be seeing a repeat of a 
previous pattern of UN caving to increasing GOET pressure on 
policing issues.  In 2004, despite a specific schedule under the 
UN Mission in East Timor (UNMISET) for the handover of executive 
control of the police, and the UNPOL Commissioner's explicit 
advice against it, the UN accelerated the handover in response 
to pressure from Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and Minister of 
Interior Rogerio Lobato.  End Note.)  SRSG Khare told CDA on 
March 22 that the SSR is merely "at a state of procedure" and 
that "a steering group had yet to be constituted."  He went on 
to add that UNMIT has no mandate with regards to the F-FDTL, and 
that until the SSR is completed, UNMIT will continue to hold "no 
prerogative relative to what F-FDTL can or cannot do."  Khare 
added that substantive work on the SSR would not be conducted 
until after the elections, but added that it would be 
independent of the Ministry of Defense's Force 2020 White Paper 
for F-FDTL. 
 
11. (C/NF) Amid regular indications that UNPOL itself is 
increasingly unable to manage the security environment in Dili 
without the direct support provided by the ISF, Post is becoming 
more skeptical about  optimism regularly emanating from the 
SRSG's office.  A senior UNMIT source reported to Emboffs that 
the SRSG "has not once said no to the GOET," that Khare simply 
"does not want to believe the bad news which is increasingly 
surrounding him on a daily basis," and that there is a sense of 
desperation that is possibly shaping Khare's behavior.  This 
source also added that Khare "badly wants for this mission to 
succeed," but that he may be willing to not disclose bad news in 
 
DILI 00000119  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
order to give others the perception that UNMIT is going well. 
If Khare - like Tor - is in such a weak position relative to the 
GOET, and if his behavior has indeed devolved to a point where 
delusional attributes are being manifested, this too could be 
indicative of growing difficulties ahead, particularly as it 
relates to the relevance of UNMIT itself.  This attitude would 
be in contrast with the fact that Khare has in the past alluded 
to his desire to take a strong stance, in coordination with the 
diplomatic community, against any GOET push to normalize 
security sector operations before it was time.  (See reftels.) 
 
12. (C) SRSG Khare added that there would be no move on the 
Commission of Inquiry's recommendation for prosecution of Ruak, 
ex-Defense Minister Roque Rodrigues, and other senior F-FDTL 
leaders until after both the national elections have been 
finally contested, and Reinado had been brought into custody. 
 
Policy recommendations 
---------------------- 
 
13. (C) Post will continue to keep these matters on the front 
burner in our ongoing dialogue with UNMIT, the GOET, and 
diplomatic counterparts.  Additionally, both UNMIT and the GOET 
should understand that we regard both the expansion of F-FDTL 
operations in Dili and the rearming of PNTL as important policy 
decisions that cannot be regarded as routine operational calls. 
Post will ask to be consulted regarding such developments in the 
future, and will endeavor to bring as much of the diplomatic 
community on board within this context.  Also, Post will 
strongly support a credible Security Sector Review process, and 
regularly impart the importance and priority we place upon its 
role.  Lastly, Post should request upon a formalized way in 
which the donor and diplomatic communities be both consulted and 
informed on security sector matters, and on the progress of the 
Security Sector Review.  In addition, we will ask that the RSO 
be included in the weekly Security Operations Center updates 
which are currently limited to UN agencies. 
HARSHA