VZCZCXRO1683
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0196/01 0601306
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011306Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3040
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0335
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000196 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY IR IZ LE
SUBJECT: SYRIAN CONFIDENCE WAVERING? 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary:  In the aftermath of a visit to Tehran 
clouded by growing differences over Iraq and Lebanon, Bashar 
al-Asad's self-confidence stemming from foreign policy 
positions he believed were paying dividends may now be 
eroding.  Disappointments over the frictions with Iran, the 
apparent weakening of its allies in Lebanon, and the prospect 
of what it views as a military escalation in Iraq rather than 
a Baker-Hamilton-led diplomatic breakthrough, have left the 
Syrian regime a bit uncertain about where things are headed. 
The upcoming Arab summit, unfolding events in Lebanon in the 
coming months, and how they manage increasing problems for 
Syria from Iraq will provide tests for the Syrians that will 
help determine whether their confidence continues to falter 
or the regime rights itself and emerges emboldened once 
again.  Given its inherent cautiousness, the SARG is likely 
to maintain a confident public posture and avoid any sudden 
shifts in policy, regardless of how events play out, with the 
perhaps mistaken impression that time is on its side.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) DIFFERENCES EMERGING WITH IRAN: The February 17-18 
Bashar al-Asad visit to Tehran came at a pivotal time for 
Syria, raising questions about the apparently increasing 
areas of disagreement or at least differing emphases between 
the two countries, and at a sensitive time for Syria's 
relations with its neighbors in the region.  While Syria and 
Iran attempted to communicate a joint front during the visit, 
it seems clear that differences are emerging more than they 
have in the past year, in ways that are raising questions 
about whether Syria's regional position has weakened to some 
degree in the past five or six months. 
 
¶3.  (C) IRAQ MORE OF A PROBLEM THAN EXPECTED:  While Iran 
seems relatively satisfied with its close relations with the 
now-powerful Shiites in Iraq, it seems clear that for Syria, 
Iraq is becoming more of a problem than it expected.  Iraqi 
refugees, the presence in Syria of extremists supporting the 
Iraqi insurgency and harboring anti-Syrian regime sentiments, 
ascendant Shiite (and Iranian) power next door provoking a 
Sunni backlash in Syria, are all threats for the SARG.   At 
the same time, the SARG's efforts to work with the Ba'ath 
Party and to cultivate Iraqi tribal leaders (and other Sunni 
elements) have not brought much comfort to Bashar or met with 
great success.  The SARG also seems a bit frustrated that its 
re-embrace of Iraq -- with the opening of diplomatic 
relations and high-level discussions -- seems to have 
stalled.  The SARG finds itself in an increasingly difficult 
position with the Arab (and Sunni) world as it tries to 
proclaim its "Arabness" while appearing to be complicit in 
the expansion of Shiite and Iranian power in Iraq.  The SARG 
is also palpably disappointed that Baker-Hamilton did not 
lead, as it initially anticipated, to a great push for U.S. 
re-engagement with Syria, but rather towards what they view 
as a policy of military escalation in Iraq. 
 
¶4.  (C) DIVERGENT VIEWS ON LEBANON:  An even greater point of 
friction between the Syrians and Iranians is Lebanon.  Bashar 
worries that the Iranians and the Saudis will succeed in 
reaching a deal in Lebanon that undermines his so far 
inflexible position opposing the establishment of an 
international tribunal (and supporting the downfall of the 
Siniora government).  The Syrians seem concerned that the 
Iranian leadership does not share their paranoid fears about 
the tribunal.  (Comment:  Iran would likely view the Syrian 
position more sympathetically if it assessed that the UNIIIC 
investigation and the Hariri tribunal posed a threat to 
Hizballah.)  Syria views Hizballah as an instrument to be 
used to achieve SARG strategic aims and does not mind seeing 
it weakened internally if it helps Syria stop or 
significantly delay the tribunal and weakens the Siniora 
government.  Iran sees Hizballah as an instrument to project 
Shiite power in Lebanon and throughout the region and does 
not want to see it damaged to accomplish essentially 
parochial Syrian objectives such as stopping the tribunal, 
according to contacts.  With regard to the current impasse in 
Lebanon, Syria wants it to continue while Iran seems to be 
looking for ways to end a protest that has become 
increasingly unpopular in Lebanon -- and that it fears is 
being increasingly viewed as an essentially Shiite crusade -- 
in order to protect the political interests and future 
legitimacy of Hizballah (and preserve it for later use in its 
own disputes with the U.S.). 
 
¶5.  (C) The Syrians also view Hizballah as an instrument to 
maintain pressure on Israel with the objective of eventually 
 
DAMASCUS 00000196  002 OF 003 
 
 
regaining the Golan.  Once that objective is met, the Syrian 
view is that Hizballah is expendable.  The Iranians do not 
share that view, seeing Hizballah's long-term, ascendant 
presence in Lebanon as essential to helping them project 
regional Iranian power and maintaining a critical role for 
itself in the Israeli-Arab conflict.  While that divergent 
view on Lebanon and Hizballah has long been present in 
Syrian-Iranian calculations, disagreements over the tribunal 
increase the irritation factor. 
 
¶6.  (C) OTHER CHALLENGES IN THE REGION:  Apart from its 
Iranian alliance, the SARG, while publicly boasting that it 
is beating isolation, faces a minefield in its relations with 
others in the region.  Desperately seeking to rejoin the Arab 
world, the SARG still faces hostility from the Saudis 
(although Bashar did receive this week an invitation from 
King Abdullah to attend the late March Arab summit) and 
dismissiveness from the Egyptians, only heightened as an 
"anti-Iran" front gathers steam in the Arab world.  The SARG 
seems to have been initially troubled by the success of King 
Abdullah in wooing Hamas with the Mecca Agreement, although 
the diplomatic aftermath does not seem to have harmed 
longer-term Syrian interests in the Palestinian issue or 
changed the SARG's fundamental calculations, which may 
explain Syria's cautiously supportive reaction once the 
agreement was announced.  Also, at this stage, Syria would 
like to see some movement on any track of the peace process. 
On the other side of the ledger, relations with Turkey are 
good. In addition, Bashar's gambit with Israel seems to be 
paying off, with Bashar seeing himself as having firmly 
batted the ball into the Israeli court. 
 
¶7.  (C) EROSION IN SYRIA'S REGIONAL POSITION?:  At present it 
remains unclear to what degree Syria's regional position has 
eroded in the past five months.  Disappointment over the lack 
of any U.S. effort, post-Baker-Hamilton, to re-engage 
diplomatically on Iraq, emerging frictions with Iran, and 
fears that its hard-line position in Lebanon is being eroded 
by weakened allies there, all are raising the level of 
anxiety here, especially given the tremendous regime 
confidence in December and January that things were going 
their way in the all-important test of wills in Lebanon. 
There are several testing events in the coming few months 
that will make more clear whether Syria is emerging buoyed by 
the success of its intact hang-tough position, or if it has 
faltered and will seek to adopt more flexible positions as it 
adapts to evolving circumstances.  The Arab summit offers a 
good test for assessing how Syria's regional position has 
fared in the past six months.  If Bashar attends and is 
relatively warmly welcomed back into the Arab fold, the SARG 
will certainly feel vindicated. 
 
¶8.  (C) SYRIANS STILL BELIEVE TIME ON THEIR SIDE:  More 
significantly, if the SARG manages in these coming months to 
maintain the festering instability in Lebanon, it will likely 
feel bolstered.  (However, if that situation shows overly 
promising signs of improvement, the Syrians may administer 
"deniable" doses of political violence, to prevent any return 
to stability.)  On the other hand, any significant progress 
towards the establishment of the tribunal or publication of 
UNIIIC investigation results further implicating the regime 
will deeply rattle the regime.  If the U.S. military surge in 
Iraq in the coming months continues to face significant 
levels of violence, and the Malki government fails to 
establish a more effective presence, then Bashar is likely to 
feel that he can play "hard to get" on cooperation with the 
U.S. or the Malki government.  The more difficult 
relationship they are experiencing with the Iranians, who 
seem to have the upper hand at present, comes at a time when 
an anti-Iranian front is gathering steam in the Arab world (a 
world in which the Syrians see themselves a leader).  In the 
end, the Syrians remain confident that their assets -- key 
strategic location, ideological and political leadership of 
the pan-Arab and Palestinian rejectionist causes, and a 
valuable "Iraq card" that they believe can be played to forge 
a better relationship with the U.S. -- will eventually prove 
their value and allow them to re-calibrate the relationship 
with Iran in ways more favorable to their interests.  For 
now, despite any momentary doubts, the Syrians do not seem to 
have fundamentally changed any of their basic calculations 
and continue to believe, perhaps mistakenly, that time is on 
their side. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DAMASCUS 00000196  003 OF 003 
 
 
CORBIN