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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6899
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0705
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 3670
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2750
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 7471
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 5187
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0125
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1857
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS AND SCA PDAS MANN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: SCENESETTER FOR SCA PDAS MANN'S VISIT 
TO COLOMBO 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b, d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Your visit to Colombo comes at a critical time. 
There is a substantial risk of a return to fighting in the 
east and north in the next few weeks.  Prospects are 
uncertain that the ruling Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) 
will present a viable devolution proposal to the All-Party 
Representative Committee that could form the basis for a new 
round of negotiations.  Embassy efforts have made a 
difference in the humanitarian situation in places like 
Jaffna, but we have not yet been able to effect an 
improvement in the government's human rights record.  Your 
meetings with government officials are an invaluable 
opportunity for us to reinforce the messages agreed on by 
Co-Chair Ambassadors.  You will also have the chance to reach 
out to the media and the general public in your press 
conference. 
 
DETERIORATING SITUATION ON SEVERAL FRONTS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The situation has deteriorated in Sri Lanka since 
your last visit, and that of Assistant Secretary Boucher. 
Casualties of GSL soldiers, LTTE cadres, and innocent 
civilians caught in the crossfire have been rising with the 
uptick in hostilities.  Many foreign tourists and investors, 
understandably alarmed, are staying away from Sri Lanka. 
Abductions and kidnappings by paramilitary organizations 
(such as the Karuna group, or TMVP, and the Eelam People's 
Democratic Party of Social Affairs Minister Devananda), 
criminal gangs, and by government security forces, are also 
on the rise.  Sri Lankans, like the international community, 
are deeply concerned about the climate of fear that now 
prevails in the country. 
 
¶3.  (C) While we perceive no direct threat from the LTTE to 
Americans or westerners in general, there is a risk that 
someone could find himself in the wrong place at the wrong 
time.  This nearly happened to Ambassador Blake on February 
27, when a delegation he was traveling with to Batticaloa 
came under an LTTE mortar attack. 
 
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT: 
WORTH THE PAPER IT'S PRINTED ON 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The 2002 Cease-fire Agreement between the Government 
of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) has been unraveling by degrees.  Both sides bear 
responsibility for numerous, and increasingly serious, CFA 
violations.  However, it is the new aggressiveness of the 
government forces, who have been capturing territory in the 
East from the LTTE, that has increased the likelihood of one 
side or the other withdrawing from the CFA.  It would only 
take a letter to the Norwegian Foreign Minister, giving two 
weeks' notice, to do so.  Thus far the government remains 
committed to the CFA. 
 
GOVERNMENT PLANS TO TAKE WAR TO NORTH 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Officially, the President and senior Ministers 
continue to tell us that they support a negotiated solution 
to the conflict, while insisting rightly on Sri Lanka's right 
to defend itself.  But there are numerous indications that 
the military intends to pursue the military campaign into the 
Tiger's northern stronghold, once they finish remaining 
operations in the east.  Polls show continued strong support 
in the President's political base in the south for pursuing 
the military option.  If such an expanded military push does 
take place, the most likely time frame would be in the 
northeastern dry season of April to August, when weather 
 
COLOMBO 00000350  002 OF 004 
 
 
conditions would be more favorable to the government forces. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Embassy continues to say publicly and privately, 
however, that there can be no military solution to the 
conflict.  Most of our sources, including the Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission, believe that the government may be 
underestimating the Tigers' residual capability.  Even if 
government forces were able to occupy the entire territory of 
the country, including the northern LTTE stronghold of the 
Vanni, the LTTE could probably carry on indefinitely as an 
underground guerrilla force and terrorist organization and 
inflict considerable damage in all parts of the country. 
 
¶7.  (C) While it is no doubt true that in some sense the CFA 
now exists only on paper, it still serves a useful purpose in 
limiting the level, extent and nature of the escalating 
violence.  Negotiating a new one following the Government's 
military victories in the East would not be practical.  There 
is growing domestic political pressure on the government to 
withdraw from the agreement.  We need to urge the GSL not to 
do so. 
 
POLITICAL MANEUVERING ENDANGERS "SOUTHERN CONSENSUS" 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Large sectors of the Sri Lankan population, as well 
as the international community, had invested a great deal of 
hope in the prospect of a "Southern consensus" on a peace 
proposal based on the devolution of power to Sri Lanka's 
regions.   However, the President decided not to implement 
the MoU between his SLFP and the opposition United National 
Party, preferring to accept 18 "crossovers" from the UNP into 
the already-bloated cabinet to assure himself a new 
parliamentary majority.  The UNP denounced the move and 
withdrew from the MoU, but UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe 
has assured us that his party will continue to support a 
reasonable devolution proposal as the foundation of a renewed 
peace process. 
 
¶9.  (C) We and the other Co-Chairs, plus India, are pressing 
the Government to come up as soon as possible with a 
power-sharing proposal that meets the aspirations of the 
Tamil people, and those of other communities, that could form 
the basis for renewed talks with the LTTE.  We believe, at a 
minimum, that the proposals should exceed in scope those that 
the SLFP put forward under President Kumaratunga in 2000. 
However, while the President has often spoken of "maximum 
devolution," it remains unclear whether he is willing to 
accept a true power-sharing arrangement.  His pre-election 
platform, Mahinda Chintana ("Mahinda's Thoughts"), is 
explicit in its endorsement of a unitary state and its 
rejection of federalism. 
 
¶10.  (C) The President told Ambassador Blake that he supports 
the development of a credible devolution proposal that would 
meet the aspirations of moderate Tamils.  Key figures in his 
Cabinet such as the Foreign Minister and influential UNP 
crossovers such as Trade Minister Peiris and Tourism Minister 
Moragoda continue to assure us they believe the President 
remains committed to this course. 
 
¶11. (C) Others are not so sure.  The ad-hoc committee of the 
ruling Sri Lankan Freedom Party tasked with developing ideas 
for the All-Party Representative Committee (APRC) is 
reportedly working ideas that would significantly dilute the 
Vitharana report.  Anything that represents less than what 
former President Chandrika Kumaratunga proposed in 2000 
(which was rejected at that time by the parliament) is 
unlikely to be viable as the basis for a negotiated 
settlement.  This would be a serious setback for the peace 
process.  It will be important for you to urge all your 
interlocutors to have the SLFP and UNP work together within 
 
COLOMBO 00000350  003 OF 004 
 
 
the APRC to ensure that the consensus document that emerges 
from the APRC exceeds the 2000 Kumaratunga proposal. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS: 
FIGHTING THE "CULTURE OF IMPUNITY" 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The GSL barely bothers to deny any more that the 
security forces are involved in extrajudicial 
"disappearances" ) and worse.  While there are ministers, 
such as Human Rights Minister Samarasinghe, who clearly want 
to do the right thing and are disturbed by these reports, 
they are not the ones who wield clout on security policy. 
Defense Secretary Rajapaksa and the security establishment 
appear convinced that they will need to roll up networks of 
LTTE agents and sympathizers in the government-controlled 
south to win the fight against the Tigers, and that this 
justifies the use of extralegal methods.  They have not yet 
been swayed by the argument ) which we have made repeatedly 
) that a democratically elected government must hold itself 
to a higher standard than that employed by a terrorist 
organization.  We have also noted that these tactics can 
backfire, creating more sympathy for the Tigers and driving 
even moderate Tamils into their arms. 
 
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY AND INTERNATIONAL PANEL 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) An ad-hoc group of countries (U.S., UK, Canada, 
Australia, Netherlands, India and the EU), following a green 
light be UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour, 
has appointed members to an International Independent Group 
of Eminent Persons, or IIGEP, to assist the national 
Commission of Inquiry (CoI) on Human Rights established by 
President Rajapaksa.  This is perhaps the best chance for the 
international community to help bring some accountability 
into GSL human rights practices and help clear up some of the 
most reprehensible cases of violations by both the GSL and 
the LTTE. 
 
¶14.  (C) Unfortunately, there are signs that the Attorney 
General's office is attempting to hamstring both the CoI and 
the IIGEP.  American representative Gene Dewey has joined his 
international colleagues in trying to push back to establish 
a clear and robust mandate for the Commission and the 
international panel to carry out their work.  The Ambassador 
has said publicly and privately that while we welcome the 
important work of the COI, the GSL must also take concrete 
action to stop the disappearances, abductions and killings, 
and prosecute those responsible.  If the GSL continues to 
stiff-arm the international community, the UN already has 
begun a dialogue with the GSL to deploy international human 
rights monitors.  We should also be prepared to support a 
strong statement in the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. 
 
 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 
---------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Sri Lanka's gross domestic product grew by an 
estimated 7 percent in 2006 to about $27.4 billion, or about 
$1,375 per capita.  The telecommunications, ports, 
construction, and agriculture sectors are all healthy.  This 
rapid growth rate was accompanied by double digit inflation 
and the depreciation of the Sri Lankan Rupee, however, as the 
government borrowed heavily to finance deficit spending on 
military and social programs.  So far, the erosion of 
consumer purchasing power has not become a political issue. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Both the government and major businesses in 
Colombo are counting on Sri Lanka's "resilience" to insulate 
the economy from events involving the conflict. 
 
COLOMBO 00000350  004 OF 004 
 
 
Historically, this has been true, but if the LTTE were to 
successfully attack a major economic target, as they did with 
the airport in 2001, they could drag the economy down 
significantly. 
 
¶17.  (C) With this in mind, Post has been encouraging 
business leaders to more actively press the government to 
pursue a peaceful solution to the conflict.  Businesspeople 
agree with us that a resolution must be political, not 
military, but they have been timid about saying so publicly. 
They fear repercussions ) either from the government viewing 
such statements as criticism or from ultranationalists 
charging them with being unpatriotic.  In your discussions 
with the government, you could emphasize that peaceful 
resolution of the conflict could unlock significant economic 
growth potential in the north and the east, which would 
contribute greatly to the Mahinda Chintana goal of reducing 
poverty and speeding development. 
 
PUSHING CO-CHAIR AGENDA: BACK TO BASICS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (C) We are seeking appointments for you with the 
President, Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona (also chair of 
the GSL Peace Secretariat, SCOPP), Defense Secretary 
Gothabaya Rajapaksa, and Treasury Secretary P.B. Jayasundera. 
 Foreign Minister Bogollagama will be in the UK March 7-9, 
but will likely host a dinner for you on March 10.  We should 
use your meetings to reinforce the points agreed with the 
Co-Chair Ambassadors in Colombo: 
 
o  Sri Lanka has an important opportunity now to achieve 
peace. 
 
o  Hope the SLFP and the APRC will develop as rapidly as 
possible a credible power-sharing proposal that will be 
acceptable to moderate Tamils and India and will exceed in 
scope the SLFP proposals put forward by President Kumaratunga 
in 2000. 
 
o  We welcome the beginning of the work by the Commission of 
Inquiry and a group of eminent persons.  To be effective, 
both bodies must be permitted to undertake their work in an 
independent and impartial manner. 
 
o  The Government of Sri Lanka must take concrete actions now 
to address growing human rights abuses in Sri Lanka.  In 
particular, killings, abductions and kidnappings must stop. 
 
o   The government must also stop the illegal activities of 
the Karuna group and take rapid measures to re-establish 
Government control of law and order in the East. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) For your press conference in March 9, we should 
take the line: 
 
o   The U.S. and the other Co-Chairs believe the conflict can 
only be solved through a negotiated settlement that takes 
into account the legitimate interests and aspirations of all 
communities, whether Sinhalese, Tamil, or Muslim. 
 
o   We believe Sri Lanka now has an important opportunity to 
develop a power-sharing proposal that could form the basis 
for renewed talks with the LTTE.  We hope the SLFP and the 
UNP will work together within the APRC to fashion a proposal 
that will meet the needs of the Tamil and other communities. 
 
o   We should again call on the LTTE to renounce terrorism, 
give up violence, and join in negotiating a peaceful solution 
to Sri Lanka's conflict that will satisfy the aspirations of 
all the country's people. 
BLAKE