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DE RUEHCV #0667/01 0891803
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R 301803Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8264
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000667 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR KLINGENSMITH AND NGRANT 
COMMERCE FOR 4431/MAC/WH/MCAMERON 
NSC FOR DTOMLINSON 
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
ENERGY FOR CDAY, DPUMPHREY, AND ALOCKWOOD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN EPET VEN
SUBJECT: PDVSA'S MEGA USD 5 BILLION BOND ISSUE 
 
REF: A. 05 CARACAS 2596 
 
     ¶B. CARACAS 183 
     ¶C. CARACAS 305 
     ¶D. CARACAS 448 
     ¶E. CARACAS 493 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On April 12 PDVSA is scheduled to issue USD 
5 billion in debt.  This bond sale represents the largest 
issuance of debt in Venezuelan history, and one of the 
largest for emerging markets.  The bonds are 
dollar-denominated Eurobonds and will almost certainly be 
resold by most local buyers in secondary markets outside 
Venezuela to obtain dollars.  The announcement has driven the 
parallel market rate down from nearly Bs 4000/USD to around 
Bs 3500/USD.  The low yield and inherent risks associated 
with these bonds means that buyers do not have the guaranteed 
return they did with the previous "bonos del sur" sale.  The 
issuance size, in today's high oil-price environment, points 
clearly to Chavez' reliance on PDVSA as the BRV,s cash cow, 
and to how little freedom PDVSA has had to invest in its own 
operations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) After months of speculation, Minister of Popular 
Power for Energy and Petroleum (MPPEP) Ramirez announced on 
March 22 that PDVSA would issue USD 5 billion in bonds in the 
coming weeks.  The bonds, a combination of three securities 
with maturity dates of 2017, 2027, and 2037 and yields of 
5.25 percent, 5.37 percent and 5.50 percent, respectively, 
are scheduled to be allocated on April 2 and issued on April 
¶12.  The minimum purchase is USD 1000, which provides USD 400 
worth of bonds maturing in 2017, USD 400 maturing in 2027, 
and USD 200 maturing in 2037.  These Eurobonds are dollar 
denominated and pay interest and principal in dollars.  They 
will be sold locally at 105.5 percent of face value at the 
official exchange rate (Bs 2150/USD) and are tax-free in 
Venezuela.  The lead bank is ABN AMRO, and the bonds will 
initially be quoted on the Luxembourg exchange.  The bonds 
are not registered with the SEC and thus cannot be traded 
within the United States until 40 days after issuance. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The bond issuance is ostensibly to "stimulate 
internal savings through a secure investment for Venezuelans 
and their direct participation in the petroleum industry," 
though most purchasers are surely more interested in 
obtaining dollars to get their money to a safe harbor outside 
of Venezuela, rather than participating in the local 
petroleum industry.  PDVSA has been accruing substantial debt 
lately; having also recently obtained USD 1 billion in 
financing from BNP Paribas (reftel C) and USD 3.5 billion 
from a consortium of Japanese groups (reftel D).  Ramirez 
announced that the offering would be targeted at "small 
investors, workers' saving accounts, pension funds, medium 
investors, companies, and large investors."  (COMMENT: While 
running the gambit of anyone potentially having funds to 
purchase a bond in Venezuela, it also calls into question 
whether pension funds or savings accounts should hold junk 
bonds.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) Standard and Poors and Fitch Ratings both rate the 
issuance at BB- (barely junk status).  Given the low yield 
offered by these bonds, they will trade at a discount to face 
value.  The economic daily "Reporte" estimates that discounts 
will range from 81 percent of face value (2017) to 73 percent 
(2027) to 70 percent (2037), which gives the aggregate a 
trading discount of 76 percent of face value (read: a USD 
1000 bond will be resold for USD 760).  Combining the sale 
price, commissions, and eventual discount when sold abroad 
yields an exchange rate value of Bs 3044/USD.  JP Morgan 
estimates a slightly lower discount of 78.6 percent of face 
value.  In general, analyst estimates of the implicit rate 
based on the eventual discount range between 2900 and 3200 
bolivars/dollar.  The current parallel market rate is 
hovering around Bs 3500/USD, demonstrating that an arbitrage 
potential exists, though one no where near the size of the 
"bonos del sur" issuance, which cost around Bs 2800/USD 
during a time when the parallel rate was nearly Bs 4000/USD 
(reftel E). 
 
¶5. (SBU) The parallel market for dollars has fallen since the 
announcement from Bs 4000/USD to Bs 3500/USD.  Unlike the 
 
CARACAS 00000667  002 OF 003 
 
 
recent "bonos del sur" issuance, it seems likely that the 
PDSVA bonds will, at least temporarily, meet some of the 
foreign exchange needs in the Venezuelan economy.  The 
Commission for the Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(CADIVI) approvals shot up from an average of around USD 90 
million daily in 2006 to USD 142 million daily in January to 
USD 166 million a day in February (though in March are 
running closer to the average of USD 90 million daily) and 
this may have also relieved pressure on the parallel market. 
Additionally, it is tax season in Venezuela and many wealthy 
Venezuelans are converting dollars back into bolivars in 
order to pay their income tax obligations. 
 
¶6. (SBU) 500,000 Venezuelans and Venezuelan companies have 
applied for an allocation and similar to the "bonos del sur," 
many investors are submitting multiple requests using 
identity documents from friends and co-workers.  One 
brokerage contact estimated that the ten brokers in her 
office had together submitted 1,600 requests just for 
themselves.  The President of a local multinational bank 
estimated that individuals could receive as much as USD 
10,000 each and corporations as much as USD 150,000.  These 
amounts would not be sufficient for corporations looking to 
repatriate profits or obtain dollars for commercial-scale 
imports.  The Ministry of Popular Power for Finance (MPPF) 
has already announced that it is planning a third round of 
the "bonos del sur" and PDVSA has hinted that it may issue 
more debt this year.  By providing outlets to dollars, these 
issuances have a guaranteed market within Venezuela, but at 
some point the demand for Venezuelan debt in secondary 
markets may be met, at which point the value of using these 
bonds to get dollars will be offset by the heavy discount 
required to unload them outside of Venezuela. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Another BRV claim is that this issuance will work to 
soak up excess liquidity and combat Venezuela's high 
inflation, which has been over 20 percent during the past 12 
months.  While the bonds will temporarily remove USD 5 
billion worth of bolivars from the Venezuelan economy, they 
will likely return to the economy in the form of PDVSA 
spending.  PDVSA has said that it will convert the bolivar 
proceeds to dollars through the Central Bank (BCV) and then 
use those dollars to fund investment purchases abroad.  This 
would prevent the money from reentering the Venezuelan 
economy, but we judge it to be unlikely.  Almost all of 
PDVSA's revenues are already in dollars, so it should have no 
need for more dollars.  In addition, by converting PDVSA's 
bolivar proceeds to dollars, the BCV will be depleting 
Venezuela's foreign exchange reserves by USD 5 billion (or 
over 15 percent) overnight at the same time that the BCV is 
supposed to be transferring an additional USD 4-5 billion to 
the National Development Fund (FONDEN), severely crimping its 
ability to manage the money supply and interest rates. 
 
¶8. (SBU) PDVSA claims that this money is needed for 
investment as part of its "Plan Siembra Petrolera" (reftel 
A), which intends to invest USD 70 billion to double 
Venezuela's oil production by 2012.  A more likely scenario 
is that this money will be used to pay current PDVSA 
obligations, rather than fund future investment.  There are 
increasing signs that PDVSA is having cash flow problems 
(reftel B) in view of its huge social spending obligations. 
Many sources confirm that PDVSA has had trouble paying its 
bills lately.  In addition, its liabilities are growing. 
PDVSA will pay about USD 840 million to nationalize the 
Caracas and Margarita Island electrical utilities and will 
need to compensate the companies in the Faja who will be 
converted to 60-40 joint ventures on May 1.  Contacts have 
also told us that PDVSA will use the proceeds to pay its 
joint venture partners in the former Operating Service 
Agreement fields. 
 
¶9. (SBU) COMMENT: The PDVSA bond issuance had been expected 
since the end of 2006, but the timing nonetheless seemed a 
little rushed (taking place in the middle of Holy Week when 
most Venezuelans will be on vacation).  PDVSA has not 
published audited financial results for 2006; each time it 
does produce financial information, the information tends to 
contradict earlier published data.  By not registering with 
the SEC, PDVSA avoids having to provide a lot of 
 
CARACAS 00000667  003 OF 003 
 
 
documentation it may not be able to produce.  The cash flow 
problems that are plaguing PDSVA in part stem from its 
massive obligations to the state (which totaled as much as 
USD 39 billion in 2006) and a lack of financial controls. 
Despite claims that the debt issuance is destined for 
investment (which is woefully lacking), our expectation is 
that most of the money will be used to pay off current 
liabilities.  Given Chavez's insatiable appetite for spending 
and PDVSA's role as the cash cow for that appetite, it seems 
likely that further loans and debt issuances will occur if 
only to keep feeding the beast.  With the USD 5 billion in 
new debt, PDVSA's debt load will increase to about USD 12 
billion, which remains quite manageable for a company that 
had over USD 100 billion in revenues in 2006.  END COMMENT. 
 
BROWNFIELD