VZCZCXRO2767
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBY #0329/01 0610734
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020734Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7006
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 2315
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0169
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE PRIORITY 3910
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH PRIORITY 2339
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY 1934
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0696
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0041
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0486

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000329 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP AND SA 
PACOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA WANTS ADDITIONAL FORCES FOR AFGHANISTAN 
TO OPERATE UNDER U.S. VICE DUTCH COMMAND 
 
REF: A. CANBERRA 293 
 
     ¶B. CANBERRA 196 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor James F. Cole, for reasons 1.4 (a),( 
b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: On February 28, we received a briefing 
from Australian Defence Force (ADF) CMDR Jonathan Sadlier and 
Australian Department of Defence (ADOD) Afghanistan Section 
Assistant Director Malcolm Brailey, which provided additional 
information about the proposed Australian troop increase in 
Afghanistan (Ref A).  Contrary to the impression provided in 
an earlier briefing (Ref A), Sadlier indicated that the GOA 
was inclined to have the Australian Special Operations Task 
Group (SOTG) operate in Oruzgan Province under the U.S.-led 
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), rather 
than under Dutch command in NATO/ISAF.  Despite Dutch 
opposition to the plan, the Australians feel that placing 
their SOTG under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) command and 
control would, among other benefits, allow them to take a 
more aggressive posture against the Taliban during the spring 
offensive.  Sadlier cautioned that the ADF was still in a 
"reconnaissance" phase regarding its plans for Afghanistan, 
and that the Cabinet would not make a final decision until 
late March.  Australia will be looking to the U.S. for some 
enablers, such as helicopter support.  End Summary. 
 
ADF WANTS TO BE AGGRESSIVE, BUT ISAF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TOO 
LIMITED 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶2.  (S/NF) Sadlier stated that, while no decision had been 
made, the ADF was leaning towards operating under OEF command 
and control, and specifically under CJSOTF, rather than under 
the Dutch-led PRT of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF).  According to Sadlier, the ADF's desire to work 
under CJSOTF was brought about by three main issues: a lack 
of access within ISAF to enablers that the SOTG considered 
critical; ISAF's restrictive Rules of Engagement that 
necessitated a defensive, rather than offensive posture; and 
an expected Dutch drawdown in mid-2008. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) While the Australians have previously declared 
their overall satisfaction about working with the Dutch in 
Oruzgan, they have repeatedly expressed frustration that the 
Dutch were focused on reconstruction and were not being 
pro-active militarily in the province (Ref B).  Sadlier 
reiterated this frustration, and expressed Australia's deep 
concern about the expected Taliban spring offensive.  By 
operating under OEF, he stated, the ADF would be able to take 
a more aggressive posture against the Taliban. 
 
DUTCH OPPOSED TO PLAN 
--------------------- 
¶4.  (S/NF) The Government of the Netherlands has expressed 
its opposition to the ADF's plan for a SOTG under CJSOTF 
command in Oruzgan during meetings with the Australian Vice 
Chief of the Defence Force in The Hague this week.  The Dutch 
DCM also called on DCM Clune to express concern with the 
plan.  According to Sadlier, the Dutch feel that it would be 
inefficient to have troops in Oruzgan operating under two 
different commands.  He stated that the Dutch have had 
problems in the past with U.S. Special Operations Forces not 
providing the Dutch with sufficient information about their 
operations in Oruzgan, and that the Dutch feared a similar 
problem with the Australian SOTG.  Sadlier commented that, 
given the close working relationship between the Dutch and 
Australians in Oruzgan, this was unlikely to be as much of an 
issue.  Sadlier also told us that, off the record, some Dutch 
military had expressed understanding about the ADF's desire 
to operate under a command and control structure that is less 
restrictive than ISAF's. 
 
DECISION BY END OF MARCH 
------------------------ 
¶5.  (S/NF) The ADF proposal for the SOTG is expected to be 
formally submitted to Cabinet on March 26.  Sadlier expected 
 
CANBERRA 00000329  002 OF 002 
 
 
that the actual deployment would occur very quickly 
thereafter.  They will likely need to request some enablers 
from the United States, such as helicopter support, air and 
fire support, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and satellite 
communications. 
 
MCCALLUM