VZCZCXRO5576
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0865/01 0851448
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261448Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4254
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000865 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2017 
TAGS: PREL ARABL KPAL MEPN IZ GZ LE EG
SUBJECT: A/S WELCH'S MARCH 20 MEETING WITH ARAB LEAGUE 
SECRETARY GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY DCM STUART JONES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) In a March 20 meeting with NEA Assistant Secretary 
Welch, Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa discussed 
the upcoming Arab summit and Arab-Israeli peace issues. 
Welch pressed Moussa for ideas on how to help Israel and the 
Palestinians get back to the negotiating table.  Welch urged 
Moussa to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the 
Arab Summit to show leadership and, specifically, to improve 
upon the 2002 Beirut Arab Peace Initiative (API).  While 
interested in improving both the content and "marketing" of 
the initiative, Moussa believed such steps unlikely absent 
meaningful Israeli moves to improve the atmosphere.  Moussa 
suggested that an emergency AL session was being considered 
should present U.S. efforts to resuscitate the peace process 
fall short.  On Iraq, Moussa emphasized the positive nature 
of the League's latest ministerial resolution on the topic, 
and cautioned the U.S. not to focus too heavily on security 
at the expense the political process.  On Lebanon, Moussa 
committed to continued mediation efforts to end the current 
crisis, but warned that the situation was becoming more 
difficult and that time was running out to find acceptable 
compromises to the present impasse.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) A/S Welch was joined in the meeting by the 
Ambassador, Deputy Legal Advisor Jonathan Schwartz, NEA 
Senior Advisor Gamal Helal, and Embassy poloff (note-taker). 
Moussa was joined by AL Chief of Staff Hisham Youssef, 
Cabinet staff member Talal Elamine, and Spokesman Alaa Rushdy. 
 
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Israel/Palestine 
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¶3.  (C) A/S Welch began by describing the near-term political 
calendar on Arab-Israeli peace issues, including several of 
his own visits to the region, and those of the Secretary to 
meet with Arab Quartet members and later with the 
International Quartet.  This high degree of focus and 
engagement reflected President Bush's and the Secretary's 
deep commitment to resolving the region's conflicts.  Welch 
asked Moussa to describe what the League hoped to accomplish 
during its March 28-29 summit in Riyadh, urging a more 
forward-leaning stance on the League's 2002 Beirut Arab Peace 
Initiative (API). 
 
¶4.  (C) Moussa touted the API as a fair starting point, and 
complained that Washington was pressing the Arabs to be more 
conciliatory, but was not pressing the Israelis.  Meanwhile, 
Israel continued to send more and more "negative" messages 
such as its continued settlement expansions and separation 
barrier construction, its excavations at the Temple 
Mount/al-Aqsa Mosque, and its rejection of contacts with the 
new Palestinian national unity government (NUG).  Moussa 
asserted that a proactive Arab approach on the API was 
impossible without a "serious" and "fair" counter offer from 
the Israeli side (i.e., "a door for a door").  When the 
Israelis are ready, he said, the U.S. must serve as broker in 
the process.  Moussa emphasized the importance of getting the 
sides back to the negotiating table and said he could accept 
meetings of an expanded Quartet "i.e., Quartet-plus" in lieu 
of an "international conference."  Moussa noted that if the 
current round of U.S.-led multilateral diplomacy came up 
short, the League was already considering holding an 
emergency summit or ministerial session to address the 
Palestinian issue. 
 
¶5.  (C) Returning to the Arab peace initiative, Welch pressed 
Moussa hard to explain why the Arabs had been completely 
silent in public about their own initiative.  He also sought 
an explanation why the Arabs had not yet sat down with the 
Israelis and directly addressed their questions on the 
initiative directly with them.  Moussa replied that such 
interaction meant implicit recognition and normalization with 
Israel, despite failure by Israel to take positive steps in 
the direction of the Arabs' collective and "fair" position. 
"We won't sit together with them to socialize: if they have 
something to offer, we'll sit with them."  The USG needed to 
assume the role of broker to get the peace process back on 
track.  Welch and delegation also discussed the precise 
wording and political significance of PM Haniyeh's March 16 
speech to announce the NUG's creation.  Moussa's analysis was 
that the speech was a "major step" in the right direction by 
Haniyeh and Hamas, and something that should be welcomed and 
built upon. 
 
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Iraq 
 
CAIRO 00000865  002 OF 002 
 
 
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¶6.  (C) Moussa agreed with A/S Welch that "now is the time to 
achieve something concrete" in Iraq, saying Arab and U.S. 
interests are now aligned.  He emphasized a March 3 AL 
Council of Ministers Iraq resolution as a "unanimous" 
agreement to support present plans to restore stability to 
the country and help the U.S. ("and us") to get out of the 
present mess there.  A focus on security issues alone is 
insufficient, he argued.  There must also be a focus on 
political issues.  And, "we must hold the Maliki government 
accountable" for progress on the political front.  While the 
situation in Iraq is a catastrophe, he said, "we are well 
disposed to cooperate" to help improve the situation there. 
 
¶7.  (C) Welch shared the USG impression that the March 10 
Baghdad meeting of Iraq's neighbors went well and was 
conducted in a professional manner by the Iraqis.  While it 
became clear at the meeting that the Syrians wanted to talk 
more with the U.S., the Iranians were afraid.  The U.S. 
position on the regional meetings is flexible, and designed 
to support the Iraqi government. 
 
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Lebanon 
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¶8.  (C) Moussa said that the political situation in Lebanon 
was becoming "more difficult."  Recent talks between Nabih 
Berri and Saad Hariri appeared to have "not produced much." 
Lebanon, he said, would be discussed on the margins of the 
Arab summit, or behind closed doors, but no breakthroughs 
were expected.  New issues, he said - "even more difficult to 
resolve than the tribunal or government formation" - will 
"creep up" and make the situation even worse.  Moussa cited 
the upcoming selection of a replacement for President Lahoud 
as an example.  We are trying to help, he asserted, though 
time is running out. 
 
¶9.  (C) Welch described U.S. thinking on Lebanon, emphasizing 
the importance of preventing Syria from gutting the 
international tribunal and further undermining Lebanese 
sovereignty.  Washington will also support whatever 
resolution the Lebanese themselves agreed to on formation of 
a new Cabinet, consistent with Lebanese democracy. 
 
¶10.  (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Welch. 
RICCIARDONE