VZCZCXYZ0016
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DE RUEHJB #0237/01 0891237
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301237Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0185
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUJUMBURA 000237 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/S; PRETORIA FOR T. TRENKEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PINR BY SF
SUBJECT: BURUNDI CEASE FIRE AT CRITICAL JUNCTURE 
 
REF: PRETORIA 1077 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Ann Breiter for Reasons 1.4 (B) and 
(D.) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Burundi's cease fire agreement with the 
rebel PALIPEHUTU-FNL has stalled.  Visiting South African 
analyst Jan van Eck (protect) warned that the accord could 
collapse because the South African facilitators had assured 
the FNL that certain outstanding issues could be discussed 
in Bujumbura following the September signing.  Van Eck 
claimed, however, that the facilitators never obtained the 
Government of Burundi's (GOB's) assent to this plan.  Van 
Eck feared that this revelation might prompt the FNL to 
leave the negotiating table.  South Africa's Ambassador to 
Burundi (protect) disputed this claim, but he acknowledged 
that on March 26, the FNL categorically refused to continue 
discussions until the GOB met its concerns.  Clearly 
annoyed, the Ambassador implied that Van Eck's discussions 
with the FNL may have prompted the party to take a harder 
line.  For his part, Van Eck plans to travel to Dar es 
Salaam on March 31 to meet with FNL leaders there and 
return to Burundi early in the week.  Van Eck also 
expressed concern that FNL chief Agathon Rwasa's personal 
credibility within his party could be at stake.  End 
Summary. 
 
Two Conflicting Stories 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Burundi's fragile cease fire agreement with the 
rebel PALIPEHUTU-FNL may be on the verge of failure, warned 
South African analyst Jan van Eck (protect) on March 29. 
The FNL signed the September cease fire agreement after 
intense pressure from the facilitators, said Van Eck, 
because the facilitators assured the FNL that they would be 
able to negotiate certain key points, including terms of 
political participation,  after the signing.  However, 
newly-elected CNDD-FDD party President Jeremie 
Ngendakumana, who participated in the peace talks in Dar es 
Salaam for a time, told Van Eck on March 29 that the 
Government of Burundi (GOB) never agreed to continue talks, 
and that the facilitators never broached the possibility of 
such an arrangement with the GOB.  Burundi's government has 
steadfastly maintained that it will not reconsider the 
terms of the September 8, 2006, agreement. 
 
¶3.  (C) According to Van Eck, Ngendakumana expressed shock 
at Van Eck's report that the FNL had agreed to sign only on 
condition that the two sides would continue to negotiate 
certain key points.  In Van Eck's presence, Ngendakumana 
immediately telephoned South African Ambassador to Burundi 
Mdu Lembede to seek confirmation of the report.  Ambassador 
Lembede apparently tacitly confirmed Van Eck's version of 
events, according to Van Eck.  Van Eck surmised that, in 
the runup to the agreement, the facilitators may have 
"forgotten" to advise the Government of Burundi of the 
proposal.  He feared that, once FNL leaders learned of the 
apparent disconnect, they could question the good faith not 
only of the GOB, but also of the facilitators 
themselves. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ambassador Lembede hotly contested this version of 
events, telling Charge on March 30 that when the FNL signed 
the cease fire agreement in Dar in September, they 
continued to insist upon additional discussions on four 
outstanding issues: the rewriting of  Burundi's history; 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; the identification 
and location of assembly areas for former combatants; and 
FNL participation in the government.  The parties discussed 
these concerns in Dar for over six hours before agreeing 
that they would be more appropriately discussed in 
Bujumbura.  Lembede reminded Charge that he had personally 
participated in the talks in Dar and thus knew what was 
said. 
 
¶5.  (C) Ambassador Lembede continued that when President 
Nkurunziza met with FNL leader Agathon Rwasa in Dar es 
Salaam in September, Nkurunziza plainly stated that given 
the provisions of Burundi's Constitution, he could not 
guarantee that FNL members could obtain specific positions 
in the government.  Once FNL leaders are demobilized, the 
government could advise the party of those government 
positions which were available, and FNL members could 
compete for those jobs based on their skills and merit. 
 
¶6.  (C) Lembede acknowledged, however, that the 
implementation process has come to a standstill.  Certain 
of the FNL's most recent demands, he said, would be very 
difficult to meet.  For example, continued the Ambassador, 
the FNL has asked the government to release all political 
prisoners before they continue discussions; however, the 
government could not simply open the doors of all Burundi's 
prisons.  Instead, the release would require a defined 
process. 
 
¶7.  (C) The mandate of the Joint Verification Monitoring 
Mechanism is to implement the cease fire, continued 
Lembede, but the process could not succeed without the 
cooperation of the FNL.  Ambassador Lembede lamented that 
the FNL representatives still remain outside the 
negotiating process and are obliged to consult with their 
senior leaders by telephone in order to make decisions. 
Lembede added that he could not understand the FNL's 
continued absence; as long as the FNL remains outside the 
process, there will be no movement.  Unfortunately, opined 
the Ambassador, Burundi's government is no longer focusing 
on the cease fire agreement because it is consumed with 
other, more pressing problems.  He concluded that both 
parties must exhibit political will in order for the 
agreement to succeed.  The South African facilitators 
planned to meet with a technical team in Cape Town on March 
30 to review ways in which to reinvigorate the 
discussions.  However, Ambassador Lembede warned that 
ultimately, if the two sides could not resolve their 
differences sufficiently to implement the agreement, the 
entire process would collapse. 
 
¶8.  (C) Turning again to Van Eck's statements, Lembede 
stated with visible frustration that he did not know where 
Van Eck received his information, nor what he was trying to 
achieve.  Lembede somewhat angrily commented that on 
Friday, March 23, the FNL had not yet responded to the 
government's position.  He noted that Van Eck arrived in 
Burundi on Sunday evening, and on Monday, the FNL flatly 
refused to continue negotiations.  "I don't think that's a 
coincidence," alleged Ambassador Lembede. 
 
Rwasa's Credibility Threatened? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Van Eck, in turn, has expressed grave concern that 
the revelation that Burundi never agreed to the subsequent 
political talks, a stipulation which the FNL required in 
order to sign the September agreement, could destroy the 
South African facilitators' credibility.  In the worst 
case, the FNL could decide to break off talks completely 
and return to the bush.  In an effort to break the impasse, 
Van Eck proposed to Ngendakumana that President Nkurunziza 
meet personally with FNL chief Agathon Rwasa. 
Ngendakumana was receptive to the proposal.  Van Eck 
planned to meet with African Union representatives later on 
March 29 to discuss options.  He also planned to travel 
briefly to Dar es Salaam over the weekend of March 31 to 
meet with FNL spokesperson Pasteur Habonimana and then to 
return to Burundi early in the week. 
 
¶10.  (C) Rwasa's personal credibility and leadership within 
the FNL is at stake, opined Van Eck.  He characterized the 
FNL as a very dogmatic, tightly run operation whose 
discipline results largely from Rwasa's leadership and the 
force of his personality.  Were Rwasa to be discredited, 
the potential for violence from rogue elements of the party 
would increase dramatically. 
 
¶11.  (C) Van Eck also expressed fears that a continuing 
power struggle within the ruling CNDD-FDD could weaken the 
government.  Despite Radjabu's dismissal as party head, 
President Nkurunziza is still widely perceived as a weak 
figure who spends little time in the office, thus leaving a 
"power vacuum."  According to Van Eck, party members 
increasingly hope to put pressure on the President to serve 
a portion of his term and then to resign in favor of 
another, stronger leader who would be able to make tough 
decisions. 
 
¶12.  (C) During his meeting with Van Eck, African Union 
(AU) Ambassador Mamadou Bah decried the JVMM's inability to 
make substantive progress on implementation, according to 
another western diplomatic source who spoke with Van Eck on 
the evening of March 29.  Ambassador Bah suggested that if 
the two sides could at least agree on the location of 
assembly areas, the underutilized AU forces could perhaps 
begin to prepare assembly areas for the FNL troops.  The 
AU's forces include one battalion of former UN peacekeepers 
who remained in Burundi following the UN's drawdown in 
December and were immediately rehatted.  However, both Bah 
and Van Eck worried that the FNL leadership would oppose 
such a move, believing that it would serve to confirm that 
the government never intended to negotiate further any of 
the FNL's concerns. 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  This is Jan Van Eck's first trip to Burundi in 
over a year; he reportedly was denied a visa to return to 
the country after certain government officials, notably 
former CNDD-FDD head Hussein Radjabu, became concerned 
about his close relations with the FNL.  Following 
Radjabu's dismissal as party head, Van Eck sought 
successfully to return to Burundi.  While clearly 
sympathetic to the FNL, he nevertheless enjoys access to 
the highest levels of Burundian society, in which he is a 
known and respected commodity.  As one of the most 
long-serving diplomats in Bujumbura, African Union 
Ambassador Bah has an extensive knowledge of Burundi's 
peace process and commands widespread admiration. 
 
¶14.  (C) While it is unclear what influence Van Eck may 
have had, if any, on the FNL's decision to halt 
discussions, it is certain that the talks have reached a 
critical, and possibly perilous, juncture.  The 
facilitators have long worried that if the FNL walks away 
from the table, it would be very difficult to draw them - 
and also possibly the government itself - back into the 
discussions.  It is also possible that the infighting in 
the ruling CNDD-FDD party over the past months has 
distracted the government from the process itself. 
Nonetheless, with a major donor conference scheduled in 
Bujumbura in late May, the government has a powerful 
incentive to keep the FNL engaged. 
 
BREITER