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C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
P FOR HEIDE BRONKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON AR CU HA VZ BZ
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS AND FM TAIANA DISCUSS REGIONAL STABILITY 
ISSUES 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ANTHONY WAYNE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  U.S. Participants: 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs R. Nicolas Burns 
Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs 
      Thomas Shannon 
Ambassador Early Anthony Wayne 
DCM Mike Matera 
William McIlhenny, Member, Policy Planning Council (S/P) 
Heide Bronke, P Special Assistant 
David Alarid, Control Officer 
Heidi Gomez, Notetaker 
 
Argentine Participants: 
Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana 
Vice Foreign Minister Roberto Garcia Moritan 
Under Secretary for Foreign Policy Amb. Luis Cappagli 
North America Director Ambassador Vicent Espeche Gil 
Maria Belen Garcia Alcat, Notetaker 
 
¶2.  (C)  Summary.  On February 9, Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs R. Nicolas Burns met with Foreign Minister 
Jorge Taiana and Vice Foreign Minister Roberto Garcia 
Moritan.  GOA officials who met with U/S Burns just prior to 
the meeting made a point to underscore the message  that 
"there are more things that unite us than separate  us."  On 
that note, U/S Burns and FM Taiana exchanged views on how 
best to achieve stability in the region,  particularly in 
Haiti, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and  Cuba, with U/S Burns 
stressing that the USG wishes to  engage the hemisphere in a 
"positive and ecumenical"  manner.  He also extended an 
invitation from Secretary Rice to Taiana to visit Washington 
in the next three months.  Taiana welcomed the invitation and 
stressed that more dialogue between the U.S. and Argentina is 
needed.  As this year marks the 25th anniversary of the 
Falklands/Malvinas war, he requested USG assistance in 
encouraging the UK to agree to holding sovereignty talks to 
resolve the  long-standing dispute and stressed that 
Argentina seeks to  resolve the dispute diplomatically.  U/S 
Burns indicated that the USG does not want to interfere in 
the matter, but that the USG would be willing to serve as a 
messenger between both countries.    End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
An invitation to Washington 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  On February 9, Under Secretary for Political 
Affairs R. Nicolas Burns met with Foreign Minister Jorge 
Taiana and Vice Foreign Minister Roberto Garcia Moritan to 
exchange views on how best to achieve stability in the 
region, particularly in Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Cuba 
and Haiti.  Just prior to the meeting, Trade Secretary 
Chiaradia made the point to tell U/S Burns that "there are 
more things that unite us than separate us."  On that note, 
U/S Burns began the meeting by extending Secretary Rice's 
invitation to FM Taiana to visit Washington to review the 
state of bilateral relations and discuss ways to build on 
our already strong bilateral cooperation.  Taiana thanked him 
for the invitation and noted that it is important to improve 
the dialogue between the two countries. 
 
---------------- 
Nonproliferation 
---------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  U/S Burns then commended Argentina for being "a 
real partner on difficult issues," especially at the IAEA, 
where Argentina has voted with the USG to refer Iran to the 
UNSC for noncompliance with IAEA nuclear safeguards.  He 
also expressed appreciation for Argentina's leadership role 
in  nonproliferation issues, noting that it is the only 
country  in Latin America to have signed on to the 
Proliferation  Security Initiative and one of two countries 
to have signed  on to the Container Security Initiative. 
 
--------------- 
Regional Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Turning to a discussion of regional issues, U/S 
Burns stressed that the USG wishes to engage the hemisphere 
 
in a "positive and ecumenical" manner.  He reiterated that 
the USG does not wish to close the door on the more difficult 
countries of the region like Bolivia and Ecuador.  He pointed 
out that Venezuela, however, is "trickier;" the USG has a 
poor relationship with Chavez, and yet has an important 
economic relationship with Venezuela.  U/S Burns noted that 
the U.S. does not view Chavez as a direct threat to vital 
interests, however, there is concern over the negative 
influence he exerts in the region. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Taiana began by explaining Argentina's own 
turbulent history in recent years.  In the 1990s, Argentina 
completed its transition to democracy while simultaneously 
adopting extensive economic reforms.  Many other countries in 
Latin America did as well.  At first, the reforms went well, 
but by the early 2000s, the public became disillusioned with 
the reforms as poverty and social and political exclusion 
continued to persist.  As a result, different countries in 
the region are now experimenting with new policies to address 
their political, social and economic difficulties.  Argentina 
is only one example of this trend due to its own economic 
crisis in 2001-02.  The GOA aims to achieve a "long and 
sustainable period of Prosperity," Taiana asserted, adding 
that when Argentina is  stable, it can exert a moderating 
influence in South  America. 
 
-------- 
Mercosur 
-------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Taiana suggested that perhaps Mercosur could be 
used as a mechanism to achieve regional stability, as it is 
becoming a major sphere of influence in South America. 
Mercosur is not a trade agreement, he claimed, but rather a 
political process aimed at achieving regional integration. 
For example, one of Mercosur's major successes has been to 
strengthen Argentine-Brazilian relations, he stated.  VFM 
Garcia Moritan added that to strengthen Mercosur is to 
strengthen the region.  The inclusion of Venezuela should be 
seen in that light, Taiana argued. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Venezuela: Chavez More Peron than Peron! 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  The GOA views Chavez as a friend, Taiana  continued, 
quickly adding that the GOA does not agree with  Venezuela's 
foreign and domestic policies.  He claimed that Chavez feels 
close to Argentina because he thinks his vision for Venezuela 
is similar to ex-President Peron's.   "Chavez is more 
Peronist than we are", Taiana claimed.  He acknowledged that 
Venezuela has a fragile democracy and a weak political party 
system.  The opposition,s 2005 boycott of legislative 
actions, for example, was a disaster and a very serious 
issue, he stated. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Citing the United States own economic relationship 
with Venezuela, Taiana asserted that Argentina is trying to 
build its economic and commercial relationship with the 
country.  Garcia Moritan acknowledged that "sometimes the 
GOA does not even understand what agenda Venezuela is 
pursuing", and for that reason the GOA believes it needs to 
engage Chavez more, particularly within the Mercosur 
framework.  He added that now that Venezuela is in Mercosur, 
"it must act according to the rules of the club."   Still, he 
cautioned against "excessive U.S. leadership" given the 
personalities in the region. 
 
----------------------------- 
Bolivia: Morales must succeed 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Turning to Bolivia, Taiana described Bolivia as a 
"disaster in political terms."  The historic political, 
social, and economic exclusion of Bolivia's indigenous 
population is not just a problem for President Morales to 
address.  It is the problem that over 40 million indigenous 
people in the Americas face.  For this reason, it is 
important that Morales succeeds.  Otherwise, millions of 
indigenous people will begin to look for solutions outside of 
the traditional democratic framework.  This includes Chile, 
Taiana cautioned. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Ecuador: Correa, well-intentioned but facing difficult odds 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  On Ecuador, Taiana described President Correa as 
"young, smart, and well-intentioned," but observed that 
Correa faced difficult odds in trying to restore political 
stability.  Correa is not ideological, and has approached 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to learn from other countries' 
experiences.  Taiana suggested that the USG give Correa "some 
room," and noted that Argentina is working closely  with him 
and his young team. 
 
---- 
Cuba 
---- 
 
¶12.  (C)  On Cuba, Burns shared that his Brazilian 
interlocutors cautioned against a heavy-handed approach to  a 
democratic transition, suggesting that the USG make  its 
points quietly.  He noted the U.S. has been very muted in its 
public comments regarding Cuba since news of Castro's 
deteriorating health became known.  However, Burns questioned 
who will stand up and demand the release of political 
prisoners and urge the restoration of democracy if the USG is 
quiet?  He urged Argentina and its MERCOSUR partners to take 
a more assertive stance in favor of a democratic transition 
in Cuba. 
 
----- 
Haiti 
----- 
 
¶13.  (C)  On Haiti, Under Secretary Burns described the 
February 1 Haiti Key Players meeting as very positive. 
Taiana agreed and noted that Latin America's leading role in 
Haiti is not only good for Haiti but also good for the 
region.  The participation of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Uruguay, and Paraguay in MINUSTAH has helped to build 
confidence among the Southern Cone nations in the political 
and defense arenas.  Haiti has compelled all five countries 
to work together to forge a regional consensus on defense 
matters.  Taiana noted that Argentina and Chile have even 
decided to stand up a joint battalion together to be deployed 
in peacekeeping  missions. 
 
------------------ 
Falklands/Malvinas 
------------------ 
 
¶14.  (C)  Taiana noted that 2007 marks the 25th  anniversary 
of the Falklands/Malvinas War.  Over the years, the GOA has 
urged the UK to hold sovereignty talks to resolve competing 
claims over the islands, but the UK has refused.  He 
complained that the UK does not permit commercial flights 
from mainland Argentina to the islands, and requested U.S. 
assistance in encouraging the UK to agree to sovereignty 
talks. 
 
¶15.  (C)  U/S Burns stated that the USG does not want to 
interfere in this issue, but that it is willing to carry 
messages between the GOA and the UK.  He relayed that the UK 
had expressed concerns that Argentina may try to use the 25th 
anniversary to redefine the issue in a way that would violate 
the UK's understanding of the 1989 sovereignty umbrella 
agreement.  U/S Burns then noted that when former Ambassador 
Gutierrez expressed such concerns to the GOA in July 2006, 
the GOA had clearly indicated that it would seek a resolution 
through diplomatic means.  VFM Garcia Moritan agreed, 
emphatically stating that "Argentina is not a threat."  He 
explained that the war was undertaken during the military 
dictatorship and stressed that it would be "incomprehensible 
for a democracy" such as Argentina's to consider taking 
military action to force the issue.  He explained that when 
Argentina's constitution was revised in 1994, it stipulated 
that the Falklands/Malvinas issue must be resolved 
diplomatically with respect for international law. 
 
¶16.  (C)  When U/S Burns mentioned that the UK would like  to 
explore whether Argentina would consider commemorating  the 
anniversary jointly, VFM Garcia Moritan quipped that 
 
offering a joint commemoration is easy for the victor, but 
that the UK would more likely seek a celebration, rather 
than a commemoration, of the war.  Still, VFM Garcia Moritan 
will continue to urge the UK to hold sovereignty talks, and 
that the GOA remains committed to resolving the  issue 
through diplomatic means. 
WAYNE