VZCZCXRO0366
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHBS #1099/01 0891521
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301521Z MAR 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN BO
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF BELARUS OFFER MIXED VIEWS ON ENGAGEMENT 
 
Classified By: POLMINCOUNS LAURENCE WOLHERS FOR REASONS 1.5(D) and (E). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (C) On March 21, DAS David Kramer and U.S. Ambassador to 
Belarus Karen Stewart participated in a Friends of Belarus 
meeting convened at the Lithuanian Permanent Mission to the 
EU, in Brussels.  The meeting was held on the margin of EU 
capital-based COEST experts meeting and US-EU COEST Troika 
meeting in Brussels (septel).  The meeting helped bring out 
more vocal skepticism to the Council's forward-leaning 
approach in Minsk than had been expressed at a PSC meeting on 
the subject the previous week.  A number of EU member states 
either expressed concern (Lithuania, UK, France, Sweden), or 
outright skepticism (Poland) about the Council Secretariat 
and German Presidency's aggressive engagement strategy for 
Belarus.  Delegations also concurred with the U.S. assessment 
that Lukashenko was under unprecedented pressure from all 
sides and that his overtures to the West could merely be a 
tactical response to Russian pressure.  There was broad 
agreement on support for civil society, second tier of the 
government, political opposition, NGOs, independent media and 
flow of information (including more broadcasting and people 
to people exchanges).  Highlighting the need for continued 
strong US-EU cooperation, DAS Kramer won support for regular 
Friends meetings in the future.  The German Presidency also 
undertook to consider DAS Kramer's suggestion that the U.S. 
and EU consider language on Belarus for inclusion in the 
US-EU April 30 Summit Declaration.  At the conclusion of the 
meeting, the Lithuanians circulated a non-paper (USEU 
e-mailed to EUR/ERA for Deputy Rob Faucher). 
END SUMMARY 
 
Participation 
------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Rytis Martikonis, Lithuanian Permanent 
Representative to the EU hosted the Friends of Belarus 
meeting at the Lithuanian Permrep.  The discussion was led by 
Mr. Arunas Vinciunas, Director of the Eastern Europe and 
Central Asian Department of the Lithuanian MFA.  The United 
States was represented by David Kramer, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs, Ambassador to Belarus Karen 
 
SIPDIS 
Stewart and poloff notetaker. The Germany EU Presidency (and 
current COEST Chair) was represented by Hans-Dieter Lucas, 
Director for Eastern and Central European Affairs, German MFA 
and Peter Sonnehol, Belarus Desk Officer, MFA.   Other 
capital-based participants included Ms. Aurelia Buchez, 
Deputy Director of Eurasian Affairs, Directorate for 
Continental European Affairs, French MFA and Mr. Wojciech 
Zajaczkowski, Director of Eastern Policy Department, Polish 
MFA.  Sweden and the UK were represented by Brussels-based 
experts.  Helga Schmid, Deputy Dirgen for Strategic Policy 
Planning, and Pirkka Tapiola, Advisor to the High Rep for CIS 
countries represented the Council Secretariat.  Commission 
official Hugues Mingarelli was invited, but did not attend 
the event. 
 
 
Council/Commission Trip Readout 
------------------------------- 
¶3. (C) In an overview of her March 4-5 visit to Minsk, 
Council Secretariat Director of Strategic Policy Planning 
Helga Schmid sought to highlight that her purpose was to 
determine the seriousness of Belarus' opening to the EU 
against a backdrop of increasing Russian pressure on 
Lukashenkko.  She asserted that she had made clear to GOB 
officials that it was up to Belarus to take the first step 
before serious "negotiation" with the EU could begin.  In 
this regard, she stressed that the EU had to simultaneously 
prepare itself for (reciprocal) action.  According to Schmid, 
the opposition in Minsk, with whom she met during the visit, 
supported an EU "double track, step-by-step" approach that 
contained three elements:  continued pressure on the regime; 
outreach and support for the Belarusian people and 
opposition; and willingness to engage with the authorities if 
they signaled seriousness of intent.  The  March 25 protest 
outcome was an important test of GOB intentions.  The recent 
arrest of opposition leader Vyachorka had been a "slap in the 
face" to the EU.  The EU had responded by postponing a 
EU-Belarus technical energy dialogue scheduled for March. 
 
EU Reactions Varied 
-------------------- 
¶4. (C) Hans-Dieter Lucas, the German Presidency 
representative, strongly supported the Council's initiative 
to engage, noting that "doing nothing was not an option for 
us."  Reaction from other EU members was far from 
enthusiastic -- ranging from skepticism (UK, France, and 
Lithuania), opposition (Poland) or tepid support (Sweden). 
 
BRUSSELS 00001099  002 OF 002 
 
 
France sounded a note of caution in agreeing to a 
double-track approach and underscored the need for balance 
between engagement by the EU and concrete actions by the GOB. 
 Poland dismissed the utility of the "step-by-step" or 
"benchmark" approach, arguing that it had been tried in the 
past and hadn't worked.  The UK expressed "considerable 
skepticism" and echoed French wariness about possible "fake" 
moves by the GOB.   The UK rep also insisted that a 
sustainable and irreversible "jump" and not a "step" by the 
GOB to prove its sincerity was required before the EU could 
begin engagement.  Lithuanian Ambasasdor Martikonis noted 
that the Vyachorka arrest had demonstrated that the 
Belarusian security apparatus and MFA were not coordinating 
their actions and policy.  This misstep had called into doubt 
the Belarusian MFA's ability to deliver in a political 
negotiation with the EU. 
 
¶5. (C) The Polish MFA rep stated that the crucial question 
before any engagement revolved around any radical change or 
orientation in Luka's policy or his country's place in 
Europe.  For its part, Poland thought the answer was "no" as 
evidenced by Luka's greater interest i of in Belarus -- asking 
rus was on t@t our policy 
would nodt`- `n leveraQy EUviate ation 
office in Misk. 
 
Limited prisoner releases not enough 
------------------------------------- 
¶7. (C) DAS Kramer noted that while the US would certainy not 
reject thsoners, this action would not Qe sufficient to change US 
policy, including a easing of the visa ban or asset freeze. 
 The GOB needed to satisfy our demand to release al 
political prisoners, including Aleksandr KoQulin. 
Furthermore, the EU should not give the Belarusian 
authorities "credit" for the release of three political 
prisoners who were set to conclude their prison sentences by 
this July.  Martikonis noted that names could not be removed 
from EU visa ban list "on principle."  Ambassador Stewart 
briefed other participants on rising intimidation and attacks 
by the Belarusian security apparatus on youth. 
 
U.S.-EU Summit Language 
----------------------- 
¶8.  (C) DAS Kramer highlighted the value of US-EU cooperation 
on Belarus. He reiterated U.S. support for the EU's Shadow 
Action Plan and Schmid's trip as a way to demonstrate to 
Belarusian's that there was light at the end of the tunnel - 
if they first took the necessary steps.  He also noted that 
the US-EU summit could provide an opportunity to stress our 
solidarity with the Belarusian people and asked others to 
explore this possibility.  On the margin of the meeting, 
German MFA expert asked USEU to provide USG elements, noting 
that Germany could be open to such language especially if it 
was positive and forward looking in tone. 
 
¶9.  DAS Kramer and Ambassador Stewart have cleared this 
message. 
GRAY 
.