VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0133/01 0611530
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021530Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0733
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0073
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0625
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0092
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0043
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KOC YI LO
SUBJECT: FICO: I WILL NOT ALLOW MY GOVERNMENT TO BE 
ISOLATED FROM THE EU ON KOSOVO 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reason 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Fico told the Ambassador that 
he will not allow his government to be isolated in Europe on 
the issue of Kosovo, which is what he believes to be the aim 
of opposition leader Mikulas Dzurinda.  Fico expressed firm 
support for FM Kubis, who in turn gave public remarks 
expressing firm support for Ahtisaari and emphasizing the 
importance of European unity on the issue of Kosovo.  Given 
the positive messages coming from the government and the 
leading coalition party, we recommend that Slovakia be 
brought into the UNSCR drafting process as soon as possible. 
End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In a 1 1/2 hour long breakfast meeting March 2, Prime 
Minister Robert Fico (Smer party) told the Ambassador that he 
would not allow his government to be isolated in Europe on 
the Kosovo issue.  Fico theorized that opposition leader 
(former PM) Mikulas Dzurinda was using Kosovo as a domestic 
political issue because he has no other issue that resonates. 
 Fico believes Dzurinda wants to force the Fico government 
into isolation from the rest of Europe.  Fico seemed very 
determined to make certain his government was respected in 
European and transatlantic circles.  Fico appreciated the 
support the embassy and USG officials were giving to Foreign 
Minister Jan Kubis, especially in emphasizing bluntly to 
Dzurinda that Slovakia must not derail European consensus in 
support of Ahtisaari's plan for final status. 
 
¶3. (C) Fico's domestic strategy includes trying to ensure 
that the Kosovo does not become an issue of debate in 
Parliament.  He said he planned to speak to coalition partner 
Jan Slota of the Slovak National Party and ask that SNS 
withdraw its draft parliamentary declaration on Kosovo, 
saying that parliament is not the place to resolve the issue. 
 If, despite all attempts by the government and international 
partners, a parliamentary resolution sponsored by SDKU or SNS 
comes to the floor, Fico is certain that coalition parties 
Smer and HZDS, plus opposition Hungarian Coalition Party 
(SMK) will have the votes to block it. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador explained that U.S. embassy officers as 
well as officials such as EUR DAS Rosemary diCarlo were 
having private discussions with the entire range of Slovak 
politicians.  Fico encouraged the U.S. to continue these 
activities and our support for Kubis.  He said the Kosovo 
status discussions were politically sensitive for the GOS, 
although "among the population at the gas stations" there was 
little concern about Kosovo other than the ten percent of 
Slovaks that support SNS. 
 
¶5. (C) Fico asked about the Russian position on Kosovo.  The 
Ambassador explained that although the Russians were not 
happy, they had never told us they would block the final 
resolution.  EU unity, and an affirmative Slovak vote in New 
York, were essential to send the right signal to Russia. 
Fico said he would discuss Kosovo during his April 3-4 visit 
to Moscow, and offered to de-brief the Ambassador afterwards. 
 Fico said he was suprised how well-informed the Chinese were 
on the Kosovo issue during his recent visit to Beijing. 
 
The Pro-Status Parties 
---------------------- 
¶6. (C) Fico's position, as expressed in private, seems to be 
moving in the right direction.  We got a foretaste of this 
during EUR DAS Rosemary diCarlo's February 28 meeting with 
other Smer party members, including Chair of the 
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Boris Zala.  Zala had 
just returned from Berlin where he met with Martti Ahtisaari, 
Javier Solana, and German FM Steinmeyer.  He expressed 
Slovakia's "emotional experience of history" and said it was 
painful to accept a country being forced to be split.  But 
his bottom line was that Slovakia was realistic and 
understood there was no other way.  He made a plea for strong 
language from EU and U.S. leaders, and perhaps even in the 
draft resolution, that Kosovo must be understood as a unique 
case and not a precendent. 
 
¶7. (C) SMK leaders told DAS DiCarlo of their committment to: 
--uphold EU unity; 
--endorse a UNSCR; 
--support Ahtisaari and the contact group; 
--protect human and minority rights, as well as religious and 
cultural monuments; and 
--push for swift integration of Western Balkans countries to 
the EU. 
 
Hungarian party leaders resent the use of fictional Hungarian 
demands for autonomy as an excuse for Slovak politicians to 
support a position counter to the EU consensus.  The 
guarantees in the Ahtisaari plan to protect minority rights 
of Serbs is more relevant to SMK than the prospect of 
ethnically-based demands for independence. 
 
¶8. (C) Vladimir Meciar's party, Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia (HZDS), is saying the right things about European 
unity and the need for Serbia to move forward toward European 
integration. 
 
The Parties Opposed to Independence 
----------------------------------- 
¶9. (C) The Slovak National Party has its own warped view of 
history and will never be convinced to support independence 
for Kosovo.  An SNS MP told DiCarlo, "Serbia was never a 
multi-ethnic state, it has always been a Serb Nation with 
ethnic minorities," causing the SMK MP present to nearly fall 
out of his chair.  The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) 
does not like the prospect of independence for Kosovo, but 
has neither the political clout domestically nor the desire 
to oppose its partners internationally to take a leading role 
in the debate. 
 
¶10. (C) The most worrisome opposition voice continues to be 
that of Dzurinda's SDKU.  It believes that Slovakia can move 
the EU position and buy more time for Serbia and argues 
unconvincingly that this might lead to some movement in the 
Serb position toward compromise.  SDKU insiders have told us 
that they are determined to pursue their parliamentary 
resolution, although they understand they don't have the 
votes to pass it.  (Comment: Since pursuing the resolution 
will have no practical impact on the government, it is 
clearly designed to embarrass the Fico government 
domestically and internationally.  We, and other contact 
group embassies (especially German and UK)  continue to 
emphasize that the issue of Kosovo is too important to play 
domestic political games.  End comment) 
 
Kubis is Consistent 
------------------- 
¶11. (SBU) In remarks to the press after his March 2 meeting 
with Ahtisaari in Vienna, FM Kubis said that SDKU's position 
on Kosovo (that Slovakia would not accept independence for 
Kosovo without the agreement of Serbia) had shocked partners 
in the EU.  Kubis stressed that such a position would isolate 
Slovakia in the EU and NATO and could even lead to the 
inability to adopt the necessary UNSCR.  Kubis repeated that 
Slovakia must take care to ensure that the resolution of 
Kosovo's status will guarantee security and stability in the 
region and a European perspective for Serbia and Kosovo. 
European unity is essential, he said, and confirmed that on 
the question of Kosovo, EU unity exists. 
 
Comment: 
------- 
¶12. (C) The Ambassador was somewhat encouraged after his 
meeting with Fico by three specific points: 
--Fico expressed clear support for FM Kubis. 
--Fico does not want Slovakia to be the European outlier. 
--Fico does not believe most Slovak voters are interested in 
Kosovo's final status. 
What Fico did not say was how Slovakia would vote on the 
UNSCR.  Nonetheless, Fico's message, combined with Kubis' 
public statement, was positive enough that we recommend 
Slovakia be brought into the UNSCR drafting process as soon 
as possible.  Allowing Slovakia to point to success (perhaps 
including specific language important to Slovakia in the 
UNSCR) will show domestically that the government is involved 
in the process; this buy-in will make them more likely to 
vote enthusiastically and affirmatively when the time comes. 
VALLEE