VZCZCXYZ0036
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #0484/01 0681440
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091440Z MAR 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7395
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1108

S E C R E T BERLIN 000484 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN, EAP, EUR, AND TREASURY/TFI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017 
TAGS: KNNP KS MNUC PARM PREL KH GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN GOVERNMENT ALERTED TO USG CONCERNS OVER 
POTENTIAL SALE OF GERMAN PRESS TO THE DPRK 
 
REF: A. STATE 25950 
     ¶B. EDDY/MOON EMAILS FEB 27 2007 
     ¶C. BERLIN 354 
     ¶D. BERLIN 318 
     ¶E. STATE 18308 
     ¶F. 06 BERLIN 2224 
     ¶G. 06 STATE 118598 
     ¶H. 06 BERLIN 1876 
     ¶I. RUGGIERO/CONWAY EMAIL JUNE 21 2006 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 ( 
b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  DCM as Charge as well as senior Embassy 
staff again raised the need for German government action to 
preclude the possible printing press sale to North Korea by 
the German firm Drent Goebel, as requested in refs.  MFA 
State Secretary Silberberg, Chancellery Deputy National 
Security Adviser Nikel and other senior German officials 
state they are well aware of North Korea's long record of 
counterfeiting.  Silberberg stated the German Government 
could ultimately block the export of the printing press on 
foreign policy/national security grounds in the event Drent 
Goebel tried to go forward with the deal.  However, senior 
officials in the Finance and Foreign Ministries note while 
the Government has the ability under German law to stop the 
sale of an item not currently included in a dual-use, export 
control or sanctions list for six months, the law would then 
need to be amended during those six months to include the 
particular item, e.g., the intaglio printing press, as 
something requiring an export license.  The process of 
legally blocking the export would be complicated and lengthy, 
and officials uniformly stated the German Government's case 
would be bolstered by any additional evidence we could supply 
on North Korean counterfeiting activities.  Plese see action 
request in para 7.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) DCM (then Charge) delivered ref A demarche to German 
MFA State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg March 2.  Silberberg 
was familiar with the issue and indicated MFA Director 
General for Economics and Sustainable Development Peter Ammon 
had been in contact with Drent Goebel.  In response to our 
point noting the conflicting information we and the German 
Government have received from the firm regarding their 
intentions, Silberberg said the German Government fully 
shares the USG's concerns.  Silberberg also said he was aware 
of North Korea's long record of counterfeiting, and noted 
that even if Drent Goebel persisted in trying to export the 
printing press to North Korea, the German Government could 
stop the export.  Charge and Polcouns also delivered the 
points to German Deputy National Security Adviser Rolf Nikel 
in a separate meeting March 2.  Nikel said that although he 
was unfamiliar with the case he would check into it.  He 
noted Germany would not wish to be involved in anything 
potentially connected to counterfeiting U.S. currency. 
 
¶3.  (S) EMIN made the same points to Acting MFA Director 
General for Economic Affairs Michael Witter and Office 
Director of the International Economic Policy Division Ingo 
Karsten March 2.  EMIN underscored two USG concerns about 
Drent Goebel: that it may have been duplicitous in what it 
told the German Government about dropping plans to sell the 
press and that Drent Goebel may have understated the 
technical capabilities of the press to be used for 
counterfeiting.  EMIN urged the German Government to provide 
assurances that it understands the USG concerns and that it 
will ensure that this press is never exported to North Korea. 
 
 
¶4.  (S) Witter said the German Government shares the USG 
concerns and that it does not wish to see counterfeit 
currency come from North Korea.  Witter noted that Drent 
Goebel had told the German Government it would not export the 
press, and if it changed its plans to complete the sale it 
would notify the German Government.  In the event that Drent 
Goebel tried to export the press, the German Government could 
stop it by invoking a "catch-all" provision in the German 
Foreign Trade and Payments Act.  (Note:  According to the 
"catch-all" provision, the German Government can restrict 
legal transactions and acts in foreign trade and payments in 
order to "guarantee the vital security interests of the 
Federal Republic of Germany."  End note.)  The difficulty in 
using this provision, continued Witter, is that the 
government would need to use a single case intervention and, 
since the printing press is not currently included in a 
dual-use, export control or sanctions list, the sale could 
only be blocked for a maximum of six months.  During the six 
month period the law would need to be amended to include that 
particular item.  The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
 
Economics, Finance, and other federal agencies would have to 
collaborate to coordinate the single case intervention. 
 
¶5.  (S) EMIN also met with Finance Ministry Deputy Director 
General for Banking, Insurance, Investment, Stock Market, and 
Currency Berthold Leber and Michael Findeisen, Office 
Director of the Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance 
Division.  Findeisen said the Federal Office of Criminal 
Investigation (BKA) had recently talked to him about this 
case.  He reported the BKA said technically the contract 
between Drent Goebel and the DPRK is still pending, but that 
North Korea has yet to pay the deposit of 90 percent of the 
sales price of the press as required.  Drent Goebel will not 
even begin production of the press until it receives this 
deposit.  As a result, the firm has not started production on 
the printing press.  EMIN noted this situation should make it 
even easier for Drent Goebel to walk away from the deal with 
North Korea. 
 
¶6.  (S) Leber and Findeisen also stated that, since standard 
export controls would not apply to this case, the deal would 
have to be blocked on national security grounds.  To do so, 
said Findeisen, the Government would need to show the deal 
entailed a "security risk."  Findeisen said because the 
burden of proof is on the German Government, the government 
needs hard evidence that the DPRK Government is involved in 
counterfeiting and that the machine will be used in 
connection with this or other illicit purposes.  Emboffs 
noted the information already passed, including the Interpol 
notice.  Findeisen and Leber said additional information 
would be needed to act further and requested the USG, if it 
has additional information, to share it with the German 
authorities. 
 
¶7.  (S) Action requested:  Request Washington agencies 
provide, as appropriate, any additional information we can 
share with the German Government to support our assertions 
that North Korea would likely use the printing press for the 
purpose of counterfeiting western currencies. 
TIMKEN JR