VZCZCXRO1475
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #1249/01 0601110
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011110Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5212
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 6714
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1683
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001249 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: THAI RAK THAI LEADER ADDRESSES THREAT OF 
PROSECUTION 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 1187 (AMBASSDOR'S LUNCH WITH WINAI) 
 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 1034 (CHATURON DEFIES RESTRICTIONS) 
     ¶C. BANGKOK 232 (GENERALS TAKE STRONGER LINE) 
     ¶D. 06 BANGKOK 6366 (CHATURON ON POLITICAL 
        ENVIRONMENT) 
 
Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor David R. Greenberg, reason: 1 
.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng 
said the authorities' decision to prosecute him for political 
activities was unwarranted and generated extra publicity for 
his views.  In remarks before a packed house at the Foreign 
Correspondents Club of Thailand on February 28, Chaturon also 
said that, to promote an early return to normalcy, TRT would 
support the draft constitution, barring egregious flaws or 
provisions allowing the coup leaders to retain political 
power.  Chaturon discouraged speculation about the outcome of 
the Constitutional Tribunal proceedings that could lead to 
TRT's dissolution.  He noted TRT retains substantial popular 
support, and had a net influx of members since the coup. 
Despite recent defections, many former legislators remain in 
the party, although the party's leadership has changed 
significantly.  Having threatened to prosecute Chaturon, the 
authorities are now in a somewhat difficult position, but it 
is unclear whether they will pursue him vigorously; 
Chaturon's case may remain but a sideshow compared to the 
continuing decline in the government's credibility.  End 
Summary. 
 
AUTHORITIES THREATEN PROSECUTION 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On February 27, a Council for National Security (CNS) 
spokesman announced that the CNS had asked the government to 
prosecute TRT Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng for flouting a 
government ban by engaging in political activities during a 
visit to Thailand's Northeast (ref B).  (Note: CNS Secretary 
General Winai Phattiyakul had told the Ambassador on February 
26 that the CNS felt impelled to respond to Chaturon's 
actions; the Ambassador cautioned Winai against responding 
harshly -- ref A.  End Note.) 
 
¶3. (C) As of March 1, the government's intended course of 
action remains unclear.  The ban on political activities is 
based on a broadly worded announcement (forbidding political 
parties from carrying out "any political activities") issued 
by the coup leaders two days after the coup.  The interim 
constitution (Article 36) provides that such announcements 
"as well as any actions taken under them, whether before or 
after the promulgation of the Constitution, shall be deemed 
lawful and constitutional."  However, the meaning of 
"political activities" is undefined, and leaders of other 
parties have engaged repeatedly in activities of a political 
nature (ref B).  The coup council's announcement specified 
neither a range of potential penalties for violating the ban, 
nor which government body has enforcement responsibilities. 
The current administration has generally sought to adhere to 
established legal standards and practices, even when these 
standards have impeded corruption investigations targeting 
deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.  Thus, it remains 
unclear whether police or prosecutors will be eager to 
initiate proceedings against Chaturon. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In a February 28 appearance at the Foreign 
Correspondents Club of Thailand, Chaturon portrayed his 
recent actions in the Northeast as innocuous.  He stated he 
had visited the office that managed a village fund (the 
village fund program having been a Thaksin administration 
initiative).  Approximately 80-100 people appeared at the 
office, having heard from the media of his planned visit, so 
Chaturon addressed the group.  Chaturon also claimed he 
greeted people when he had breakfast at a local market; he 
accepted an invitation to deliver remarks at a school (since 
he formerly served as Education Minister); and he attended a 
cremation.  (Note: This account is essentially consistent 
with press stories.  End Note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Chaturon observed that the CNS and the government 
have been widely criticized as slow and ineffective.  He 
speculated that the authorities may have targeted him in an 
 
BANGKOK 00001249  002 OF 003 
 
 
effort to demonstrate they could take firm and rapid action. 
Chaturon claimed he was not worried about the threat of 
prosecution, as he had done nothing wrong, and he would rely 
on the justice system to produce a fair outcome. 
 
¶6. (C) The threat of prosecution seemed ironic, Chaturon 
noted, since TRT's recent policies had benefited the 
authorities by calming the party's supporters.  Since 
becoming party leader, he had sought to promote 
reconciliation, had not confronted the CNS, and had not 
instigated efforts to overthrow the interim administration. 
(Soon after becoming Party Leader, he met with the Ambassador 
and described these as basic approaches he would follow -- 
ref D.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Chaturon said he thought the CNS's approach appeared 
"confused," and he noted it had generated more extensive 
publicity for TRT.  Chaturon said that, before this incident, 
CNS pressure on the media (ref C) had sharply reduced 
coverage of TRT press conferences; when he made himself 
available to the press, only "two or three" journalists would 
show up, and some would not air their footage but simply 
provided reports to the CNS.  On February 28, however, after 
the controversy erupted, over 30 journalists had come to hear 
him speak at TRT's headquarters.  Now, Chaturon quipped, if 
he were to go to northern Thailand and simply shop at the 
local market, he would garner extensive press coverage. 
(According to local media reports, Chaturon has canceled a 
prior plan to travel to northern Thailand; the authorities 
objected publicly to this proposed trip, after his visit to 
the Northeast.) 
 
TRT'S POSITION ON THE CONSTITUTION 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) TRT hoped for a speedy return to normalcy, Chaturon 
said, and, therefore, the party would hold the Constitution 
Drafting Assembly (CDA) to a reasonably low standard; the 
draft charter need not be perfect, simply "acceptable." 
Chaturon said the constitution would prove unacceptable if it 
allowed someone who was not elected to the parliament to 
become Prime Minister, or if it were to provide other 
mechanisms for the coup leaders to retain political power. 
Mirroring some other politicians' views, he also said the 
Senate should not be appointed or "semi-appointed," but it 
was unclear whether this represented a redline for TRT. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Chaturon said it would have been wiser to have 
included political parties in the constitution drafting 
process; had they been involved, party figures would have a 
more difficult time opposing the constitution when the 
authorities hold their constitutional referendum.  Chaturon 
reiterated it was not in TRT's interest to prolong the status 
quo, or to generate turmoil, so only if it was "very 
necessary" would TRT advocate the constitution's defeat in 
the referendum.  (Like many others, Chaturon envisioned the 
constitution could later be amended by an elected parliament; 
a member of the CDA recently told us that the new 
constitution will likely retain the 1997 Constitution's 
provisions for future amendment.) 
 
TRT'S PERSISTENT INFLUENCE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) TRT had substantially revamped its leadership since 
the coup, Chaturon noted.  Of approximately one dozen top 
figures, only Chaturon had held a cabinet position in 
Thaksin's administration.  Responding to a journalist's 
question, Chaturon said he had only spoken with Thaksin twice 
since the coup, most recently two months ago.  Thaksin had 
said he left the party's management to Chaturon and his 
colleagues; Chaturon joked he (Chaturon) was "following his 
order not to listen to him."  But he observed that Thaksin 
still deserved a degree of credit and TRT should not cut its 
ties with him; many of the former Prime Minister's ideas 
persisted in the party.  "I should talk to him more often," 
Chaturon said, seemingly sincere. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Addressing the defection of many high-ranking 
figures from TRT, Chaturon remarked that, while 100 
parliamentarians had left the party, 200 remained.  Some who 
had quit might return, or might fail to win election with 
another political machine.  TRT remained popular and had 14 
million members -- the party had a net inflow of members from 
 
BANGKOK 00001249  003 OF 003 
 
 
the time of the coup to the present day.  Chaturon said that 
the CNS had sent soldiers to rural areas, trying to dissuade 
people from supporting TRT, but Chaturon maintained that 
Northeasterners already had decided they would vote for TRT, 
if given the option.  He emphasized TRT had revolutionized 
Thai politics by developing and following through on a 
platform meaningful to the peasantry.  He also noted there 
was no precedent in Thai history for a party continuing to 
struggle for democracy after being evicted from power by a 
military coup. 
 
¶12. (C) Chaturon only briefly addressed his party's ongoing 
legal case, which could potentially result in TRT's 
dissolution.  (The CNS Secretary General recently assured the 
Ambassador TRT would be dissolved -- ref A.)  Citing some 
authority figures' public predictions of TRT's dissolution, 
Chaturon said it was inappropriate to make such comments 
while the Constitutional Tribunal's procedures were ongoing. 
The case would have to run its course, he said. 
 
"THAI-STYLE DEMOCRACY" 
---------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) A foreign journalist asked Chaturon to explain his 
view of "Thai-style democracy," noting that many Thais tried 
to fend off foreign criticism of the coup by claiming Thais 
were entitled to maintain distinctive political practices. 
Chaturon replied that the term "Thai-style democracy" was 
nothing more than jargon that a small group of elite figures 
deployed to justify a non-democratic system.  Chaturon 
asserted that "democracy" was a largely universal value, and 
foreigners should not be fooled into deference. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) Chaturon's activities in the Northeast put the CNS in 
a bind.  Had the authorities failed to respond, Chaturon and 
others likely would have continued to push the envelope, 
potentially knocking this already shaky administration 
further off balance.  In signaling they will take action, 
however, the authorities enable Chaturon to claim 
victimization.  This could have a significant impact, if the 
CNS pursues the case vigorously.  But we note the CNS has not 
staked significant credibility on this matter; discord within 
the cabinet and the government's declining popularity are 
receiving much more attention than Chaturon's case.  (Opinion 
poll results reported in late February placed Bangkok 
residents' favorability rating of Prime Minister Surayud at 
just under 35 percent, while Thaksin received almost 29 
percent.)  The prospective Chaturon prosecution -- like many 
other investigations -- could simply fade away. 
 
¶15. (C) Chaturon may well have been sincere when stating that 
TRT is inclined to support the constitution, in order to 
speed a return to political normalcy.  One can easily see how 
this would promote TRT interests.  However, we also note 
reports that CNS foes have begun agitating for the 
constitution's defeat in the referendum, and we believe it 
will take much more than Chaturon's public position to 
reassure the administration. 
BOYCE