VZCZCXRO0961
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1118/01 0901712
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311712Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0481
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001118 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ JO TU JA SA IR
SUBJECT: SUNNI VP HASHIMI DISCUSSES RECENT TRAVEL, 
DE-BA,ATHIFICATION 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard per 1.4 (b) and 
 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  In a meeting with the DCM on March 30, Sunni 
Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi discussed his recent travel 
to Japan, Jordan, and Turkey.  He cited Japan's extension of 
its law authorizing its air force mission in Iraq as a major 
success of the trip.  Hashimi said that he gave President 
Jalal Talabani the authority to negotiate the draft 
de-Ba'athification law while he was traveling.  He had not 
read the final draft of the law and did not know that it was 
signed by the President and Prime Minister, rather than the 
Presidency Council  Nevertheless, he said the Sunnis "have no 
objection" to a reformed de-Ba'athification law.  Hashimi 
said Tawafuq's desire to replace Minister of Defense 
Abdalkader al-Mufriji is becoming a key issue in the Cabinet 
reshuffle.  He expressed frustration with the lack of 
deliverables he is able to show his constituency and said he 
perceives a lack of support from the United States.  He said 
a timetable for Coalition withdrawal should be contingent on 
reforming the Iraqi Security Forces or there would be a 
security vacuum.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Trips to Japan, Jordan, and Turkey 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Hashimi said he had just returned from three days in 
Japan, two days in Jordan, and one day in Turkey on official 
visits.  He said the Turks are worried about the PKK and are 
sensitive about Kirkuk.  He said Jordanian King Abdullah was 
frustrated with the instability in Iraq.  In Japan, Hashimi 
said he met with numerous policymakers to help drum up 
support for Tokyo's commitment to Iraq.  Hashimi cited 
Japan's extension of legislation that authorizes its air 
force mission to Iraq as a success of the trip.  He also 
praised Japan for training some 1,400 Iraqi engineers and 
technicians to work in Iraq's oil sector. 
 
¶3. (C) Hashimi said he was surprised by Saudi King Abdullah's 
statement at the Arab League Summit calling the US presence 
in Iraq an "illegitimate foreign occupation."  Hashimi 
thought the remark was aimed at King Abdullah's domestic 
audience and questioned the DCM as to how much the Saudi 
government is doing to counter Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).  The 
DCM said that while it appears the Saudi government is 
against AQI, it is not taking enough action against the group. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
No Objections So Far to De-Ba'athification 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Hashimi said he spoke with President Talabani while he 
was in Tokyo and authorized him to negotiate on his behalf 
regarding the Presidency Council's version of a draft 
de-Ba'athification law.  He did not know that the draft 
ultimately was negotiated and signed as an initiative from 
the President and Prime Minister, and he had not read the 
draft released to the public, although poloffs had sent his 
staff a copy in Arabic.  Nevertheless, Hashimi said he had no 
objection to de-Ba'athification and commented that it was the 
Shia that would have objections. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Frustration with MOD, United States 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) In the middle of the conversation on 
de-Ba'athification, Hashimi became distracted when one of his 
staff delivered him a note saying the office of the head of 
the Sunni Endowment was being raided by the Iraqi Army, and 
asked for the US to investigate the incident.  (Note: MNF-I 
later confirmed that IA cordoned off an area that contained 
the Sunni Endowment office, but no one associated with the 
Endowment was detained.)  Later in the meeting, when asked 
about a Cabinet reshuffle, Hashimi said the Tawafuq wants to 
change MOD Abdulkader and is frustrated that Tawafuq cannot 
do so even though the bloc nominated him.  Hashimi insisted 
that changing Abdulkader would not affect the management of 
the Baghdad Security Plan. 
 
¶6. (C) Hashimi also complained that he was frustrated with 
the United States.  He said it is difficult to save face with 
his constituency when he cannot deliver on his campaign 
promises.  He stressed that it is difficult to speak out 
against AQI and to try to bring insurgents into the political 
process when both groups are getting stronger and his support 
for the GOI has gotten him nowhere.  As usual, he said he 
felt marginalized from the PM's decision-making.  He asked 
for more support from the United States, citing detainee 
releases as an example. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00001118  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (C) The DCM pointed out the increased Coalition oversight 
of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) and the decrease in 
militia activity as improvements Hashimi could show to the 
Sunni street.  With respect to recent U.S. Congressional 
bills proposing timetables for withdrawal, Hashimi said a 
timetable for troop withdrawal should be made after the ISF 
have been reformed because the ISF are incompetent and 
insufficient to handle Iraq's problems.  He noted that until 
reforms happen, there would be a security vacuum if Coalition 
forces left that would lead to civil war.  He said the 
average Sunni does not think the Coalition forces are leaving 
soon. 
 
¶8. (C) Turning briefly to the Iranian kidnapping of British 
navy members, Hashimi said he thought Tehran was annoyed at 
the British in Basrah and was becoming nervous.  He said the 
lack of coordination among Tehran's different governmental 
organization made Tehran difficult to deal with. 
 
CROCKER