VZCZCXRO0955
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1117/01 0901559
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311559Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0478
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WITH FM ZEBARI DISCUSS RIYADH SUMMIT, 
NEIGHBORS CONFERENCE 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 1033 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: On March 30, the Foreign Minister warmly 
welcomed Ambassador Crocker to Iraq, accepted copies of his 
credentials, and discussed at some length the recent Arab 
League Summit in Riyadh.  The GoI countered Saudi comments 
about an "illegal occupation" by noting Iraqi concurrence 
with the coalition presence.  He suggested that Saudi 
Arabia's real concern was Iran's increased regional 
influence, which the Kingdom should counter by supporting the 
GoI.  Zebari was generally pleased with the summit's outcome 
and hoped Arab states would be more than spectators in the 
future.  Iraq has raised the detention of 15 British sailors 
with Iran multiple times, but "more pressure" may be required. 
 
¶2.  (C) Zebari cited his frustration in overseeing foreign 
policy against the backdrop of many GoI voices claiming to 
speak on behalf of Iraq's international goals -- "everyone is 
busy doing my work."  He called for greater discipline within 
the GoI, complained about the PM's "incompetent" staff, and 
asked the Ambassador to help MFA develop as an institution by 
coordinating key issues with the Minister.  Preparation for 
the expanded neighbors' conference was complicated by poor 
GoI coordination; Zebari said there were "new ideas" on the 
conference.  Both Turkey and Egypt were willing to host an 
expanded conference without a preliminary "neighbors only" 
event, he said, but some still wanted the event in Iraq and 
Kuwait remained a possible fall back.  The GoI would insist 
on controlling the agenda regardless of venue.  End summary. 
 
Credentials passed to FM 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Foreign Minister Zebari received copies of Ambassador 
Crocker's letter of credentials March 30, noting his pleasure 
at the Ambassador's return; he cited the Ambassador's 
familiarity with Iraq and the region and looked forward to 
working on "common goals" in these "critical and historic 
times."  The Ambassador expressed his pleasure at being here 
to work with the great people of Iraq and assist GoI efforts 
to reign in violence. 
 
Riyadh summit 
------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Stating that Iraq would not "shy away" from its close 
relationship with the U.S., Zebari said Iraq had countered 
King Abdullah's remarks at the Riyadh Summit (regarding an 
"illegal foreign occupation" of Iraq) by stressing that the 
coalition presence was not illegal, was at Iraqi invitation 
and consent, and had an international mandate.  He did not 
speculate as to the King's motivation, but joked that some 
cited the "illegal occupation" as Iran's influence in Iraq. 
Saudi Arabia has "a deep sense of insecurity" about Iran's 
role in the region, a concern which it could not "tolerate 
nor ponder."  Riyadh's attitude towards the (Shia-led) GoI is 
not positive, said Zebari, who had encouraged the Saudis to 
recognize that the best option to overcome Iranian influence 
was to support the independence of the GoI.  Conversely, 
neglecting the GoI would play into Iranian hands.  Zebari 
said he "hammered" this issue repeatedly with Arab 
counterparts. 
 
¶5.  (C) Riyadh was Zebari's fourth Arab Summit, and he 
detected a heightened awareness of the danger of what is 
happening in Iraq.  He was generally pleased with public 
statements and positive atmospherics in bilateral meetings 
(mentioning Saudi, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Arab League, 
Turkey, and Syria).  Iraq's "tough words" at the ministerial 
helped set the stage for a practical discussion of Iraq, he 
suggested, and aside from King Abdullah's remarks (which left 
Iraq "a bit hurt"), statements were not provocative and no 
one was calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops.  Withdrawal 
would be "the real disaster," he had emphasized with his Arab 
counterparts -- who were "on the defensive" about not doing 
enough to support Iraq.  He called on Arab states to move 
beyond a "spectator" role.  Statements in support of a 
high-level Arab League gathering in Iraq were also 
significant, he added. 
 
¶6.  (C) Asked about debt relief, Zebari said the topic was 
addressed positively and with "balance" in Riyadh, without 
elaborating.  He had focused on GoI efforts to stabilize the 
country and called for Arab support of reconciliation.  In 
closed session in Riyadh, Zebari claimed he had told 
participants that the GoI's legitimacy comes from the Iraqi 
people and did not require Arab approval -- reconciliation 
 
BAGHDAD 00001117  002 OF 003 
 
 
should therefore focus around support for GoI efforts. 
 
¶7.  (C) Outcomes of the summit included a "clear, 
unequivocal" condemnation of terrorism, support for the 
Baghdad security plan, urging the Arab League to revive 
reconciliation conferences, positive comments on debt relief, 
praise for the Baghdad Neighbors' Conference, mention of the 
Iraq Compact, and "the usual" notes about diplomatic 
representation and reciprocal visits.  The PM was satisfied 
that the Riyadh statement was the best Iraq could hope for 
"under the circumstances." 
 
British sailors detained in Iran 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Iraq raised the detention of 15 British sailors and 
marines with Iran's foreign minister, said Zebari, which was 
the "second or third" GoI approach to encourage their 
release.  The sailors were part of MNF "operating in our 
waters at our invitation."  He acknowledged the absence of a 
clear agreement on a demarcation line between Iraqi and 
Iranian waters, adding that these patrols had been ongoing 
for some time in the area.  He lamented Iran's "backing down" 
on a promise to release the female sailor, noting that more 
pressure may be needed.  Summit participants in Riyadh were 
not willing to commit to increasing the pressure (although 
Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal had reportedly agreed to call for the 
sailors' release if asked by the press). 
 
¶9.  (C) Zebari had not personally discussed the sailors' 
detention with Iran's Ambassador in Baghdad (suggesting that 
he thought his staff may have done so), but said the Iranian 
foreign minister's aides with whom he had raised it report 
"in similar channels" as Iran's Ambassador.  He said he had 
raised the issue in New York as well. 
 
GoI coordination of foreign policy 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Expressing "high hopes" that better security would 
pave the way for more effective Iraqi diplomacy, Zebari 
emphasized that there is "very little we can achieve on 
foreign policy" without fixing "the domestic" aspect of 
governance.  Domestic stability and coordination was needed 
to gain international credibility.  Zebari said Iraq's 
foreign policy was unduly complex because "everyone is busy 
doing my work" -- a clear jab at other GoI entities engaging 
in uncoordinated meetings with foreign officials.  Kuwait had 
hosted, for example, four delegations of an "almost 
presidential" level within two weeks, confusing MFA efforts 
at coordination.  (Note:  The PM's office has similarly 
accused Zebari of uncoordinated engagement with foreign 
leaders.  End note.)  The FM called for discipline within the 
GoI, reigning in individuals who were giving a "completely 
different picture" of GoI goals in their international 
outreach. 
 
Slow coordination of expanded neighbors' conference 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶11.  (C) Asking to reserve discussion of the 
ministerial-level neighbors' conference for another time 
(likely to avoid sensitive topics in front of MFA and Embassy 
staff), Zebari said all parties supported the concept, wanted 
to keep momentum alive, and were juggling a number of "new 
ideas" about how to proceed.  Pressed on the importance of 
setting dates and venue quickly, Zebari said Turkey was still 
willing to host an expanded meeting and that Egypt was keen 
to host on similar terms.  FM Aboul Gheit has specifically 
asked President Mubarak about Egyptian willingness to host a 
neighbors plus event and received a positive nod for hosting 
on April 23-24. 
 
¶12.  (C) Zebari said he had spoken with Treasury DepSec 
Kimmit in New York and the UNSG in Riyadh and agreed that 
mixing the neighbors' conference (which had a strong security 
and political focus) with an Iraq Compact event (focused on 
economic engagement and reconstruction), might not meet the 
approval of the GCC.  The two events have separate lists of 
participants as well.  Nonetheless, Zebari said that an 
expanded neighbors plus event could feature a session in 
which the Compact was signed -- avoiding excessive pressure 
to host two events that might be incompatible.  The 
Ambassador reminded Zebari that two distinct events on 
subsequent days were feasible and offered an opportunity to 
advance Iraq's interests on multiple fronts. 
 
¶13.  (C) Asking the Ambassador and DCM to join him in private 
session, Zebari noted difficulty in coordination with the 
PM's office (see para 15).  In spite of prior understandings 
of the PM's views on parameters for an expanded 
ministerial-level neighbors' conference, the PM's office had 
 
BAGHDAD 00001117  003 OF 003 
 
 
apparently not taken action and was under pressure because 
"Najaf does not want an expanded conference."  Zebari had 
pushed back, but was finding coordination very difficult. 
 
¶14.  (C) The GoI wanted to control the agenda regardless of 
venue, said Zebari, who hoped to give the world confidence in 
GoI management of a large diplomatic event.  The PM's office 
had made unhelpful suggestions about meeting in Geneva (a 
"neutral" location) and the PM himself still wanted to host 
the event in Iraq (Zebari said President Talabani still had 
similar notions), in spite of Zebari's insistence that the 
scope of the meeting would overwhelm either Baghdad or Erbil. 
 He felt he had convinced them of the impracticalities, yet 
the PM and his advisors were still pressing for an Iraqi 
venue.  Iran wants it here as well, he noted.  At present, 
all options remain open, including Kuwait as a possible fall 
back (Kuwaiti FM reportedly gained the Emir's concurrence). 
Kuwait would be a host country "without an agenda" of its own. 
 
Strengthening the MFA's foreign policy role 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) The FM told the Ambassador privately that the MFA, 
an institution built with U.S. help, should play a more 
central role in Iraq's foreign policy.  The world needed to 
respect MFA's voice.  Multiple channels of communication on 
foreign policy issues complicated MFA's role and diminished 
its international impact -- including by implication U.S. 
negotiation with other Iraqi officials on issues clearly 
within the purview of MFA.  Claiming to have good working 
relations with the PM himself, Zebari cited difficulties in 
working with the PM's staff, many of whom are "incompetent" 
and "sectarian to the core."  The PM would often take 
Zebari's advice on an issue, only to have the agreement 
unraveled by his advisors.  The Ambassador expressed his 
great respect for the MFA as an institution and said he 
planned frequent coordination with the minister. 
CROCKER