VZCZCXRO0948
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1115/01 0901518
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 311518Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0474
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001115 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF DHI QAR PROVINCE: PART III 
) OMS AND JAM 
 
REF: A) 06 BAGHDAD 4186 B) 06 BAGHDAD 4430 
 
Classified By: Classified By: Dhi Qar PRT Deputy Team Leader Richard Ri 
ley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is a PRT Dhi Qar cable, the third in a series 
detailing the political landscape of Dhi Qar Province. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Summary: The Office of the Martyr Al-Sadr (OMS) has 
a large following in Dhi Qar Province, but no representation 
on the Provincial Council (PC) or in the Governor's office 
(the OMS boycotted PC elections).  Were a PC election held 
today with OMS participation, however, we believe the OMS 
would gain seats, although certainly not a majority in 
competition with three other strong parties -- SCIRI, Fadilah 
and Al-Dawa.  The militia wing of the OMS, the Jayesh 
Al-Mahdi (JAM), has a strong presence in Dhi Qar and a 
demonstrated willingness to conduct anti-coalition attacks. 
Evidence gathered from coalition sources suggests that the 
city of Nassiriyah in Dhi Qar is being used as a weapons 
emporium for JAM elements in other provinces like Baghdad and 
Najaf.  While direct evidence of Iranian support is difficult 
to establish, circumstantial evidence suggests the Government 
of Iran may have supplied JAM in Nassiriyah with 107 mm and 
122 mm "Katyusha" rockets, IEDs, and possibly weapons 
training either in Iran or through Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
Although JAM and the Badr Corp are political (and at times 
military) rivals, the two organizations have demonstrated a 
willingness to cooperate with each other on issues of mutual 
interest like targeting former Ba'athists for assassination 
or coordinating logistics for attacks on Coalition Forces 
(CF).  Evidence suggests that in addition to the "official" 
JAM, up to 20% of affiliated militia members not under direct 
JAM control operate as loyal (?) rogue elements.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
REASONS FOR OMS/JAM SUPPORT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) The OMS base of support in Dhi Qar Province is largely 
among the uneducated poor, whether rural or urban.  This is 
primarily due to the origins of the organization, which 
include Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr's demonstrated affinity for 
poor Shi'ites in the 1980's and 1990's and his son's (Moqtada 
Al-Sadr's) continuing organizational activities among the 
Shia poor.  Dhi Qar's largely uneducated rural population 
continues to permit pervasive OMS/JAM influence.  There is 
significant support for OMS/JAM in the cities of Nassiriyah 
and Suq Al-Shuyukh.  Despite the following they enjoy in the 
province, the OMS and JAM are also resented by many due to 
activities which include ad hoc police patrols to check 
shopkeepers for pornography, schemes resembling protection 
rackets, and other destabilizing operations.  (Comment: Iraqi 
Police and other government officials recently told CF 
representatives that they no longer permit JAM to man illegal 
checkpoints in the city of Nassiriyah.  This year,s Ashura 
celebration in January and February was the first time in a 
few years that these checkpoints were absent and JAM members 
were not allowed to carry weapons in public.  End comment.) 
Support for OMS/JAM is thus not universal and has limits 
among those who, while not secular, nevertheless eschew 
extremism and believe that the government and other 
institutions of Dhi Qar should focus on economic prosperity. 
They have endured Saddam Hussein and more than a decade of 
economic hardship and simply want to put militant activity 
behind them. 
 
¶4.  (C) OMS has some mosques in Dhi Qar under its control, 
but not nearly as many as the SCIRI and Fadilah parties. 
Many OMS members will go to mosques associated with Fadilah; 
there is significant communication between Fadilah and OMS. 
Despite the fact that Fadilah and SCIRI control more mosques, 
OMS is gaining popularity in Dhi Qar.  We suspect part of the 
reason is that JAM is now helping Shi'ite refugees who have 
come to Dhi Qar fleeing the Sunni Insurgency in places like 
Baghdad and Baquba.  Thus, significant support for OMS/JAM in 
some quarters due to financial benefits is countered by the 
dislike of many others who resent intrusive and destabilizing 
activities. 
 
--------------------------- 
OMS/JAM OPERATIONAL PROFILE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S/REL: AUS, CAN, UK, US)  Sheik Ahmed Al-Khafaji is the 
Division Commander and senior JAM leader residing in Dhi Qar. 
 Another key commander is Sheik Aus Al-Khafaji, who was once 
a lieutenant of Moqtada al-Sadr and a recognized Imam within 
OMS/JAM but who fell out of favor for a short while in the 
summer of 2006.  We now believe he is back in favor, 
generally operates out of Baghdad, and comes frequently to 
 
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Dhi Qar to buy weapons and initiate attacks against coalition 
forces using his offices as an Imam, and his prestige as a 
Sadrist preacher close Moqtada Al Sadr.  Coalition military 
sources operating in Dhi Qar believe that Sheik Ahmed 
al-Khafaji appears to be the point of contact for JAM 
commanders in other provinces such as Baghdad, Najaf and 
Basrah, facilitating the sale of illegal weapons.  The local 
JAM leadership in Nassiriyah then coordinates with contacts 
in Suq Al-Shuyukh for transfer of weapons to JAM buyers. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) Coalition military sources in Dhi Qar, 
corroborated by PRT sources, believe there are approximately 
5,000 JAM members in Dhi Qar, although the number fluctuates 
and not all aligned with JAM participate in militia 
activities.  In addition to JAM's generally rural and 
uneducated demographic, the organization also enjoys the 
support of some Sheikhs (many rural and uneducated 
themselves), and counts as members some senior Iraqi Police 
(IP) and Iraqi Army (IA) personnel.  These more senior 
members of the IP and IA act as facilitators of JAM 
activities by providing intelligence and using their 
influence to facilitate the transfer of weapons (including 
rockets, IEDs and mortars) to and from the Nassiriyah area. 
(Comment: The city of Suq Al-Shuyukh, the second most 
populous city in Dhi Qar, appears to be used as a hub for 
Iraqi insurgents and terrorists for weapons from Iran.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) Like the other political parties in Dhi Qar, OMS 
maintains its party headquarters in Nassiriyah and has 
offices on the district and sub-district level.  We believe 
they use these offices to coordinate with JAM as well as for 
political activities.  Recently, in addition to the OMS 
office and JAM headquarters in Nassiriyah, JAM opened a 
separate Operations Center in the city.  Coalition sources 
has learned that JAM leadership and officers recently moved 
out of the OMS office in Nassiriyah into the JAM 
headquarters.  (Comment:  We believe this move was calculated 
to reinforce the illusion that OMS and JAM are separate 
entities, and to give the OMS better political cover, 
especially in light of expected provincial elections in the 
second half of 2007.  End comment.) 
 
¶8.  (SBU) While OMS is technically out of political power in 
local Dhi Qar governance, making it difficult to win 
appointment to official jobs controlled by the Governor's 
Office and PC, many are appointed to federal jobs in Dhi Qar 
controlled by  the Sadrist ministries in Baghdad; almost all 
such appointments are OMS related.  JAM is also known to use 
strong arm tactics with local contractors to secure jobs for 
its members.  JAM may then "guarantee" the security of a 
contracted project, and the behavior of the JAM employees, in 
essence running a mafia-like protection racket. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Coalition military sources operating in Dhi Qar 
report that an individual seeking a job with the Iraqi Police 
must bribe the hiring officer with three months' salary.  The 
estimated starting monthly salary for an entry level police 
officer $350.  Three months' salary reaches over $1,000 -- a 
significant sum in this poor province.  Other reports 
indicate $300 as the "entry fee" to join the police.  The 
bribe varies from province to province and depends on one's 
political affiliation.  JAM will pay that bribe for its 
members, or for potential JAM recruits, in order to 
infiltrate the police and win new recruits. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) JAM is active in the Province and engages in 
anti-coalition activities via Indirect Fire (IDF) Attacks 
against Camp Adder and Cedar II, two primary Coalition bases 
in Dhi Qar.  In addition to IDF, there have been various 
Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFP,s) emplaced and targeted 
against CF.  Coalition military sources operating in Dhi Qar 
believe the JAM, and militias associated with OMS, are 
responsible for most of the direct and indirect fire attacks 
on CF in Dhi Qar. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
POSSIBLE IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR JAM IN DHI QAR 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S/NF) Despite OMS/JAM,s professed rejection of Iranian 
influence inside Iraq, coalition sources believe, based on 
local sources, that many JAM units have been receiving 
support from Iran to carry out anti-CF attacks.  The major 
hub of weapons trafficking in Dhi Qar -- Suq Al-Shuyukh -- is 
the traditional smuggling hub for almost any illegal item 
from Iran.  Consistent reporting shows a pattern of  Suq 
Al-Shuyukh being used as a depot for JAM rockets and IEDs, 
and  Nassiriyah JAM acting as  the weapons broker and point 
of contact for the JAM and other sympathetic militias in 
other provinces.  Coalition military sources report weapons 
 
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smuggling from other points as well, such as Al-Amarah in 
Maysan province and Chubayish in southern Dhi Qar, all of 
which are on traditional smuggling routes from Iran. 
Coalition military sources have also learned that the average 
resale price on the "open market" in Dhi Qar for a 107 mm 
Katyusha rocket is around $200 and for a 122 mm Katyusha 
rocket is $500.  We are not certain how these prices compare 
with the international weapons market, but suspect they are 
low, possibly indicating subsidization from their likely 
point of origin, i.e. Iran.  As to direct cash support for 
JAM in Dhi Qar, the evidence is conflicting.  We have several 
credible reports which indicate JAM was cash strapped in late 
2006, which could refute assertions of direct funding from 
Iran.  There is insufficient evidence to make a direct cash 
link to Iran. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
COOPERATION AMONG ERSTWHILE COMPETITORS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
12  (S/REL) JAM and members of the Badr Militia will 
cooperate with each other when Coalition Forces are the 
target, and in targeting former Ba'athists for assassination. 
 The extent of anti-CF cooperation seems to be in scenarios 
in which JAM does the targeting and Badr Militia members 
facilitate the transfer of weapons by allowing them to pass 
unimpeded through police checkpoints under their control. 
This is done largely out of fear of JAM reprisal.  JAM, the 
Badr Militia, and other organizations have cooperated to 
target former Ba'athists as well. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
ROGUE ELEMENTS AND THE ATOMIZATION OF JAM 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (S) Many militias which claim to be part of JAM in Dhi 
Qar do not fall under JAM command and control, yet these 
rogue elements carry out anti-CF attacks independently of 
direction from JAM commanders (reftels).  In addition, the 
ranks of the JAM, much more so than other militias, contain 
individuals who are more criminal opportunist than idealist 
and who use the JAM structure to carry out kidnapping for 
profit and smuggling operations.  In addition to these 
criminals, JAM's "rogue elements" also include ideologically 
motivated elements who will attack CF even without the 
approval of JAM Dhi Qar central command. 
 
¶14. (S) In Dhi Qar, the OMS and JAM are separate operations. 
OMS is linked directly to Moqtada Al-Sadr as his political 
party, and JAM is a militia ostensibly under Sadr's control, 
but which in reality tends to act independently.  We believe 
that JAM in Dhi Qar will take operational orders from senior 
JAM leadership in Baghdad, and sometimes Najaf, but the day 
to day operations, including orders to carry out anti-CF 
attacks in Dhi Qar, are issued at the provincial level.  JAM 
and OMS are linked in the sense that they operationally 
support one another. 
 
15  (S/NF) Many smaller militias in Dhi Qar associate 
themselves with JAM but are not under its command and control 
structure.  Some estimates suggest that around 20% of the 
total JAM militia force in the province falls into this 
category (ref. A).  We believe this ratio may increase as 
local commanders seek autonomy from centralized direction. 
 
¶16.  (C) Understanding the rationale behind OMS and JAM 
support in the province is critical in determining strategies 
to dilute their influence.  Contact with Iraqis in regions 
under heavy OMS/JAM influence has demonstrated that contact 
with personnel from U.S. Army Civil Affairs, U.S. State 
Department and other U.S. federal agencies operating through 
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams has the potential to 
undermine support for OMS/JAM.  The U.S. Army team and the 
Dhi Qar PRT on Camp Adder have been able to make inroads into 
areas previously thought to be "off limits" because of 
militia activity in Dhi Qar -- most notably the city of Suq 
Al-Shuyukh.  A strong regimen of capacity building, economic 
and infrastructure development, along with a strong Public 
Diplomacy program, will go a long way towards furthering 
Coalition goals, and undermining support for OMS/JAM in the 
province. 
CROCKER