VZCZCXRO7534
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #0559/01 0751229
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161229Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8475
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000559 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR
SUBJECT: FM BAKOYANNIS OUTLINES GOALS FOR HER MARCH 22 
VISIT TO WASHINGTON 
 
REF: ATHENS 550 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES RIES.  REASON:  1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  In advance of her March 19-23 visit to the 
U.S., FM Bakoyannis told the Ambassador of her hope that the 
visit can result in a clear indication by the Secretary of 
political support for Greece's entry into the Visa Waiver 
Program.  She also pressed for a U.S. statement supporting 
Greece's position on a cancelled NATO exercise, arguing that 
a NATO-wary Greek public needed to see that the U.S., and 
NATO, would defend Greek interests as well.  Ambassador 
emphasized that he understood the importance of public 
perceptions of NATO in relation to possible further Greek 
contributions to NATO operations, including in Afghanistan. 
Bakoyannis added that she anticipates discussing Balkan 
issues with the Secretary, including Macedonia's NATO entry 
and next steps on the Ahtisaari plan on Kosovo.  END SUMMARY. 
 
ONE (SMALL) STEP FORWARD ON VWP? 
 
¶2.  (C)  Bakoyannis went straight to the point:  under 
political pressure at home for being too pro-American, she 
needed to point to positive results from her March 22 
meetings in Washington.  She hoped that, as a result of their 
meeting, the Secretary would be able to make a statement of 
political will from the U.S. administration regarding Greek 
participation in VWP.  She hoped the Secretary could 
emphasize that Greece deserved to enter VWP, and would be 
both clear and positive -- not something journalists would 
misunderstand.  It also needed to go further than what had 
been said to other Greek officials.  While as an EU member, 
Bakoyannis anticipated that Greece would eventually become 
eligible through the EU's efforts, it would be better for 
U.S.-Greek relations for the decision to be made on a 
bilateral basis. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Ambassador pointed out that the administration 
wanted Greece to be able to participate in VWP, but that, 
bureaucratically, the process was not yet ready to for a 
formal finding that Greece was eligible.  Bakoyannis 
questioned the delay; hadn't the procedure had been under way 
for a year?  The Ambassador reminded her that, formally, it 
had begun only late last fall.  No decision on VWP could be 
made during Bakoyannis' visit.  Bakoyannis mulled a request 
to see DHS Secretary Chertoff, but emphasized that she was 
not looking for a final decision on Greek participation. 
That was a deliverable for PM Karamanlis to achieve.  Rather, 
Bakoyannis wanted a step forward -- underscoring that the 
U.S. Administration was commmitted to Greek entry into VWP. 
 
 
NATO EXERCISE CANCELLATION:  NEED U.S. SUPPORT 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ambassador underscored the importance of effective 
Greek participation in NATO, which he had just discussed 
during consultations in Brussels.  He noted that many factors 
played into decisions regarding NATO exercises in the Aegean; 
members of the SYG's staff had expressed concern about the 
unfortunate handling of the Ayios Efstratios decision. 
Bakoyannis confirmed that she would raise the subject with 
Secretary Rice.  For Greece, NATO acquiescence in Turkish 
 
SIPDIS 
efforts to cast doubt on the status of islands in the Aegean 
would create a "black hole," with half of the Aegean 
demilitarized.  The United States could not remain neutral in 
this case.  For that reason, Bakoyannis hoped for a clear 
statement from the U.S. during her visit, emphasizing our 
agreement that Ayios Efstratios was not demilitarized.  The 
Greek public needed, for once, NATO (and U.S.) backing for 
its position. 
 
¶5.  (C)   Ambassador noted that we had already alerted 
Washington to this request (reftel).  We noticed the reaction 
to the controversy here.  We understand that a better opinion 
of NATO in Greece could help the government find the 
political capital to support committing  further forces to 
NATO efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere.  Ambassador asked 
whether Greece is pushing for a U.S. statement that we do not 
consider Ayios Efstratios demilitarized, or U.S. suppport for 
re-staging the cancelled exercise.  Bakoyannis (and her Chief 
of Staff Chalastanis) noted that while either would be 
positive, they much preferred a U.S. statement backing 
Greece's position. 
 
MACEDONIA 
 
¶6.  (C)  Bakoyannis noted she would also raise Greek concerns 
regarding "FYROM" with the Secretary.  The new government in 
Skopje seemed to be losing its sense of restraint, 
undertaking acts (airport naming, statue erection) that 
needlessly provoked Greek public opinion.  While Bakoyannis 
was trying to keep this issue from affecting internal 
 
ATHENS 00000559  002 OF 002 
 
 
politics in Greece, it was clear that NATO accession was a 
looming problem.  If accession is delayed for a year, that 
would provide additional time to work on a solution to the 
name issue.  Ambassador pointed out that the U.S. would not 
agree to postpone Macedonia's accession to 2009 because of 
the name dispute.  The decisions would be taken on the basis 
of whether the three met NATO criteria. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Bakoyannis took the point, adding that there was no 
need to highlight the name dispute if accession was postponed 
for substantive implementation reasons.  She added that while 
the GOG believed that the previous government in Skopje had 
been committed to an eventual agreement, the current 
government made no secret of its intentions not to 
compromise.  The GOG was ready to do most of the heavy 
lifting (and the Karamanlis government was prepared to take 
the political heat), but they needed assurances that it would 
not be a one-way street.  As she put it, "We can move 80 
percent of the way, but the Skopjeans have to be prepared to 
move 20 percent." 
 
KOSOVO 
 
¶8.  (c)  Bakoyannis told the Ambassador she had discussed 
Kosovo with Russian FM Lavrov March 15, admitting that even 
after the discussion, she did not know how far Russia would 
go in backing the Serbs.  She also planned to talk to Serbian 
PM Tadic later on March 16 (he is on a private visit to 
Greece).  Both the Russians and the Serbs were concerned 
about the Ahtisaari's "lack of generosity" to the Kosovo 
Serbs.  Their fears should be addressed.  Bakoyannis believed 
that more time was needed to make progress on 3-4 issues that 
might make the settlement go down more easily.  She did not 
expect the Serbs would ever explicitly agree, but if the deal 
was rebalanced somewhat, it might have less impact on 
instability in the wider region (she was particularly 
concerned about Bosnia).  Ambassador pointed out that NATO 
forces needed to operate in a permissive environment; it was 
not an occupying force.  For that reason, it was essential to 
craft a Kosovo transition that was supported by the majority 
of Kosovars, and to do so now.  Prolongation of the status 
quo was not an option. 
COUNTRYMAN