VZCZCXRO3516
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAR #0497/01 0611439
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021439Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3875
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0044
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ACCRA 000497 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AF/RSA DANIEL EPSTEIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017 
TAGS: CH ECON EFIN ENRG PGOV PREL XA XE GH
SUBJECT: CHINESE INFLUENCE IN GHANA - AN UPDATE 
 
REF: A) STATE 024937 B) BEIJING 679 C) 04 ACCRA 621 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF SCOTT TICKNOR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  Chinese involvement in Ghana, dating from 
the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1960, is strong 
and growing.  After independence, President Kwame Nkrumah 
sought close ties with China, a relationship that continued 
throughout the Rawlings years.  The bilateral friendship 
became more guarded after President Kufuor was elected in 
2000, yet China and Ghana continue to interact across a wide 
spectrum of activities.  In particular, economic and 
commercial ties are growing.  Ironically, Ghana reportedly 
contracted with China to supply a special "Ghana at 50" 
fabric for the Jubilee celebrations next week.  As requested 
ref A, following is a summary of Chinese activities in Ghana 
and potential areas for future U.S.-Chinese dialogue and 
cooperation in Ghana.  End summary. 
 
 
Diplomatic, Political, and Military Activities 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Chinese maintain a medium-sized mission in 
Accra.  Perhaps due to their policy of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of other countries, the Chinese tend to 
focus their efforts on the economic and commercial front. 
They support Ghana's participation in various African 
peacekeeping missions, including a $1.2 million grant for the 
purchase of vehicles used in such operations.  Ghana has just 
taken delivery of two Chinese K8 Fighter jets; two more will 
be delivered later.  The Chinese have also rehabilitated 
military barracks in Accra, built an administrative bulding 
for the Ministry of Defense on the military base in Accra, 
and donated ammunition for Ghana's Soviet-era equipment. 
China hosts training for Ghanaian military personnel but 
Ghana prefers the military training offered by the United 
States.  The GOG has, for example, requested that the U.S. 
provide training for the pilots who will fly the K8 fighters. 
 The Ghana-China Friendship Association was launched in 2002 
but because the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) had close 
ties with Taiwan prior to coming to power in 2000, a degree 
of reserve in Chinese-Ghanaian relations followed President 
Kufuor's election.  Nevertheless, Kufuor hosted a visit by 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in June 2006 and joined 
representatives of 48 other African nations in attending a 
Chinese summit in November 2006 that was designed to chart a 
roadmap for cooperation between China and Africa for the 
period 2007-09.  During this summit, Kufuor was reportedly 
very favorably impressed with China's offers of new loans and 
assistance.  Since the summit, there have been a series of 
follow-up visits between the GOG and China to work on deals 
discussed during the summit. 
 
 
Economic and Commercial Activities 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) China's general economic and commercial engagement 
in Africa (ref b) is evident in Ghana.  For example, China 
has become Ghana's second-largest trading partner after 
Nigeria, with two-way trade increasing in 2005 to $769 
million, up 30% over the previous year.  Ghana exported 
timber, cocoa, scrap metal, wood products, salt, and fish 
products valued at $79 million, a sum dwarfed by $690 million 
of Chinese imports into Ghana, primarily light manufactured 
goods, chemicals, and low-cost clothing.  The clothing 
imports are controversial since many Ghanaians believe that 
the importation of items such as faux kente cloth have 
damaged the domestic textile industry.  Nevertheless, Ghana's 
desire to cultivate closer relations with China was further 
evidenced by its decision to give China the contract to print 
the special "Ghana at 50" cloth for next week's Jubilee 
celebrations. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) China has offered Ghana financing for a number of 
high profile projects, most notably a $600 million loan to 
finance construction of a 400-megawatt dam at Bui on 
concessional terms yet to be finalized.  Other infrastructure 
loans said to be in the works include $70 million to expand 
rural telephone service, $30 million to complete a fiber 
optic grid, and additional funding for tilapia fish farms, 
fishing piers, and cold storage facilities.  In addition, the 
Chinese are discussing the possibility of building a 140-200 
megawatt power plant; executives from Shenzen Energy Group 
have traveled to Ghana twice in the past six months. 
Consequently, total new borrowing from China could exceed $1 
billion.  (Comment:  These projects will address some of 
 
ACCRA 00000497  002 OF 002 
 
 
Ghana's major development challenges but they may not be the 
best choices over the long term.  Though concessional, these 
deals would add to Ghana's debt and a cost/benefit analysis 
of these specific projects compared to other options has not, 
to our knowledge, been done.  End Comment.)  China also 
provides grant and in-kind assistance, such as building a 
large youth center in Kumasi and renovating the National 
Theatre.  These projects, typically employing hundreds of 
Chinese contractors and using imported Chinese materials, 
have generated a good deal of positive publicity for the 
Chinese government. 
 
¶5.  (C)  China competes aggressively with the U.S. and others 
for deals with the GOG, often to the frustration of U.S. 
businesses.  Because China is not bound by the OECD Export 
Credit Agency agreement nor international norms concerning 
labor rights, environmental protection, and corruption, the 
playing field is not level.  Exacerbating the situation is 
Ghana's own tradition of cronyism and lack of transparency in 
procurement.  The Procurement Act has loopholes allowing for 
sole source contracting and the acceptance of unsolicited 
offers that are fully financed.  For example, after two years 
of negotiations, Motorola recently lost out to a last-minute 
Chinese offer to provide radios to the police, ostensibly 
because the Chinese financing package was more attractive, 
despite the fact that China's EXIM bank had not committed to 
the project.  Chinese nationals are also widely believed to 
be involved in illegal logging and fishing.  China was 
unsuccessful, however, in its attempt to maneuver around 
ALCOA and purchase raw Ghanaian bauxite. 
 
 
Chinese Activities in Health 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) China is planning to send medical teams to Ghana to 
perform research and combat infectious diseases. China has 
also donated some mosquito nets but has not, to date, been 
involved with other donors in planning or coordination.  The 
Chinese did not participate in the multi-donor task forces on 
avian flu or malaria and did not respond to an Embassy 
request for information on activities to help inform the USG 
as it prepares to implement the President's Malaria 
Initiative. 
 
 
Potential US-Chinese Cooperation 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) U.S. assistance tends to focus on policy reform, 
capacity building, health, and humanitarian work, while the 
Chinese prefer to invest in splashier projects, such as roads 
and buildings.  This division of labor could be complementary 
but China tends to keep its plans close-hold and has not 
traditionally participated in donor coordination meetings. 
This may be about to change.  The Heads of Mission (HOM) in 
Accra recently invited China (and India) to consider 
participating in monthly HOM meetings.  China's COM welcomed 
the idea and said China would attend the next meeting on 
April 5, where HOM's will discuss resources employed, 
results, and harmonization of efforts in support of Ghana's 
development.  It remains to be seen whether China's 
participation will be permanent, and if so, whether it will 
lead to greater transparency or will simply provide China 
with more information it can use to pursue its own interests 
more effectively.  Unfortunately, those interests may not be 
in accord with ours, nor will they necessarily redound to 
Ghana's long-term benefit. 
 
¶8.  (C) Areas of potential cooperation with the Chinese 
include health issues and some elements of the MCA Compact, 
such as infrastructure improvements and agricultural 
development.  As a developing nation with millions of small 
farm plots, China is in a good position to work in a 
complementary manner with us in increasing yields and helping 
farmers to improve their standard of living.  Their 
willingness to work with us in these areas is less certain. 
Nevertheless, we recommend continuing a dialogue with the 
Chinese in hopes of leveraging our programs and moving the 
Chinese incrementally toward greater support of our efforts 
to promote transparency, the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights in Ghana. 
BRIDGEWATER