VZCZCXRO4410
RR RUEHCHI
DE RUEHVN #0144/01 0530929
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 220929Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0915
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 7155
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0148
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0975
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0218
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0684
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0513
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0591
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0150

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 VIENTIANE 000144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC), PRM/FO (DAS GREENE), 
DRL/AWH (ORONA), AND IO/FO (DAS WARLICK AND LAGON); BANGKOK 
ALSO FOR REFCOORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 
TAGS: LA PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SMIG
SUBJECT: UNHCR AND ICRC REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES DISCUSS 
HMONG ISSUES 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 0596 
 
     ¶B. VIENTIANE 0110 
     ¶C. 06 VIENTIANE 1205 
     ¶D. 06 VIENTIANE 1045 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach: reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met with Bangkok-based 
representatives of both UNHCR and ICRC to review the recent 
spurt of issues relating to the problems the Government of 
Laos (GOL) has with its Hmong minority.  Both UNHCR and ICRC 
help hold keys to resolving Hmong issues, from the 
decades-old but dwindling insurgency to dealing with the 
thousands of Lao Hmong in Thailand, including the 8000 at the 
holding camp in Petchabun Province.  Unfortunately, the GOL 
is missing opportunities -- neither UNHCR nor ICRC have been 
able to make appointments with GOL officials during their 
visits.  Fortunately, both take their responsibilities 
seriously and will continue to try to establish and expand 
their relationships with the GOL.  For UNHCR, that means a 
possible visit by Erika Feller, UNHCR's Director of 
International Protection, in April.  End summary. 
 
UNHCR MEETING 
------------- 
¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with Mr. Hasim Utkan, UNHCR's 
Bangkok-based Regional Representative, and his Deputy, Mr. 
Giuseppe de Vincentis, on February 20 to discuss a range of 
issues relating to the Hmong minority group.  The UNHCR has 
not had a presence in Laos since the GOL asked it to stop 
operations and leave as of December 31, 2001. 
 
   The Nong Khai Group (152  2) 
   ---------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Mr. Utkan called Nong Khai, where more than 150 Lao 
Hmong have been held for an extended period, "a no man's 
land."  Although the Thai Prime Minister, after an 
unsuccessful attempt on January 30 to deport this group to 
Laos (even though all had UNHCR refugee determination -- ref 
A), had promised that resettlement abroad would be 
considered, Utkan pointed out that no one has been allowed 
access to the group since.  One problem is that the Thai and 
Lao had reached a bilateral agreement to deport the group as 
illegal migrants, and the Thais say the Lao side insists the 
agreement be carried out.  Both U.S. and Australian refugee 
processing officers have been on standby for more than a 
week, but the Thais continue to deny access.  It is unclear 
when this will be resolved.  Utkan expressed appreciation to 
the Ambassador for the Embassy having sent a PolOff to Nong 
Khai (in coordination with Embassy Bangkok) to help monitor 
the situation on January 30.  (Note: the basic group included 
152 people; since then 2 babies have been born.) 
 
¶4. (C) Utkan also noted tension between the Thais and the Lao 
over the failed deportation may be affecting his attempts to 
improve relations between UNHCR and the Lao at this time. 
Although the Government of Laos (GOL) is aware that he is 
visiting Vientiane this week, GOL officials are choosing not 
to meet with him.  GOL-UNHCR relations have been difficult 
for some time.  The new Lao Ambassador in Bangkok has chosen 
not to meet with Utkan.  So in Vientiane, Utkan is limited to 
meeting with UN officials as well as a range of other 
ambassadors including those from Germany (the current EU 
President), France, and Australia. 
 
¶5. (C) One of the messages Utkan is trying to make clear 
during his discussions here is that the 152 ( 2) have all 
been screened and have all been officially designated as 
refugees.  Utkan noted that the High Commissioner sees this 
group as important because Thailand has never deported 
recognized refugees before.  If the deportation were to 
happen, it would be a bad precedent.  Moreover, UNHCR is 
concerned about the Thai and Lao reaching a bilateral 
agreement about this group -- concerned that this type of 
bilateral agreement could itself be a bad precedent when 
dealing with refugee groups.  Thus UNHCR is considering the 
fate of this 152  2 group to be an issue of principle.  The 
Ambassador opined this group may still be at risk of local 
Thai authorities deciding unilaterally to push the group back 
 
VIENTIANE 00000144  002 OF 004 
 
 
to Laos to honor the bilateral agreement.  Utkan agreed the 
situation is unpredictable and noted that no one is really 
sure who is making decisions in Thailand at this time. 
 
   The Petchabun Group 
   ------------------- 
¶6. (C) Utkan provided the Ambassador a copy of a revised 
"Proposal for Joint Plan of Action: Laos Hmong in Thailand," 
which he said had just been completed on February 16 (copy 
e-mailed to EAP/MLS, PRM, and Embassy Bangkok).  The goal is 
an integrated solution to resolve the long-term situation of 
the Hmong at the holding camp in Thailand's Petchabun 
Province -- now numbering 8000.  UNHCR has been trying to 
negotiate a solution for the Petchabun situation since July 
2005, insisting on screening as a component.  Utkan said the 
Thais have not accepted this and have been especially 
inflexible since the September 2006 coup. 
 
   Screening 
   --------- 
¶7. (C) Utkan noted that the Thais have raised the possibility 
of returning the Hmong, apparently including the 152  2 as 
well as the larger Petchabun group, to Laos with third-party 
monitoring and possible screening of these groups after they 
have been returned to Laos.  Utkan emphasized that there is 
no "Lao component" to the current issue of the Hmong groups 
in Thailand.  Thailand has responsibility, and the only way 
to resolve the Petchabun situation is via screening. 
Monitoring of those who are returned to Laos after being 
screened out would be a longer-term issue.  UNHCR has done 
monitoring of those who have been voluntarily repatriated in 
other situations, including in Vietnam. 
 
¶8. (C) De Vincentis noted the Thais have developed a 
screening process for Karen refugees; he expressed hope this 
type of system might be adopted for the Hmong.  Utkan agreed 
Thai cooperation would be essential to resolve the Petchabun 
situation, noting the Thai army knows a great deal about the 
Hmong being held, having interviewed them after they entered 
the holding camp.  If UNHCR were to try to start from scratch 
on interviewing all 8000, it may take up to two years.  If 
the Thai military were to accept responsibility for 
"profiling" the group to identify those who actually have a 
possible claim to refugee status (perhaps 15% of the group), 
UNHCR could focus its interviews on this smaller group -- 
speeding up the process significantly.  Thailand did 
pre-screening of other groups in the mid-1980s as well as the 
1990s.  UNHCR proposed this 18 months ago for the Petchabun 
group, but the Thais have not responded. 
 
   Moving Forward 
   -------------- 
¶9. (C) Utkan mentioned that UNHCR is planning for a possible 
visit to the region of Erika Feller, UNHCR's Director of 
International Protection in the second half of April.  Feller 
is likely to visit Thailand and Malaysia.  UNHCR is 
evaluating whether she should also visit Laos to try to 
reopen a dialogue between the GOL and UNHCR so that GOL 
officials can begin to overcome their suspicions of UNHCR and 
gain a better understanding of UNHCR's policies and 
practices.  The Ambassador thought a Feller visit would be 
helpful, although expectations should be modest.  The GOL's 
senior leaders and officials from the GOL's security 
structure still have only limited exposure to the outside 
world -- not unlike the situation in North Korea.  Thus 
achieving, for example, a MOU on allowing UNHCR to operate in 
Laos as the result of one visit would be unlikely.  Utkan 
agreed, pointing out that UNHCR's MOU with Vietnam took a 
year to negotiate, and that happened after Vietnam had 
already decided to "change course" in its relations with the 
rest of the world. 
 
   The K52 Visit 
   ------------- 
¶10. (C) The Ambassador reviewed the recent MFA-organized trip 
for Vientiane-based diplomats to meet a Hmong community at 
Kilometer 52, including a family of 5 returned from Thailand 
with a group of 50  Lao economic migrants.  (Note: none in 
this group had claimed refugee status -- ref B).  We see this 
 
VIENTIANE 00000144  003 OF 004 
 
 
as a preliminary first step by MFA and are continuing to push 
for the second trip MFA promised -- to Bolikhamsai Province 
where a group of 16 Hmong have been pushed back from 
Thailand.  This group of 16 has members linked to the ongoing 
insurgency, and verifying the status of this group is more 
important.  Moreover, Bolikhamsai is of specific interest, 
because information from there is rarely released -- 
including any word on the more than 1000 Hmong who may have 
surrendered in Bolikhamsai during the past two years (ref C). 
 The Ambassador praised the role of the German Ambassador, at 
this point also representing the EU Presidency, in pushing 
the GOL on the broad range of Hmong-related issues currently 
underway. 
 
   The Children 
   ------------ 
¶11. (C) The Ambassador and Utkan reviewed the case of the 26 
Hmong children irregularly returned to Laos in December 2005 
and now held for more than a year.  At one point, there was a 
rumor that some of the children -- the 21 girls -- might be 
released by the GOL once the deportation of the 152  2 had 
taken place (even though there is no apparent logical linkage 
between the two cases).  Still no one believes the five boys 
-- some of whom have reached age 18 and would no longer be 
considered "children" -- will be released, especially with 
information about their mistreatment becoming available.  At 
any rate, with the failure of the January 30 attempt to 
return the 152  2, the fate of the children remains in limbo. 
 The issue refuses to go away and remains a benchmark for the 
international community's perception of the GOL: if the GOL 
-- a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
-- is not willing to treat these children humanely, how can 
the GOL be trusted to deal with the larger Hmong issues 
justly?  De Vincentis noted that the group of 152  2 detained 
in Nong Khai by the Thais includes more than 90 children, and 
Thailand is also a signatory to the same Convention. 
 
MEETING WITH ICRC 
----------------- 
¶12. (C) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
Regional Delegation Director Fred Grimm and the Ambassador on 
February 21 discussed the Nong Khai situation and the MFA 
trip to Kilometer 52.  The Ambassador emphasized we will 
continue to press MFA for the promised trip to Bolikhamsai 
Province.  She assessed the MFA as being increasing aware of 
a need to do public relations activities to offset the 
negative publicity accruing from the January 30 attempted 
deportation.  However these issues move forward, ICRC is 
being widely viewed as a logical choice as an international 
monitor within Laos. 
 
¶13. (C) Grimm told the Ambassador that he has talked to 
UNHCR/Bangkok and the Thai National Security Council (NSC) 
about ICRC as a potential monitor of returned Lao Hmong, and 
the NSC had been very supportive.  Grimm noted that he had 
been in Geneva and had discussed Hmong issues at the ICRC 
Headquarters.  ICRC sees that it could play a monitoring role 
if invited and if minimal conditions are met regarding 
follow-up.  It would not be acceptable for ICRC only to meet 
a group on arrival and provide a returnee assistance package. 
 The GOL would have to agree to ICRC's subsequent monitoring 
of the group. 
 
¶14. (C) Grimm noted disappointment that the GOL had not kept 
an agreement made in relation to the domestic surrender of a 
group of 354 in the Vang Vieng area in October 2006.  The 
ICRC had coordinated with the Lao Red Cross (LRC) to have the 
LRC provide assistance to the group members when they 
surrendered (ref D) with the quiet understanding that ICRC 
monitors would be able to visit the group after it had been 
resettled.  This monitoring has never happened.  If the GOL 
does not keep its agreements, ICRC will be unable to play a 
role. 
 
¶15. (C) Like Utkan, Grimm noted that he had been unable to 
make appointments to meet any Lao officials on this trip.  He 
has been unable to make progress on access to prisons, a 
major goal.  Grimm said he is using his time to meet with 
members of the Vientiane-based diplomatic community for 
 
VIENTIANE 00000144  004 OF 004 
 
 
updated inforomation.  He plans to be back after the 
mid-April Lao New Year celebration to hold a seminar with 
provincial Lao Red Cross officials to discuss ICRC's various 
roles. 
 
   Water Projects 
   -------------- 
¶16. (C) One area going well for ICRC is water projects, which 
ICRC has been undertaking for several years.  The GOL has 
approved ICRC expanding its water projects into a fourth 
area, Phoune District, in the former Saisombun Special Zone 
-- now part of northern Vientiane Province.  Still Grimm felt 
this is slow progress since it has taken so much time to gain 
this permission. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶17. (C) It is a bit disappointing that both UNHCR's Utkan and 
ICRC's Grimm have been unable to meet GOL officials during 
their visits this week.  At some point the GOL would have to 
realize it needs both organizations operating in Laos to 
effectively resolve the range of problems the GOL has with 
its Hmong minority -- problems ranging from finally ending a 
dwindling insurgency to finding a process to return thousands 
of economic migrants from Thailand.  The GOL has little 
credibility with the international community in terms of its 
human rights policies; only neutral and respected 
international organizations like UNHCR and ICRC can help 
provide that credibility.  The Embassy will seek ways to 
quietly send this message, being careful not to increase GOL 
suspicions about U.S.-UNHCR or U.S.-ICRC linkages.  Mr. Utkan 
asked for Embassy support for the visit of UNHCR's Erika 
Feller, and we will seek opportunities to also push this 
visit since we believe she would bring a message that GOL 
officials need to hear. 
HASLACH