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FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0861
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 7137
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0145
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0967
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 2807
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0212
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0681
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0507
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0147
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0585

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000110 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC), PRM/FO (DAS GREENE), 
PRM/ANE (ALBRIGHT), DRL/AWH (ORONA), AND IO/FO (DAS WARLICK 
AND LAGON) 
BANGKOK ALSO FOR REFCOORD (HONNOLD) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2017 
TAGS: KCRM KWMN LA PGOV PHUM PREF SMIG TH
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC TOUR OF RESETTLED HMONG; WHERE ARE ALL 
THE REFUGEES? 
 
REF: A. 06 VIENTIANE 1205 
 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 816 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: An MFA-led February 8 tour of one Hmong area 
near Vientiane proved little about the situation of resettled 
Hmong in Laos -- especially former insurgents.  Only one 
family of five from the group of 52 economic migrants had 
been returned to the well-to-do area visited.  However the 
MFA tour may be the beginning of a very long process toward 
the Government of Laos (GOL) allowing some sort of 
international monitoring.  Our next priority: pushing MFA to 
set up a promised next trip -- to Bolikhamxai Province, long 
mute on Hmong issues including surrenders, resettlements, and 
the fate of the group of 16 Hmong former insurgents just 
pushed back from Thailand in early January.  Meanwhile, MFA 
continues to plan for the return of the 153 Hmong from Nong 
Khai despite the embarrassing failure of the January 30 
attempted pushback.  At the same time, the international 
community moves forward with plans to resettle this group and 
other Hmong with Australia leading the way by promising to 
take 200 of the 441 referred recently by UNHCR.  And in the 
background, one analyst points out, are radical Hmong 
Americans who will use either a pushback of the 153 or 
successful resettlement to generate headlines and enhance 
fundraising activities.  End summary. 
 
The Village Visit 
---------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Pol/Econ Chief participated in a high-profile 
MFA-led visit February 8 for Vientiane-based diplomats and 
journalists to Kilometer 52, an area near Vientiane with a 
high concentration of well-to-do ethnic Hmong.  The visit, 
promised during MFA Press DG Yong's February 1 press 
conference on the attempt to push back 153 Hmong from Nong 
Khai, actually only produced one returnee family from 
Thailand: of the 52 pushed back across the border in November 
(ref A), only 8 were sent here -- a couple with three 
children originally from a local village plus their three 
nephews.  The nephews' relatives later appeared to take the 
nephews back to their home village, leaving only the family 
of five remaining here. 
 
¶3. (U) The diplomatic group met with 100  local villagers led 
by village chief Siphandone who specified Kilometer 52 is 
actually a collection of eleven villages with close to 16,000 
people.  Of the population, 58 percent are ethnic Hmong or 
other "Lao Sung;" 5% are Khmu; and 37% are lowland Lao. 
Eighty percent of the villagers are farmers, growing rice and 
raising livestock with some new rubber plantings.  The 
presence of multiple Western Union offices indicated one 
reason why this area is well-to-do: remittances from 
relatives overseas. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The parents from the family of five -- who appeared 
to have little education -- told the group they decided to 
leave the village because they lacked sufficient good-quality 
farmland.  Their absence was short-lived: they left their 
village in September 2006, were detained soon thereafter in 
Thailand, and then were held for two months before being sent 
back.  They had paid a trafficker Baht 3000 ($87) per person 
to be taken to Thailand.  Since the family was gone for such 
a short period, returning to the village and settling back in 
was not difficult.  The father said that conditions at the 
Nong Khai Immigrant Detention Center (IDC) had been very bad; 
there was not enough food; and there had been "pain" -- which 
he did not define. 
 
¶5. (C) Since this visit focused on just the group of returned 
economic migrants rather than more sensitive returnees, the 
Kilometer 52 visit appeared at best a tentative step toward 
monitoring.  Participants attempted to make clear that 
joining the visit did not indicate international acceptance 
of the GOL version of internal tranquillity in Laos.  MFA has 
promised a future trip to Bolikhamxai Province where a group 
of 16 Hmong, apparently from the Yang Wangmeng insurgent 
 
VIENTIANE 00000110  002 OF 003 
 
 
group, pushed back from Thailand in January have been sent. 
The Bolikhamxai visit, announced in a diplomatic note along 
with the Kilometer 52 visit, had to be postponed, according 
to DG Yong, because it would need more extensive preparations 
including an overnight stay in Pakxan.  E/P Chief took the 
opportunity of a subsequent lunch to push DG Yong strongly on 
setting up the Bolikhamxai trip as soon as possible. 
 
Planning for the 152 
------------------------ 
¶6. (C) DG Yong told a German poloff during the Kilometer 52 
visit that he had been given authority via Prime Minister's 
Decrees to clear land and install roads for a new settlement 
for 300 people in northern Vientiane Province including 
authority to purchase six tractors for this project.  He 
clarified to E/P Chief in their subsequent lunch that this 
300-person settlement was designed to resettle the 152 (153 
with a new baby) Hmong currently in the Nong Khai Immigration 
Detention Center.  When asked why space for 300, DG Yong 
clarified that the GOL does not want any "mono-ethnic" 
settlements at this point, so the 152 would be resettled with 
people from other ethnic groups.  Asked why this group would 
not be split up and sent back to home provinces as had been 
done with the 52 economic migrants, Yong responded that this 
group did not have homes to return to, so a new settlement 
area had to be set up for its members. 
 
Assessing The Kilometer 52 Visit 
------------------------------------------ 
¶7. (C) The "like-minded" diplomatic group met February 9 to 
exchange views on the village visit and next steps.  One 
point of agreement: the promised visit to Bolikhamxai 
Province would be very important.  Meeting with one family 
from the group of 52 pushed back in November was not 
controversial since this group of economic migrants had no 
connections to the insurgency.  The group of 16 pushed back 
to Bolikhamxai in January clearly had insurgency links. 
Moreover, Bolikhamxai is one of the most closed provinces, 
releasing no information about any of the groups of 
insurgents that have surrendered there (ref A).  The group 
considered the Kilometer 52 village visit as a first step -- 
and a relatively difficult step -- for MFA in trying to 
become more transparent, a process with which the Government 
of Laos (GOL) lacks experience and has a long way to go.  The 
message that this group had returned and had not been 
harassed -- the point was clear that only traffickers, not 
economic migrants, would be punished -- appeared designed to 
help dry up the flow of economic migrants to Thailand. 
 
¶8. (C) Summing up his views for the group, Australian 
Ambassador Maclean noted that, during the past year, the GOL 
for the first time has acknowledged that Hmong in Thailand, 
including in the Petchabun camp, are from Laos -- a 
significant political development.  Moreover, the GOL has 
made a great deal of progress with the Thai Government toward 
reaching agreement on their return.  This agreement of course 
is at variance with the Thai Government's international 
obligations.  The attempted January 30 pushback of the 152 
Hmong from Nong Khai represented a major bilateral commitment 
as can be seen by the formal ceremonies held at Nong Khai 
City Hall by representatives of the two governments; the 
failure of the push back was a tremendous loss of face, 
particularly for the Thai side.  In essence, the GOL has 
"boxed in" the Thais with the bilateral agreement to return 
the Hmong despite the Thais' international obligations. 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador Maclean also noted a spurt of renewed UNHCR 
referrals for resettlement.  Before screening was suspended 
in early February, the UNHCR had referred 441 Hmong for third 
country resettlement.  These are not Hmong from the camp in 
Petchabun; these are Lao Hmong who have gotten to Bangkok, 
other locations, and those at the Nong Khai Immigration 
Detention Center.  Australia plans to accept as many as 200 
-- processing the first group next week.  Of the 200, 26 are 
from the Nong Khai group of 152; these 26 are receiving final 
medical clearances.  (Note: UNHCR has also informed Embassy 
Bangkok (ref B) that the Netherlands plans to accept a 
further 22 from the group of 152.) 
 
VIENTIANE 00000110  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador Maclean suggested the like-minded group 
might stress to GOL officials that real international 
monitoring would be in the GOL's own interests.  Now the 
UNHCR has to accept the version of events being told by a 
person seeking refugee determination since UNHCR is not 
allowed to be present in Laos to do its own assessment.  A 
durable monitoring system would decrease the numbers of 
applicants being given political refugee status.  For 
instance, the bulk of the Hmong at the holding camp in 
Petchabun are most likely economic migrants with perhaps no 
more than 4% real refugees. 
 
¶11. (C) The group agreed that pushing the GOL directly on 
this issue is not likely to be productive; GOL officials do 
not react well when others push them.  ASEAN may also be able 
to help at some point; the ASEAN Summit recently held in Cebu 
identified migration as a major issue.  Another avenue in the 
future might be to ask for Vietnam to help since Vietnam now 
accepts some international monitoring of its upland 
minorities.  So far, Vietnam has not been willing to 
"interfere" in Lao internal events.  UNDP Country 
Representative Sonam Rana noted that UNHCR is trying to 
restore its relations with the GOL; she has been telling GOL 
officials that having the UNHCR in Laos is in the GOL's own 
interests.  In their lunch, E/P Chief prodded DG Yong on this 
issue, countering Yong's argument that the GOL does not want 
to "internationalize" the Hmong issue through accepting 
outside monitoring by pointing out the issue is obviously 
internationalized already with Hmong in Thailand and being 
accepted for resettlement abroad by a range of countries. 
 
 
One Analyst's View 
----------------------- 
¶12. (C) Regarding the attempt January 30 to push back the 153 
from Nong Khai, one analyst noted most Hmong American groups 
have been very quiet possibly because of rivalries among 
Hmong factions.  The two main leaders in the group of 153, 
Blia Shoua Her and Chong Lee Lor, and the activist supporting 
them have long been at odds with the more radical 
Hmong-American groups.  These latter groups may actually see 
advantages of the pushback happening in terms of headlines 
and enhanced fundraising opportunities.  Of course, if the 
153 are granted asylum and overseas resettlement, these 
groups will also claim credit and use this to enhance 
fundraising as well.  In terms of the larger Hmong group in 
Petchabun, this analyst estimates that less than 15% are 
legitimate refugees, although the radical Hmong American 
groups insist that all are refugees. 
 
Comment 
------------- 
¶13. (C) Accepting the MFA invitation to tour a Hmong area 
that has little to do with the insurgency to meet with 
recently returned economic migrants was something of a gamble 
for the diplomats who participated.  On one side was the 
possibility of Lao headlines that "Diplomats Support Lao 
Efforts."  Indeed the Vientiane Times and Lao Patthana 
newspapers had articles the day after the visit saying: 
"Hmong 'returned' by Thai authorities 'happy' to be back in 
Laos" where they can "have their own homes and can educate 
their children."  On the other side was trying to find a way 
to work with MFA to create an opportunity for meaningful 
monitoring sometime in the future.  The latter seemed a bit 
more likely since the original MFA invitation was for trips 
to both the Kilometer 52 area near Vientiane and more distant 
Bolikhamxai Province.  We are disappointed the GOL has 
postponed the latter trip and will continue to push for this 
energetically.  We will also maintain the dialogue with our 
like-minded colleagues to push for some sort of outside 
monitoring either via a UNHCR return to Laos or possibly an 
ASEAN approach.  Meanwhile, we remain wary about the fate of 
the 153 in Nong Khai as well as the larger group in 
Petchabun. 
HASLACH