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FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE PRIORITY
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RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0017
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RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 7085
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0496
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0351
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000082 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017 
TAGS: NATO PREL AF
SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL READOUT FEBRUARY 7, 2007 
 
 
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard Olson, 
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: 
 
-- Afghanistan:  Departing COMISAF LTG Richards highlighted 
NATO accomplishments and remaining challenges, including: 
continued force shortfall, the need for reconstruction, 
development and governance to keep pace with Afghan 
expectations, and the importance of driving a wedge between 
the Taliban and the population.  He noted sustained downturns 
in violence in the south and east and detailed ISAF plans for 
a spring &campaign8 (vice &offensive8).  He urged private 
versus public pressure on Pakistani President Musharraf and 
proposed a &Joint Policy Action Group8 to improve 
NATO-Afghan-Pakistani policy cooperation.  Italian Ambassador 
Moreno reiterated his government,s commitment to Afghanistan 
and indirectly complained about a recent op-ed in Italian 
press by a group of NATO Ambassadors on Italy,s Afghanistan 
policy, but without mentioning any names or specifics. 
 
-- Kosovo:  SYG will travel to Belgrade and Pristina on 15 
February with message of international unity; CMC to provide 
NAC briefing on prudent military planning in the context of 
Ahtisaari,s proposal.  Ambassador Nuland briefed PermReps on 
Ambassador Wisner,s Feb. 5-6 meetings in Pristina and 
Belgrade. 
 
-- Iraq:  SHAPE recommends second scoping mission on 
gendarmerie training; SYG concurs and will seek NAC approval. 
 
-- Darfur:  NATO continues to stand by on Darfur, Somalia; 
unclear whether African Union (AU) PSC Chairman Djinnit will 
address the NAC in February. 
 
-- AFRICOM:  Ambassador Nuland informed PermReps of President 
Bush,s announcement on the creation of AFRICOM. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
¶2. (C)  In a congenial yet blunt session with the NAC, ISAF 
IX Commander LTG Richards looked back at his nine months in 
command, providing general comments on accomplishments and 
remaining challenges.  Richards praised the men and women of 
NATO deployed to Afghanistan under his command, telling 
Ambassadors &your Alliance has done pretty well.8  On 
troops, he told the NAC frankly that given shortfalls, he had 
to rely more on airpower, which results in more civilian (and 
friendly force) casualties.  He noted as an accomplishment 
sustained downward trends in violence in RC-South and 
RC-East, citing ISAF success and dismissing as &rubbish8 
analysis attributing the trend ) which dates to the initial 
August 2006 spike caused by Operation Medusa ) to a winter 
lull.  Richards praised the Policy Action Group in Kabul as a 
mechanism he created to bring synergy to reconstruction, 
development, and security activities in-country, and to bring 
coherence and accountability to the Karzai government.  On 
Pakistan, Richards said that while President Musharraf does 
not support the Taliban, he is not yet delivering fully on 
his intentions; private pressure is better than public 
pressure, which Musharraf is beginning to resent.  He cited 
the need for reconstruction and development and increases in 
governance capacity to keep up with rising expectations of 
the Afghan people as an equal, if not greater challenge to 
ISAF than Pakistan border issues.  Finally, he pointed to 
&Operation Now Ruz8 (New Year), ISAF,s new operation 
planned to be a broad-based spring campaign (distinguishing 
between &campaign8 with its positive connotations, and 
&offensive8 with its negative ones) to provide the security 
for enhanced reconstruction, development and governance. 
 
¶3. (C)  Some specific issues Richards addressed included: 
 
 
USNATO 00000082  002 OF 003 
 
 
-- CERP funds:  Richards praised both U.S. funding of 
programs to bring quick aid to areas that suffer battle 
damage, and the ability of U.S. forces to use it well; &all 
nations needed this dynamism and tempo.8 
 
-- Governance:  &Poor governance is the Taliban,s 
recruiting sergeant.8  The situation is improving, but 
Karzai still governs &like a tribal elder with a cell 
phone8 and people are beginning to become impatient. 
 
-- Counter-narcotics:  Richards drew a distinction between 
eradication, which was being done, and &fighting 
narco-warriors8 to which insufficient attention was being 
paid.  ISAF as presently structured cannot contain the second 
and third )order security consequences. 
 
-- Taliban:  Not all are irreconcilable, he said, and we need 
to drive a wedge between the hard core supporters, and those 
who collaborated for pecuniary motives. 
 
-- Musa Qala:  Richards said the Musa Qala agreement was an 
attempt to drive such a wedge, and while it had enabled the 
elders to stand up to the Taliban, he noted it was presently 
in a state of flux ) neither black nor white, but shades of 
gray. 
 
-- Pakistan-Afghanistan relations:  Richards cited the lack 
of a mechanism for the governments to come together as a real 
impediment, suggesting a &Joint PAG,8 or similar political 
equivalent to the Tripartite Commission. 
 
¶4. (C)  Ambassador Nuland praised LTG Richards for a 
successful tenure as COMISAF during which he oversaw both the 
geographical and philosophical expansion of ISAF into NATO,s 
first-ever joint, integrated combat mission involving ground 
forces.  She commended the planning behind Operation Now Ruz, 
which reflected today,s priorities of going after enemy safe 
havens, while addressing border issues and the need for 
greater development and cooperation with Pakistan.  She 
encouraged the public narrative at Seville to focus on the 
revised CJSOR not in terms of numbers, but in terms of ISAF 
enhancing its mission and strengthening our operational 
posture.  She asked Richards if COMISAF needed enhanced 
operational control over forces in theater (answer: yes, but 
nations will not give up their &red cards8), and whether 
ISAF is in position to hold onto the recent gains made in 
Panjwayi (answer: lack of sufficient Afghan security forces 
continues to be problematic.) 
 
¶5. (C)  Responding to questions from PermReps, Richards said 
the UN was ¬ up to8 doing what NATO wanted it to do ) 
namely increase effectiveness in the provinces ) but that in 
most instances, the UN could not be blamed because the 
security situation prevented outreach.  Richards said that 
PRT coordination was not a large issue, since he was 
confident that all were working toward goals laid out in 
ISAF,s OPLAN.  He hailed OEF support to ISAF, noting he had 
¬hing but praise.8  Concerning the possibility of 
another Operation Medusa, he assessed it as not likely, 
asserting that the Taliban had learned not to take on NATO in 
a direct, conventional fight. 
 
¶6. (C)  Following the Richards briefing, Italian Ambassador 
Moreno asked for the floor to reiterate that the Prodi 
government was committed to maintaining Italian commitments 
in Herat and Kabul, would maintain its lead on justice sector 
reform, and was looking to increase economic aid.  In a 
carefully worded statement from Rome (that he shared with us 
privately beforehand), he urged that discussions about 
Italian commitments be conducted in diplomatic fora, and 
observed that the Italian public would regard public 
criticism as unwanted foreign interference.  (Note: He did 
not mention Ambassador Spogli,s Op-Ed.) The Romanian 
Ambassador responded to the Italian intervention by noting 
how much it valued Italian contributions to ISAF.  Latvia 
 
USNATO 00000082  003 OF 003 
 
 
announced a two million euro equipment donation for the ANA, 
and Ambassador Nuland urged NMAs to devise procedures for 
speeding up delivery of donated equipment to the ANA. 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
¶7. (SBU)  The SYG urged Allies to use the upcoming Defense 
Ministerial at Seville to discuss the way forward on NATO,s 
role in post-status Kosovo.  He reiterated the importance of 
international unity on Kosovo and said he intends to bring a 
message of international unity when he visits Pristina and 
Belgrade on February 15.  The SYG noted this will be his 
first visit to Belgrade since the Riga decision on PfP for 
Serbia, and said he intends to convey to the Serbs his vision 
of Euro-Atlantic integration for the region.  He requested 
that the CMC provide a briefing to the NAC at the end of 
February on ongoing prudent military planning in the context 
of UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari,s recently released proposal. 
CMC responded affirmatively, noting that a good amount of 
planning had been done already and that the MC was preparing 
for a quick response following the adoption of any new UNSCR 
for Kosovo.  Ambassador Nuland also briefed PermReps on 
Ambassador Wisner,s Feb. 5-6 meetings in Pristina and 
Belgrade. 
 
Darfur 
------ 
¶8. (SBU)  The SYG said Darfur and Somalia are expected to 
dominate the UNSC,s work program this month.  One aim is to 
speed up the implementation of the three-phased approach to 
UN assistance to AMIS; however, Sudanese President Bashir 
continues to &prevaricate8 and impede implementation.  The 
SYG reported the UN is considering taking over the AU,s 
mission to Somalia at some point in the future, while noting 
AMISOM currently has a shortfall of 3,500 troops.  The SYG 
said it remains unclear whether AU PSC Chairman Djinnit will 
be able to address the NAC in mid-February. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
¶9. (SBU)  CMC said that on February 2, the Military Committee 
endorsed SHAPE,s recommendation for a further scoping 
mission on expansion of training in Iraq (i.e. gendarmerie 
training).  This mission,s report is scheduled to come to 
the MC and the NAC on March 15 for consideration.  The SYG 
supported this action, stating that &even if the country has 
a real need, we require a more through analysis,8 and 
intends to circulate a document endorsing this recommendation 
for NAC approval. 
 
AFRICOM 
------- 
¶10. (U)  Ambassador Nuland said that she would circulate to 
PermReps President Bush,s announcement on the creation of a 
new regional military command for Africa (AFRICOM), which 
will become operational in 2008.  She noted this will mean 
that CDR EUCOM (i.e., SACEUR in his US hat) will not have 
bilateral U.S. responsibilities for Africa in the future, 
enabling him to focus more on NATO issues. 
OLSON