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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0521
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0078
RHIPAAA/USCINCCENT FWD PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000113 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017 
TAGS: MARR NATO REL PTER QA XF
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON NATO-QATAR TALKS ON STATUS OF ISAF 
PERSONNEL AND ENGAGEMENT 
 
REF: 2006 NATO 731 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  High level discussions between Qatar's 
military and NATO on the future of ISAF's support to the 
Coalition Air Operations Center (CAOC) at al-Udeid Airbase in 
Qatar are back on track after a number of miscommunications. 
However, the overall prospect for this dialogue is still 
fragile.  Most strikingly, Qatar had hoped for a NATO 
security guarantee, which is not an option for a nation that 
is not a member of the Alliance.  Qatar seeks to place 
NATO/ISAF personnel under the jurisdiction of the State of 
Qatar.  MFA officials have told NATO and U.S. officials that 
the ISAF Air Operations pose a risk to Qatar, and complain 
that NATO has been unresponsive to Qatar's proposals for a 
broad framework of cooperation.  See possible way forward, 
para 9.  See SACEUR Letter para 13.  End Summary. 
 
CURRENT NATO-QATAR ISSUES 
------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) NATO D/ASG Simmons went to Doha February 1-5 on an 
urgent basis after NATO's military interlocutor in Doha, 
Brigadier General Abdullah Jumad al-Hamad, threatened to 
expel ISAF personnel by February 25, should NATO not 
recognize Qatar's jurisdiction over ISAF personnel.  Al-Hamad 
wanted a list of names of the ISAF personnel, their 
nationalities and a description of their ISAF 
responsibilities. 
 
¶3.  (C)   While in Doha, Simmons also met with Deputy Foreign 
Minister for Follow-up Affairs al-Rumeihi.  Al-Rumeihi said 
Qatar is looking to have good relations with NATO, including 
a broad framework agreement that goes beyond personnel at the 
CAOC and, preferably, from Qatar's point of view, would 
include some form of NATO security guarantee for Qatar. 
(Comment:  Allies internally have made clear that no security 
guarantee is on the table, but have offered that Allied 
expression of "interest" in Qatari sovereignty, per policy 
with other Partners as a possible basis for further 
discussion.  Simmons laid this out to Qataris early in 
February.  End Comment).  Al-Rumeihi nevertheless added his 
view that: 1) NATO had not engaged Qatar adequately in the 
past; 2) Qatar had never formally been notified of the ISAF 
activities conducted from al-Udeid Airbase and 3) NATO had 
never formally responded to written Qatari draft proposals 
for broad cooperation submitted by al-Hamad during earlier 
legal discussions on a transit/status arrangement.  (Comment: 
 This last point appears true.  The proposal languished for 
nearly one year within the Office of the NATO Legal Advisor 
and did not surface until Simmons was assigned to take over 
the Qatar dossier in January 2007.  Allied delegations have 
not officially seen this Qatari proposal. End comment.) 
Qatar's proposed framework agreement reportedly would have 
included military to military cooperation, training and 
exercises, ship visits, sharing of classified information, 
the option for NATO to build facilities at al-Udeid Airbase 
and military sports.  Al-Rumeihi and al-Hamad also orally 
proposed to Simmons that NATO should guarantee Qatar's 
security. 
 
¶4.  (C) Al-Rumeihi also told Simmons on February 5 that 
ISAF's presence in Qatar increased the country's risk of Al 
Qaeda attack.  He said Qatar may be willing to support other 
Allied operations but Qatar would be vulnerable to 
retaliation if any of the NATO powers were to attack Iran's 
facilities.  Al-Rumeihi said Qatar needed incentives for 
allowing NATO to continue operating at the CAOC. 
 
WAY FORWARD 
----------- 
¶5. (C) Simmons reports that he proposed a way forward that 
was acceptable to the GOQ on February 5:  1) SACEUR would 
submit a letter explaining the presence of the ISAF personnel 
at the CAOC; 2) notification by concerned countries to Qatar 
on an interim basis of national military personnel currently 
carrying out ISAF functions at al-Udeid Airbase; and 3) NATO 
International Staff response to Qatar's proposals for a 
comprehensive cooperation program. 
 
¶6.  (C) The GOQ is now reviewing NATO proposals for a Lines 
of Communication (LOC) agreement that will address NATO's 
interest in regional security, territorial integrity and the 
sovereignty of the State of Qatar and propose practical 
 
USNATO 00000113  002 OF 004 
 
 
cooperation based on the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 
(ICI) Menu of Practical Activities.  The LOC, however, would 
be narrower in scope than the broad framework agreement 
proposed by Qatar.  In particular, it does not contain the 
security guarantee that Qatar had sought.  (Note: a security 
guarantee is a complete non-starter.)  NATO has proposed to 
resume the discussions in Brussels on March 5. 
 
¶7.  (C) Simmons reports that Armed Forces Chief of Staff 
Major General Hamad bin Ali al-Atiyeh and al-Hamad have 
indicated to him that they are now satisfied with the way 
forward and the process of consultation and negotiation since 
his visit to Qatar.  They were also pleased to receive a 
letter from SACEUR informing Qatar that the CAOC would be 
used to support ISAF and that Allies represented at the CAOC 
sought to work with the GOQ to resolve the jurisdiction issue 
under the respective bilateral agreements.  (see para 13). 
 
¶8.  (C) In spite of a general NATO-Qatar agreement on the way 
forward, U.S. Embassy Doha reports that al-Rumeihi was 
personally antagonized by SACEUR's letter (para 13). 
Al-Rumeihi did not like SACEUR's assertion that jurisdiction 
of ISAF personnel was a matter of Allies' bilateral 
agreements with Qatar.  Moreover, al-Rumeihi inferred that 
even if he should accept that ISAF personnel were to be under 
the jurisdiction of Allies' bilateral defense agreements with 
Qatar, he wanted to know their names.  He did not understand 
why the U.S. would not furnish the names of its personnel 
attached to the ISAF mission at the CAOC (U.K., FR, NL, CA 
all have or will provide the GOQ with names of their ISAF 
personnel in Qatar).  Embassy Doha also reported that Qatar 
is most upset with the French presence.  Qatar understands 
that France is outside of NATO's unified military command and 
therefore it is unclear how the French relate to the ISAF 
mission.  The GOQ also wants to know what the French are 
doing within a separate building at the CAOC. 
 
QATAR WANTS REGIONAL CENTER 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Qatar's embassy in Brussels confirmed that al-Rumeihi 
also is responsible for heading Qatar's effort to win support 
for its hosting of the NATO Security Cooperation Center. 
Qatar delivered a Note Verbale to NATO on 22 December 2006 
reaffirming an offer 12 months previous to host and support a 
NATO MD and ICI SCC.  The note verbale also offered to kick 
off the NATO Training and Cooperation Initiative by hosting 
two NATO courses at Qatar's national military training 
facility in 2007.  On February 5, 2007 Qatar's Ambassador in 
Brussels repeated the offer to fund a future NATO SCC if it 
were to be established in Qatar.  The offer was made during 
an informal luncheon of MD and ICI and PermReps from the 
U.S., Spain, Norway as well as the Italian Charge d' 
Affaires.  Any response to Qatar (or U.S. preferred candidate 
Jordan) is pending a future decision by Allies that will be 
based in part on an ongoing Training Needs Assessment.  The 
SCC is to be a part of the NATO Training Cooperation 
Initiative, which was decided upon by Allies at the November 
2006 Riga NATO Summit. 
 
¶10.  (C) A meeting previously agreed for February 15 in the 
context of regularly scheduled NATO - ICI country 
consultations between Qatar's Ambassador al-Dosari and NATO 
Allies is being rescheduled at the request of the Qatari 
Ambassador.  The postponement may have been related to 
Qatar's difficult relations with NATO on the status of 
NATO/ISAF personnel at the CAOC and more broadly on 
negotiations about Qatar's cooperation with NATO.  (Comment: 
Another possible reason for the postponement is that Qatar is 
awaiting Belgium's accreditation of its first defense 
attache, who would will be responsible for the NATO dossier. 
Al-Dosari wanted the DATT to participate in the 26 plus 1 
meeting. End Comment.) 
 
NEXT STEPS 
--------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Simmons will meet with al-Hamad in Brussels on March 
5-6 to discuss the cooperation proposal.   He is confident 
that the GOQ understands that NATO security guarantees are 
only possible for signatories of the Washington Treaty. 
Simmons said Doha may be mollified with a mutually acceptable 
outcome on jurisdiction and the LOC agreement. 
 
COMMENT 
 
USNATO 00000113  003 OF 004 
 
 
------- 
¶12.  (C) NATO's discussions with Qatar to date have been 
plagued both by the NATO Legal Advisor's incompetence and 
International Staff stovepiping as well as by mixed signals 
from differing Qatari interlocutors.  Only in January 2007 
did NATO put the talks on a solid staff footing. 
Al-Rumeihi's argument about risk and incentives seems to be 
posturing.  We defer to Embassy Doha on Qatari motivations, 
but wonder how ISAF's presence at the CAOC would expose Qatar 
to more risk than what already may exist from the much larger 
U.S. and Coalition presence at al-Udeid.  While the GOQ would 
like to have the symbolism of a NATO security guarantee, they 
consider the U.S. on a bilateral basis, the principal 
security provider.  It is clear that al-Rumeihi and others 
remain irritated at NATO's perceived lack of response to 
Qatar's proposals and NATO's establishment of an ISAF 
presence in Qatar without its formal agreement.  It seems 
likely that the GOQ seeks the symbolism of a broad 
cooperation agreement with NATO.  Qatar is also clearly 
signaling its interest in hosting a NATO-supported Security 
Cooperation Center. 
 
SACEUR LETTER 
------------- 
¶13.  (SBU) Attachment: 
 
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE 
SHAPE BELGIUM 
 
9 February 2007 
Major General Hamad bin All AL-ATIYEH Chief of Staff of the 
Qatar Armed Forces Doha 
 
Dear General AI-Atiyeh 
 
Thank you once again for the warm hospitality during my 
recent visit, and also for the support and cooperation that 
the State of Qatar has provided to facilitate the efforts of 
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
in Afghanistan. I would like to follow up on our earlier 
discussions, and those of the NATO team led by Ambassador 
Simmons that just visited. 
 
As you know, a number of personnel provided by NATO member 
states have been acting as the liaison element for ISAF HQ in 
Kabul and are conducting ISAF air command and control 
functions within the United States Central Command Combined 
Air Operations Centre (CAOC) at al-Udeid Airbase. This 
element is called the ISAF Detachment to CENTAF CAOC (IDCC). 
 
I would like to provide you with some additional information 
about the activities of these personnel. In accordance with 
UN Security Council Resolution 1659(2006), the last months 
have seen the expansion of the NATO-led ISAF mission 
throughout Afghanistan. This expansion of the ISAF mission 
has been accompanied by changes to the command and control 
structures to achieve the long-standing military principle of 
unity of effort. Within this process, there has been a 
requirement to streamline the command and control 
requirements for air operations to ensure that ISAF and 
coalition forces are well supported. For this reason a 
limited number of positions have been identified within the 
CAOC to be filled by military personnel from individual NATO 
countries that have existing bilateral agreements with the 
Government of Qatar. 
 
I understand that negotiations regarding an agreement between 
the State of Qatar and NATO have been re-energized within the 
last few days, and that there now appears to be a clear work 
plan which will allow us to take this issue forward. In the 
meantime, I hope that you will agree that it would not be in 
the best interests of the wider effort of the International 
Community to disrupt the operations that are being conducted 
by NATO in Afghanistan. I would therefore like to formally 
request that the ISAF functions currently being undertaken 
within the Combined Air Operations Center at al-Udeid Airbase 
by the IDCC are allowed to continue for a further six months 
pending the conclusion of the agreement. In addition, I will 
recommend the Secretary General invite those NATO countries 
represented in the IDCC to work with you under their 
respective bilateral agreements and arrangements to meet your 
concerns.  Thank you again for your support in this important 
matter, and I look forward to the next time that we are able 
to meet together. 
Yours sincerely 
 
USNATO 00000113  004 OF 004 
 
 
Bantz J. Craddock 
General U.S. Army 
OLSON