VZCZCXRO4780
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHROV
DE RUEHNO #0110/01 0531505
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221505Z FEB 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0514
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNMUC/EU CANDIDATE STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5645

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000110 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL RU NATO
SUBJECT: NSA HADLEY'S 21 FEBRUARY DISCUSSION WITH NATO SYG 
DE HOOP SCHEFFER 
 
Classified By: Charge Richard Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  De Hoop Scheffer described European 
weakness as playing out in Allies, approaches to Afghanistan 
(lack of unity of purpose), Russia (desire not to rock the 
boat), and missile defense (ditto).  Mr. Hadley pressed the 
SYG to have ISAF do more on counternarcotics, and an 
augmented civilian presence in Afghanistan.  On Russia, Mr. 
Hadley emphasized that the USG would cooperate where it 
could, and stand up for its interests where it could not. 
SYG argued for a NATO debate on policy toward Russia.  On 
Kosovo, Mr. Hadley expressed concerns about a gap between 
UNMIK drawdown and the stand-up of the ESDP mission.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
AFGHANISTAN:  NO EUROPEAN ALIBIS 
-------------------------------- 
 
2  (C) SYG De Hoop Scheffer opened the conversation by saying 
that the Alliance faced a &messaging and marketing problem8 
brought about by a &perception gap8 between the US and 
Europe: the US regarded Afghanistan as the front line in the 
war on terror, while Europe lacked the necessary cultural 
identity to see Afghanistan in a unified way.  Some allies 
favored a robust military policy, others focused on the 
comprehensive approach but sometimes as an alibi for not 
providing additional troops.  In that regard, the robust US 
presentations on 26 January and at Seville were most welcome, 
but the US could not expect that Europeans would respond in 
two weeks to what had taken Americans six months to develop. 
Mr. Hadley responded that the US intention had not been to 
impose a tasking on the SYG or European allies, but rather to 
provide resources in response to NATO,s request and allow 
the SYG to skillfully use American contributions to build 
European support.   The SYG acknowledged that it was his job 
to ensure that the comprehensive approach did not become an 
alibi for Europeans. 
 
¶3. (C) Mr. Hadley said the USG thought ISAF could do more on 
counternarcotics, in particular interdicting the 
narco-traffickers.  The SYG replied that the NATO OpPlan 
allowed for limited ISAF support, but a coherent 
counternarcotics (CN) strategy seemed to be missing.   Mr. 
Hadley said the USG believes it has an effective plan, 
especially over the long-term, but we might not get to the 
long-term without a good short-term strategy.  In the 
short-term, interdictions were important.  Ambassador Nuland 
added that it would be useful to brief Allies on the overall 
CN strategy. 
 
¶4. (C) Mr. Hadley said that a more robust civilian presence 
was needed; the EU, UN and NATO were all underpowered on the 
civilian side.  Consideration was being given to dual or 
triple-hatting arrangements.  The SYG replied that the weak 
link was the UN, especially SRSG Koenigs, and that the 
problem with triple-hatting was that the international 
community did not have the extraordinary powers it has in the 
Balkans, and so any new arrangements would have to be sold to 
Karzai. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
EUROPEAN WEAKNESS PLAYS OUT IN RUSSIA, MD 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Continuing on the theme of European weakness, the SYG 
pointed out FM Steinmeier,s recent criticism of US Missile 
Defense policy, suggesting it amounted to a plea to ¬ 
rock the European boat,8 and expressed the view that NATO 
needed to take a more vigorous position with regard to 
Russia.  Mr. Hadley said that the USG had hoped that Putin,s 
legacy would be the creation of democratic institutions that 
could serve to constrain the power of the president. 
Unfortunately, Putin had in the end not shared this vision, 
and the strategic partnership based on shared values had not 
been achieved.  Nonetheless, there were areas in which the US 
and Russia could work together on the basis of mutual self 
interest (especially Iran and non-proliferation generally), 
and we would contain the areas in which we could not work 
together.  What was needed was the Europeans to have a frank 
conversation about Russia and arrive at a European policy on 
 
USNATO 00000110  002 OF 003 
 
 
Russia, then come to NATO for a transatlantic discussion. 
 
¶6. (C)  The SYG again observed that there was no strong 
European leadership.  He had personally been disappointed 
that Merkel had raised expectations at last year,s 
Wehrkunde, but then had been completely overshadowed by Putin 
this year.  (The SYG noted that he had been the only European 
to challenge Putin at Munich.)  That said, NATO needed to 
take strong positions with Russia on three issues:  Kosovo, 
enlargement, and missile defense.   On Kosovo, Russia 
appeared to be objecting for tactical reasons, to get the 
best deal possible at the UNSC.  NATO needed to signal that 
this was not the Congo; it was a priority one issue for 
European security.  On enlargement, and particularly in the 
lead up to the 08 summit, NATO needed to make clear that it 
would not be subject to Russian bullying on enlargement 
decisions.  On missile defense, the Alliance needed to have 
an internal debate, which might be divisive, but which in the 
end would signal to Russia that missile defense was not only 
a US issue. 
 
¶7.  (C) Mr. Hadley agreed that the Alliance should reiterate, 
as we have said for 15 years, that enlargement is not subject 
to Russian blackmail.  On missile defense, Mr. Hadley 
emphasized that the systems were defensive in nature and had 
been briefed extensively to Russia and NATO.  Bringing NATO 
into the discussion was broadly consistent with US policy 
over the past fifteen years.  More broadly, we needed to 
cooperate where we could, stand up for our interests where 
they diverged, and contain areas where we could not 
cooperate. 
 
¶8. (C) Finishing his riff on European weakness, the SYG 
shared his firm conviction that a strong Europe was in the US 
national interest.  In that regard, the constitutional crisis 
within the EU was sucking all the energy out of the system. 
 
---------------- 
2008 NATO SUMMIT 
---------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Turning to the 08 Summit, which he described as 
POTUS,s legacy summit, the SYG said he wanted deliverables 
to be:  real progress in Afghanistan; resulting in more 
people on the planet living under the rule of law and 
democracy; a Europe free and democratic, including in the 
Balkans which meant finishing Kosovo; and enhancement of the 
Global Partnership program.  All of these areas needed major 
&investment8 between now and next spring. 
 
¶10. (C) Mr. Hadley said he would add &capabilities8 to the 
SYG,s list.  As a military alliance, NATO needed to reverse 
declining capabilities and enhance its sense of solidarity 
(removing caveats, augmenting forces in Afghanistan, sharing 
the duty to go in harm,s way).  The SYG readily agreed, 
adding that in this regard as in others, Germany was 
critical.  Ambassador Nuland suggested that the key was 
building support for these ideas amongst the big continental 
countries:  Germany, Spain, Italy, and France.  Nuland added 
that defense spending also needed to be addressed.  The SYG 
said that if he called for defense spending at two-percent of 
GDP, some would say there was no agreed Alliance benchmark 
and it was a question of quality not quantity.  Ambassador 
Nuland said we should emphasize the commitment on defense 
spending agreed at Riga. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
KOSOVO:  US CONCERNS ABOUT THE EU/UN GAP 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Mr. Hadley said the USG was concerned that there 
would be a security gap between UNMIK drawdown and ESDP 
mission stand-up at the critical moment of transition. 
Ideally there would be an overlap between the forces, not a 
shortfall.  The USG had not reached a formal decision on 
whether to support the ESDP mission, but did want the mission 
to succeed.  We would have to address NATO-related issues. 
The SYG replied that Solana realizes that the risk of a 
security gap exists, especially after the recent incidents 
involving the deaths of protesters. 
 
¶12.  (C) Participation: 
 
USNATO 00000110  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
US: 
Mr. Hadley 
Ambassador Nuland 
NSC Senior Director Ansley 
DCM Olson (notetaker) 
 
NATO: 
Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer 
 
SIPDIS 
Director of Private Office Shuwer 
Deputy Director of Private Office Manso 
SYG,s Personal Secretary Rutgers 
 
¶13.  (U) This cable has been coordinated with NSC Staff. 
OLSON