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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000109 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 
TAGS: NATO PGOV PREL WEU RU
SUBJECT: NSA HADLEY TALKS TO NATO 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY/COMMENT:  National Security Advisor Stephen 
Hadley discussed a wide range of strategic issues with NATO 
Allies on February 21, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, new 
U.S. efforts to revive the Middle East peace process, and 
relations with Russia.  Mr. Hadley's visit comes as Europe is 
increasingly seized with uncertainty over U.S. intentions 
with Iran, doubts over U.S. efforts to revive the peace 
process, and concerns over perceived rising U.S.-Russia 
tensions.  Mr. Hadley's tour de table with NATO Permanent 
Representatives gave Allies a chance to peak behind the 
curtain of U.S. intentions and motivations on almost every 
major foreign policy issue. END SUMMARY/COMMENT. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
AFGHANISTAN:  NOT JUST A HUMANITARIAN CAUSE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (C)  Mr. Hadley praised NATO's commitment to the 
Afghanistan mission, describing it as important and 
"path-breaking" for the Alliance.  We are there, he noted, 
because we have learned lessons from the last time the world 
stood back and watched as terrorist training camps were 
developed and plans were made to attack both the United 
States and Europe.  We cannot walk away this time; we must 
work to support a stable Afghan government that delivers 
security and economic development to its people.  Afghanistan 
is not just a humanitarian cause, he stressed, but also a 
mission to preserve U.S. and European long-term security. 
For political and economic progress to take hold, however, 
there needs to be minimum level of security.  Security must 
not be "in lieu of" but rather a "prerequisite for" a 
political-military strategy. Mr. Hadley reiterated the 
results of President's review of our Afghanistan strategy and 
noted U.S. motivations are three-fold: to ensure there are 
adequate capabilities and resources to achieve the mission; 
to make clear we are not stepping away from Afghanistan and 
dumping it on NATO; and to make clear to Allies that now is 
not the time to step back from their responsibilities just 
because the U.S. is now doing more. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
AFGHANISTAN CONT.: "STEP INTO THE FIGHT, NOT AWAY" 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶3.  (C)  Mr. Hadley asserted that NATO as an Alliance is 
going to learn a lot from the Afghanistan mission.  NATO is 
developing new capabilities in Afghanistan that we will need 
in the future.  Most importantly, these lessons serve as a 
reminder to us that NATO is a security provider first, and 
the most effective one at that.  This successful tradition, 
he said, requires us to invest further in our capabilities, 
articulate our Alliance solidarity, and prepare to "step into 
the fight, and not away."  According to Mr. Hadley, just as 
important as increased NATO capabilities in Afghanistan is 
the coordination of our strategic messaging; "we are getting 
beaten every day by the Taliban" on messaging and he 
suggested the idea of creating a NATO Strategic Communication 
Task Force.  Mr. Hadley also argued that NATO's strategy in 
Afghanistan needs to be country-wide; "we cannot Balkanize 
Afghanistan" and the Alliance must take risks and 
responsibilities with this in mind. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
PAKISTAN:  TALIBAN IS THEIR PROBLEM TOO 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  In response to Canadian and Romanian questions on 
how NATO should cooperate with Pakistan to control the 
growing problems along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Mr. 
Hadley said that areas in both Pakistan and Afghanistan are 
increasingly becoming safehavens for extremists.  He 
emphasized that the U.S. is prepared to work with President 
Musharraf in the tribal areas (including long-term economic 
development), but that Pakistani military authorities also 
need to do more in the short-term (something the U.S. is 
discussing with them).  He stressed that there is also a role 
for Europe to help promote a long-term solution, and 
encouraged Allies to articulate to Musharraf that Al Qaeda 
and the Taliban pose a threat to the Government of Pakistan 
as well. 
 
 
USNATO 00000109  002 OF 003 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
RUSSIA:  WE WILL NOT TOLERATE BULLYING 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Russia, missile defense, and Putin's performance at 
Munich were very much on the mind of Allies; Mr. Hadley 
received several questions on how the U.S. sees its 
relationship with Russia, how U.S. missile defense efforts 
affect that relationship, and how NATO should approach its 
relations with Russia.  Mr. Hadley noted that we need to 
cooperate with Russia in areas of common interest, such as 
non-proliferation, Iran and Kosovo.  As part of this 
dialogue, we should speak candidly when we have 
disagreements; Mr. Putin spoke candidly at Munich, but no 
European except the NATO Secretary General spoke candidly 
back to him.  Mr. Hadley emphasized that Europe needs to 
decide on its policy towards Russia and then speak clearly on 
it; "we can't keep carrying the water" with Russia.  The U.S. 
will not tolerate bullying on the part of Russia and 
encouraged Allies to make clear they will not tolerate it 
either. 
 
¶6.  (C)  On missile defense, Mr. Hadley attempted to clear up 
any Allied confusion over U.S. intentions, noting that the 
U.S. is expanding missile defense sites in Europe because the 
U.S. and Europe must defend ourselves.  We will continue to 
be as open and transparent with the Russian government on our 
efforts as we have in the past.  Mr. Hadley characterized 
missile defense as a "hedge" against a nuclear Iran, not a 
threat to Russia. He argued that part of why there is an 
agreement with North Korea today is because it acknowledged 
its nuclear threat capability would be marginalized by U.S. 
missile defense capabilities. 
 
¶7.  (C)  On Kosovo, Mr. Hadley emphasized that resolution of 
the issue is of "pre-eminent importance" for the security of 
Europe.  To help achieve a successful resolution, we need to 
have "quiet bilateral discussions" with Russia.  Although 
agreeing with a UK suggestion that Russia may be acting out 
in part because it wants to be treated with respect, Mr. 
Hadley said the U.S. and the Alliance should treat Russia 
with respect without accepting its bullying. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
THE MIDDLE EAST:  A CRUCIBLE AND A CHOICE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  The old Middle East is gone, Mr. Hadley said, and a 
new Middle East is emerging, the contours of which are still 
unclear.  He described the region as a crucible for a major 
struggle between forces of moderation and extremism, an 
underlying dynamic that is playing out in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon 
and in the context of the Middle East peace process. Mr. 
Hadley urged Allies to make clear which side they are on, 
especially in the context of Iran. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
IRAN: PRESSURE IS NO PRELUDE TO MILITARY ACTION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Mr. Hadley urged Allies to continue to put pressure 
on the Government of Iran.  He noted Iran will only change 
course if pressure continues to be placed on the government, 
and there is evidence that collective pressure is working. 
Parts of the Iranian government are starting to get the 
message that Ahmadinejad is not acting on behalf of the best 
interests of the Iranian people.  He said we cannot be forced 
to accept a nuclear Iran, and U.S.-European solidarity on 
this issue is needed to ensure this outcome does not occur. 
Mr. Hadley was quick to assuage some European concerns, 
however, by noting that U.S. efforts to increase pressure on 
Iran are not a "prelude to a military option." 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE:  QUARTET STILL APPLIES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10.  (C)  Mr. Hadley stressed that as the Palestinian unity 
government emerges, it must accept the agreed principles of 
the Quartet and the right of Israel to exist.  In response to 
a Spanish request to not "pre-judge" the results of the Mecca 
deal and the new unity government, he urged Allies to not 
wait to encourage the Palestinian government to accept the 
 
USNATO 00000109  003 OF 003 
 
 
Quartet principles.  Further, Mr. Hadley said that as the 
process progresses, we need to find a way to elaborate where 
the roadmap leads so that Mr. Abbas can rally the Palestinian 
people behind a positive vision for their future that 
includes the benefits of a peaceful Palestinian state. 
 
--------------------------------- 
IRAQ:  NO BAKER-HAMILTON YET 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Mr. Hadley offered a frank assessment of the 
situation in Iraq, noting that "we are not at Baker-Hamilton 
yet" and will not get there unless we can help the Iraqi 
government establish security in Baghdad.  While the world is 
seeing the military operations side of this new plan right 
now, Mr. Hadley noted that there is also a diplomatic piece 
that is not well understood and will soon be better 
articulated.  Turkey raised the only questions on Iraq, 
specifically over the situation in Kirkuk and the PKK 
operations out of northern Iraq.  On Kirkuk, Mr. Hadley 
expressed his shared concern over what he termed "one of the 
hardest issues in Iraq" and said that while he had no 
solution, it would likely require "time".  He commended 
Turkey's patience on the PKK issue, frankly commenting that 
the U.S. has not done all it should have done and has hope 
that General Ralston's process will provide some relief. 
 
------------------------------ 
LEBANON:  ONE MAJOR WORRY 
------------------------------ 
 
¶12.  (C)  The resupply of Hizballah across the Syrian border 
is not being addressed by the Lebanese government or UNIFIL 
(despite its mandate to do so if Lebanese government gives 
permission) and Mr. Hadley described this scenario as a 
"ticking time bomb". 
 
-------------------------------- 
SYRIA:  DOESN'T LIKE CARROTS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  Turkey noted that the U.S. needs a "more carrots, 
less stick" approach to the region, especially in regards to 
Syria.  Mr. Hadley rejected the assumptions that carrots 
change behavior in the case of Syria, noting that despite 
continuous effort and a high volume of visits to Damascus by 
other governments (many in the room) with carrots in hand, no 
one has gotten anything out of the Syrians.  Even more 
importantly, Mr. Hadley stressed, Syria has faced no 
consequences for its actions to destabilize the region. 
There has not been a context where Syria faces positive and 
negative incentives; any new strategy must aim to change 
Syria's behavior. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  This cable has been coordinated with NSC Staff. 
OLSON