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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000101 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017 
TAGS: NATO PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: NATO/MACEDONIA: PM GRUEVSKI HEARS ALLIES' CONCERNS 
OVER DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPASSE 
 
 
Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  Macedonian PM Gruevski told NATO's North 
Atlantic Council on February 14 that he was committed to 
implementing the reforms necessary to secure a membership 
invitation from NATO at its 2008 Summit. Allies offered solid 
support for Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic course, but expressed 
serious concerns about the poor state of relations between 
the government and opposition, in particular the ethnic 
Albanian DUI party that was boycotting Parliament.  Gruevski 
outlined all the efforts he had made to reach out to DUI and 
start a dialogue, but said DUI was not reciprocating and was 
following a strategy of pressuring him to include them in the 
government.  Following the NAC session, Ambassador Nuland 
warned Gruevski that the conflict with DUI was undermining 
Macedonia's NATO aspirations and that he needed to improve 
the political climate soon if Macedonia hoped to earn an 
invitation in 2008.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GRUEVSKI:  NATO ACCESSION IS TOP PRIORITY 
 
¶2.  (C)  In a February 14 address to the North Atlantic 
Council, Macedonian PM Gruevski said that NATO membership was 
Macedonia's highest priority and his government was committed 
to completing all the steps necessary to secure an invitation 
in 2008 to join NATO.  He acknowledged difficulties with some 
parties in the opposition, but said his goal remained to 
unify all parties around the reform agenda and said he 
expected a similarly responsible attitude from the 
opposition.  The 90 percent public support for NATO 
membership gave him confidence Macedonia would succeed. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Gruevski listed the steps the government had taken 
to try to accommodate the opposition ethnic Albanian DUI 
party, noting that it had accepted 40 amendments from the 
opposition in its first four months in office, whereas the 
previous government accepted only 13 opposition amendments in 
3 years.  He stressed that inter-ethnic relations were good 
among the general population despite the conflict between 
political parties, as illustrated by a UNDP report from the 
end of 2006 showing that only a small percentage of ethnic 
Albanians and Macedonians were dissatisfied with the state of 
ethnic relations. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Gruevski outlined Macedonia's efforts to fight 
corruption and trafficking in persons and to reform the 
judiciary.  He expressed Macedonia's commitment to fulfill 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement, noting Macedonia had tripled 
the funds for hiring ethnic Albanians in government 
institutions and adopted a law on the equitable 
representation of ethnic groups in government. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Gruevski highlighted Macedonia's economic reforms 
and said new tax laws, reductions in bureaucratic obstacles 
to business, as well as steps to fight corruption and 
implement the rule of law had led to an increase in foreign 
direct investment, a key goal of the government.  He also 
highlighted Macedonia's contributions to NATO operations in 
Afghanistan and Kosovo as evidence of Macedonia's evolution 
from a security consumer to a security provider.  He stressed 
that Macedonia was committed to maintaining good relations 
with both Kosovo and Serbia and to supporting international 
efforts to resolve the status of Kosovo.  Demarcation of the 
border with Kosovo was an important issue for Macedonia, but 
one that was satisfactorily addressed in UN Special Envoy 
Ahtisaari's proposals. 
 
ALLIES PLEDGE SUPPORT, CITE CONCERNS OVER DOMESTIC POLITICS 
 
¶6.  (C)  Most Allies offered support for Macedonia's 
ambitions for Euro-Atlantic aspirations while expressing 
serious concerns about the ethnic Albania party DUI's boycott 
of Parliament and the general lack of political dialogue 
between government and opposition. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Ambassador Nuland stated that no Ally wanted 
Macedonia in NATO more than the U.S., but the U.S. was 
worried.  Reforms had slowed, implementation of the Framework 
Agreement had slowed, and despite 90 percent public support 
for joining NATO Macedonia was not making a unified effort to 
implement the necessary reforms.  She asked the Prime 
Minister to lead an inclusive political process that would 
produce results.  She urged constructive cooperation by 
Athens and Skopje to resolve the issue of Macedonia's name 
and noted U.S. support for the UN-led negotiations to resolve 
this issue. 
 
¶8.  (C)  UK Ambassador Eldon supported Macedonia's movement 
toward Euro-Atlantic integration but said London was 
increasingly concerned about the current political crisis, 
 
USNATO 00000101  002 OF 002 
 
 
which risked derailing Macedonia's progress toward the EU and 
NATO.  He urged cautious handling of the four cases that the 
ICTY intended to return to Macedonian jurisdiction and 
suggested Macedonia only accept the cases when its judicial 
system was ready and to take them one at a time with the 
least controversial first.  Italy, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, 
Spain, and The Netherlands reiterated concerns about the 
opposition's boycott and stressed the need to establish a 
constructive political dialogue. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Greek Ambassador Zepos stressed that Greece had 
consistently supported the Euro-Atlantic integration of the 
Balkan states, but noted the need to resolve the dispute over 
Macedonia's name.  He emphasized there should be no 
violations of the 1995 Interim Agreement on this issue.  He 
said Greece had already displayed good will on this issue and 
hoped Macedonia would take the necessary final steps to 
resolve the issue. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Responding to Perm Reps comments, Gruevski stressed 
that the problem was not with the opposition as a whole, but 
with one party.  He noted his governing coalition included an 
ethnic Albanian party with only slightly fewer seats in 
Parliament than DUI.  He said he had invested a lot of effort 
into establishing a political dialogue, but DUI was resisting 
because it was trying to force its way into the government. 
While a boycott of Parliament was never a good thing, it was 
not unusual in the Balkans.  Dialogue should not have 
preconditions, yet DUI had set four conditions for any talks 
with the government. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Regarding the transfer of ICTY cases, Gruevski said 
his government was "not pushing" the ICTY to transfer the 
cases soon and was aware it would be better if they came at 
the end of the year, but was also preparing in case the cases 
came sooner.  He thanked Greece for its support and said that 
after 17 years the name issue should be resolved.  Macedonia 
was committed to the UN process and agreed there should be no 
violations of the interim agreement. 
 
¶12.  (C)  In concluding the session, SYG de Hoop Scheffer 
noted that Macedonia would find itself under increasing 
scrutiny as a NATO aspirant, which is why Allies had 
expressed both support and worries.  He noted that while 
Parliamentary boycotts may be the norm in the Balkans, they 
are not among NATO members. 
 
NULAND: YOU ARE NOT ON A PATH TO MAKE IT 
 
¶13.  (C)  Meeting with Ambassador Nuland and DCM Olson 
following the NAC session, Gruevski expressed appreciation 
for U.S. support and reiterated his willingness to do what 
was necessary to secure an invitation to join the Alliance. 
Revisiting the issue of DUI, he noted he had originally 
invited DUI to join his government, but they insisted on 
being the only ethnic Albanian party in the governing 
coalition to the exclusion of the traditional ethnic Albanian 
partner of PM Gruevski's party.  DUI was now demanding that 
four difficult pre-conditions be met before it would even 
participate in talks.  Gruevski said that recent pressure 
from the EU and other international organizations had 
emboldened DUI, which felt it had protection from the 
international community and leverage to force concessions 
from the government. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Nuland noted that Macedonia did not have time to 
waste and the dispute with DUI was damaging Macedonia's 
membership chances.  "DUI is killing you and all of 
Macedonia," she said, "it was pretty unanimous around that 
table today that you are not on a path to make it." 
Macedonia could not afford to allow the deadlock to continue 
into the spring.  If Macedonia could not get the necessary 
reforms implemented it would not have enough support to win 
an invitation.  By November, at the latest, the U.S would 
make decisions about which countries to support for NATO 
membership invitations at the 2008 NATO Summit.  Even with 
U.S. support, Macedonia currently only had the backing of 
about five other Allies.  Nuland said many other Allies were 
skeptical about further NATO enlargement and so Macedonia 
should not lose the window of opportunity presented by NATO's 
plans to offer invitations in 2008. 
OLSON