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S E C R E T ULAANBAATAR 000056 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV MG IZ PL
SUBJECT: MONGOLIA NONCOMMITTAL ON 8TH ROTATION IN IRAQ 
 
REF: STATE 10550 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Mark C. Minton, for reasons 1.5 (B) 
and (D) 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  In meetings this week, visiting EAP Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Thomas Christensen urged that Mongolia 
send a full 8th rotation of soldiers to provide force 
protection to Polish troops in Iraq.  In response, Foreign 
Minister Enkhbold noted the government's earlier decision to 
reduce the deployment to a few staff officers, opined that 
the government would need a good reason to show the public 
for reconsidering this, and was noncommittal about changes. 
Vice Defense Minister Erdenebat responded that the U.S. 
should adjust its planning to a reduced deployment, citing a 
more complex domestic political environment, and complaining 
that past U.S. promises of military and civilian assistance 
had been slow to be fulfilled.  The President's Foreign 
Policy Advisor noted that the size of the 7th rotation had 
been hotly debated last summer, but said that the President 
remains supportive of deployments to Iraq.  There is a 
reasonable chance Mongolia will send a full deployment -- but 
it likely will be slow in deciding, partially because of the 
government's political distraction.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) In a January 29 meeting with Foreign Minister 
Enkhbold, DAS Christensen drew on reftel points to urge that 
Mongolia reconsider its preliminary decision to reduce its 
8th rotation of soldiers in Iraq to a small number of staff 
officers.  Mongolia's role in providing force protection for 
Polish soldiers at Camp Echo is greatly appreciated, DAS 
Christensen said.  One of the reasons for the very positive 
views of Mongolia in Washington is the image of Mongolia and 
Poland, two young democracies, cooperating to protect the new 
democracy in Iraq. 
 
¶3.  (S) Enkhbold responded that Mongolia had taken on board 
the position of U.S. and other Coalition partners on its role 
in the process.  Mongolia earlier had decided not to send a 
full eighth rotation to Iraq.  Mongolia would take U.S. and 
Polish views into account, but that remained Mongolia's 
position at the moment.  The Foreign Minister said he did not 
know how the issue would come out.  However, he said, 
Mongolia would need a good "excuse" for reconsidering its 
decision to show the public.  As a democratic country, public 
opinion means a lot.  This is not something decided by MFA 
alone, but rather by MFA and MoD first, then the Cabinet and 
the National Security Council (note: the President, Speaker 
and Prime Minister), as well as public opinion and views in 
Parliament.  One thing is very clear: Mongolia wants to 
develop relations with the U.S. further, and MFA works toward 
that goal. 
 
¶4.  (S) During a January 30 meeting with Vice Defense 
Minister Erdenebat, DAS Christensen also urged that Mongolia 
send a full eighth rotation to Iraq.  Erdenebat responded 
that Mongolia's support for OIF and OEF had been consistent 
through three Cabinets.  However, in making its decision on 
the 7th rotation, Erdenebat said, the NSC had suggested that 
the 8th rotation should consist of a few staff officers.  The 
Ministry of Defense, he said, must follow the NSC.  Erdenebat 
asserted that Mongolia's Democratic Party (DP) had taken 
issue with the decision to deploy to Iraq, while the MPRP had 
pushed the issue.  President Enkhbayar had been Prime 
Minister when the decision was made and remained supportive. 
Erdenebat noted that he had been Vice Defense Minister from 
Enkhbayar's Cabinet until now.  Speaker Nyamdorj, he 
continued, had also been a member of the Cabinet in 2003 when 
the OIF deployment decision was made.  The Ministry of 
Defense remained supportive.  However, the political 
situation currently is complex, Erdenebat commented, with 
pressures from civil society and a diversity of views in the 
current "unity" Cabinet.  MPRP poll ratings are down, and 
there is concern that a casualty in Iraq would inflame the 
street and provide a tool for the DP to try to bring the 
Cabinet down.  Even with a reduced deployment, Erdenebat 
commented, Mongolia's flag would remain in Iraq, possibly its 
greatest contribution.  The Vice Defense Minister suggested 
that the U.S. adjust its planning to take into account a 
reduced Mongolian deployment. 
 
¶5.  (S) Erdenebat commented that, before each rotation, a 
senior U.S. official comes to Mongolia and makes promises of 
assistance.  Once the rotation goes, however, fulfillment of 
these promises is slow.  This has been true, he said, of 
promised U.S. equipment for Mongolia's increased number of 
peacekeeping troops, as well as for Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) assistance, which has been promised for several 
years but only now seemed to be approaching.  Erdenebat 
quoted a Mongolian adage about enticing a child with candy 
which is tantalizingly visible, but is behind glass.  He 
commented that he was firmly convinced that the original 
decision in 2004 to include Mongolia as an MCA-eligible 
country had been linked to the OIF deployment.  Erdenebat 
noted that long range MoD budgetary studies indicated that 
more resources will be needed to support defense reform needs 
for "Vision 2018" (note: as well as peacekeeping troop needs, 
this vision almost certainly includes some aircraft).  Would 
the U.S. help cover these needs? 
 
¶6.  (S) DAS Christensen responded that U.S. assistance to 
Mongolia, military and civilian, is rooted in U.S. commitment 
to Mongolia's democratic transformation, and is not linked to 
specific Mongolian policies related to OIF.  MCA eligibility 
was based on a variety of factors related to governance and 
transparency, not to OIF.  It is true that OIF is a key 
factor in the positive image of Mongolia in Washington, and 
that image makes advocating support for Mongolia easier 
within the USG, but this is an abstract link. 
 
¶7.  (S) In a January 31 meeting with the Foreign Policy 
Advisors to the Prime Minister and to the President, DAS 
Christensen also urged that Mongolia send a full 8th rotation 
to Iraq.  In response, presidential FPA Tsogtbaatar noted 
that the size of the 7th rotation had been hotly debated 
within the National Security Council last summer, and said 
that personalities had not changed.  He added that one 
important factor last summer had been the recognition that 
Mongolia had not signalled far enough in advance that it 
intended to downsize its deployment; this factor would not be 
present during discussion of the 8th rotation.  Nevertheless, 
Tsogtbaatar said, President Enkhbayar remained supportive of 
 
SIPDIS 
Mongolian deployments to Iraq. 
 
¶8.  (S) On January 31, Ambassador asked the Polish ambassador 
whether he had been in contact with the GOM to urge a full 
8th rotation.  The Pole replied that he had not, and had not 
received instructions on the matter from Warsaw, nor 
information on whether the issue had been raised in Warsaw 
with the Mongolian embassy there.  The Polish ambassador 
undertook to check with Warsaw on the issue and to get back 
to the Ambassador. 
 
¶9.  (S) Comment: We have some optimism that Mongolia will in 
the end decide to send a full 8th rotation, although this is 
not a certain outcome.  Poland's decision to stay on at Camp 
Echo changed the situation from that when Mongolia made its 
preliminary decision last September for a reduced follow-on 
rotation, and withdrawal now would disappoint the Poles as 
well as the U.S.  However, the GOM likely will officially 
make any decision to send a full 8th rotation only shortly 
before the 7th rotation is due to leave in April, akin to the 
cliffhanger verdict last September.  As with the 7th 
rotation, if MoD starts training troops, this will be a 
promising sign of the direction of the eventual official 
decision.  While the Vice Defense Minister exaggerated the 
domestic politics a bit, the current coalition government is 
not a decisive one, has a dysfunctional Cabinet which is 
divided on Iraq deployments, and is distracted by ongoing 
Cabinet turbulence. 
 
¶10.  (U) DAS Christensen has cleared this cable. 
MINTON