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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 000856 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Japanese version of NSC has clear Abe stamp 
 
(2) Staffing JNSC secretariat with able personnel essential; Role of 
advisor to prime minister vague 
 
(3) Japanese version of US National Security Council:  NSC that does 
not included the Finance Ministry among its members will be 
ineffective 
 
(4) Bills to reform government lenders leave privatized entities' 
shareholder requirements and profitability ambiguous 
 
(5) Interview with ASDF's 1st Air Defense Missile Group Commander 
Kenji Yamauchi on DPRK: We will intercept missiles in instant 
judgment 
 
(6) Advice to Abe administration by Shinichi Kitaoka, former deputy 
permanent representative to UN: "Moderate, conservative" diplomacy 
needed; Tough measures can't change North Korea's attitude 
 
(7) Armitage Report 2 on getting Asia right ignores burden on 
Okinawa 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Japanese version of NSC has clear Abe stamp 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Almost Full) 
February 28, 2007 
 
Prime Minister Abe proudly presented a report incorporating a 
proposal for establishing a Japanese version (JNSC) of the US 
National Security Council, saying, "This is exactly in agreement 
with my concept." The report carries a strong Abe imprint: it notes 
that the government will aim for a quick response in the diplomacy 
and security areas and passing secrets-protection legislation at an 
early date. However, the report, compiled in a hasty manner, has 
apparently failed to get to the root of bureaucratic sectionalism in 
each government agency - the original agenda item. 
 
Consideration given to US regarding secret protection 
 
One member of the Kantei (Prime Minister's Official Residence) 
Function Reinforcement Council (KFRC) yesterday complained about the 
inclusion into the report the plan for early passage of secret 
protection legislation. 
 
The contents of the report were based on the draft report presented 
on Jan. 15 by former Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobuo Ishihara, 
chairman of the KFRC. When one participant pointed out, "It is 
irrelevant for the JNSC to deal with the issue of enacting 
secrets-protection legislation," Yuriko Koike, Special Assistant to 
 
SIPDIS 
the Prime Minister and the acting chairman of the panel, insisted, 
"This is the prime minister's wish." Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Shiozaki also told the importance of intelligence control linking it 
with the issue of reinforcing the Japan-US alliance. 
 
What was the prime minister's aim? In the policy speech delivered 
last September he said: "I would like to build a framework that will 
enable the Kantei and the White House to communicate at any time." 
 
 
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When North Korea launched missiles last July, Abe, who was deputy 
chief cabinet secretary at the time, worked in close cooperation 
with US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, which led him to 
think that establishing a JNSC would be a means to strengthen the 
bilateral alliance. He presumably thought that to that end, too, it 
would be important to give consideration to the US, which is nervous 
about possible leaks of intelligence on the Japanese side. 
 
Revising the Constitution and studies on the right of collective 
self-defense, policy themes advocated by the prime minister, are 
directly linked to the further strengthening of the Japan-US 
alliance. Commenting on reasons why the prime minister has set the 
timeline for launching the JNSC as early as next April, another 
panel member said, "The prime minister wanted to pave the way for 
amending the Constitution during his tenure." As if to endorse this 
comment, Chair Ishihara yesterday told a news conference that 
studies on the right of collective self-defense might top the agenda 
of the JNSC. 
 
Prime Minister rules out participation of finance minister: 
Bureaucratic sectionalism remain intact 
 
The prime minister's insistence was also seen in the selection of 
the membership of the JNSC, which will be small in number of 
personnel. Former Finance Minister Masajuro Shiokawa in early 
February sought the participation of the finance minister in the 
JNSC, saying, "It is a problem if the finance minister does not join 
the panel. Former Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi was 
assassinated by the military because he cut military expenses." 
However, the prime minister rejected the proposal, saying, "The 
finance minister is not a key official on NSC issues." This stance 
of the prime minister was also visible at the final panel meeting 
yesterday. He underscored, "From my experience, I am strongly 
determined that Kantei (Prime Minister's Official Residence) 
leadership is necessary." The prime minister dealt with the 9-11 
terrorist attacks on the US and the North Korea issue at the Kantei 
for several years, which has made him strongly believe that it is 
important to forge security and diplomatic strategies under the 
leadership of the Kantei eliminating bureaucratic sectionalism. That 
is the reason why he has proposed a plan to strengthen the authority 
of the JNSC by appointing a lawmaker an assistant to the prime 
minister and using the KFRC as the core body in dealing with 
national security affairs. 
 
However, bureaucrats, who are sensitive to their ministry's 
interests, are alarmed about the prospect of politics making 
stronger intervention in administrative activities with one senior 
Cabinet Secretariat official noting, "There is a problem in terms of 
the separation of three powers." Another senior government official 
complained, "Under the parliamentary cabinet system, the areas of 
responsibility of the cabinet and each government agency are 
fixed." 
 
In the end, the report noted, "The JNSC is an advisory organ 
reporting to the prime minister as is the case of the existing 
Security Council." The panel has therefore approved bureaucratic 
sectionalism will remain intact. 
 
Some officials at Kasumigaseki, Japan's bureaucratic center, said, 
"It is possible to carry out what has been proposed in the report 
issued today, just by changing the application of existing 
systems." 
 
 
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US Deputy National Security Adviser Crouch give advice to Kyuma 
 
Defense Minister Kyuma yesterday met with visiting Deputy National 
Security Adviser Crouch at the Defense Ministry. They exchanged 
views on the JNSC and the Iraq policy. 
 
Crouch gave Kyuma this advice: "It is important for cabinet-minister 
members of the JNSC to make sure their staff members coordinate 
views on a constant basis. Unless the panel has a system in which 
the staff members can present policy options immediately at a time 
of crisis, it will be the cabinet ministers who will find themselves 
in trouble." 
 
(2) Staffing JNSC secretariat with able personnel essential; Role of 
advisor to prime minister vague 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Abridged slightly) 
February 28, 2007 
 
Many challenges lie ahead for the envisaged Japanese National 
Security Council (JNSC) to function as the nation's control tower of 
foreign and security affairs. The definition of the post of national 
security advisor to the prime minister, mentioned in the report 
released by the council to strengthen the Kantei's (Prime Minister's 
Official Residence) functions, is vague. Securing national security 
exerts for the secretariat's office is also essential. How to 
collect necessary intelligence for decision-making is unclear, as 
well. 
 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe last night explained the significance of 
the report to reporters this way: "It proposes a system enabling the 
JNSC to speedily discuss and draw up strategies to meet changes of 
the times and various issues." 
 
The prime ministerial advisor who will head the secretariat is 
required to attend every JNSC meeting to offer his or her view. But 
this person's lack of authority to control and issue orders to the 
Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry has raised concern that 
those offices would hesitate to provide the JNSC with intelligence. 
 
Effective policy planning depends on how speedily and effectively 
the JNSC can collect and analyze vital intelligence. The report 
reads: "Government agencies concerned shall constantly provide the 
JNSC with necessary and appropriate intelligence." There is 
apparently a need for the system to ensure close cooperation between 
government offices. 
 
The JNSC will handle a broad range of themes from the right to 
collective self-defense, to the North Korean situation, to resources 
and energy. The report calls for staffing the secretariat with 10 to 
20 experts, which is insufficient in the eyes of some observers. In 
a press conference yesterday, council chair Nobuo Ishihara described 
this number as the "minimum level" required for supporting essential 
functions. 
 
For the sake of the flexible operation of the JNSC, the experts' 
council has decided not to give the finance minister a permanent 
seat on the JNSC. "The finance minister's presence will be asked for 
whenever budgetary measures are required," Ishihara explained. 
Discontent in offices other than the Foreign and Defense Ministries 
might grow depending on how the council is run. 
 
Determining the priority order of the Abe administration's other 
 
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SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 
 
important policies would also be a challenge. 
 
In his meeting yesterday with Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma, visiting 
US Deputy National Security Advisor Jack Crouch offered this advice 
on running the JNSC: "It is important to thoroughly coordinate 
matters with the secretariat members for issuing demands and orders. 
The cabinet ministers who will be the NSC members will be in trouble 
if there are no options in time of a national emergency." After his 
meeting with Advisor to the Prime Minister on National Security 
Yuriko Koike, Crouch also said to the press: "I hope to see close 
cooperation between the NSC of the United States and Japan." 
 
Experts' views on the JNSC 
 
Military commentator Kensuke Ebata: I expected to see a body similar 
to the US National Security Council that has the authority to decide 
on policies. My impression of the report is that given the 
parliamentary system, the group had to make compromises with 
reality. Although the report plays up the Kantei's leadership, it is 
basically designed to enhance the Security Council of Japan, which 
has been a coordination body between government agencies. The report 
specifies that there will be no change to the authority of the 
Foreign Ministry and other government offices concerned. If the JNSC 
can function effectively even with that, a certain level of results 
can be achieved. 
 
Some points remain unclear, such as how to ensure cooperation with 
the intelligence department, what authority will be given to the 
advisor to the prime minister, whether or not the JNSC will make 
public its reports, and so on. 
 
Former assistant to the prime minister Yukio Okamoto: I can give a 
positive assessment to the report calling for a process allowing the 
full-time secretariat members to present the prime minister with a 
number of options for flexible decisions instead of policies 
automatically coming from bureaucratic organizations. It is also 
necessary to create a system allowing the government to swiftly 
change policies, unfettered by traditional policies and continuity, 
in order to meet changes in the international situation. 
 
The secretariat must do more than serve the prime minister. It has 
to have the ability to effectively collect intelligence and even 
come up with policies out of step with the prime minister's 
sentiment, as necessary. The JNSC must also send information to the 
public so as not to fall into secrecy. 
 
(3) Japanese version of US National Security Council:  NSC that does 
not included the Finance Ministry among its members will be 
ineffective 
 
YOMIURI (Page 12) (Full) 
February 16, 2007 
 
By Tomohito Shinoda, professor of international and Japanese 
politics at International University; author of books, Japanese 
Diplomacy in Postwar and Diplomacy led by the Prime Minister's 
Official Residence; age 46. 
 
It has been reported that a group of experts to consider the 
creation of a Japanese version of the US National Security Council 
(NSC) have drafted a final plan. The Japanese-style NSC is 
reportedly modeled after Britain's NSC and composed of a small 
number of cabinet ministers -- the prime minister, chief cabinet 
 
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SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02//07 
 
minister, foreign minister and defense minister -- like the NSC in 
America. I wonder whether the new security body will be created 
based on the full recognition of differences in the political 
systems of the United States and Britain. 
 
Like Britain, Japan has a parliamentary cabinet system under which 
the cabinet bears joint responsibility toward the Diet. Japan, 
however, interprets joint responsibility as meaning that unanimous 
approval is required for cabinet decisions. This interpretation 
limits the prime minister's leadership. Since prior consultations 
are actually carried out, cabinet meetings have lost significance. 
 
The British prime minister has the right to decide agenda of cabinet 
meetings as chair, the right to speak freely and the right to call 
on speakers; as a result, the premier can control cabinet meetings. 
The prime minister also can summarize the discussion and make 
cabinet decisions without taking a vote. Since this kind of prime 
minister-led cabinet management system has been established, there 
have been about 30 committees set up under the British cabinet. 
Committee decisions are treated as cabinet decisions. 
 
The Japanese prime minister's right to initiate new policy at 
cabinet meetings was made clear through functional enhancement by 
the Hashimoto cabinet's administrative reform drive. However, the 
principle of adopting cabinet decisions in a unanimous way has been 
upheld. As long as this principle is maintained, there remains a 
possibility that opposition from other ministries and agencies will 
prevent NSC decisions. Given that situation, there would be doubt 
about the effectiveness of an NSC decision. 
 
Modeling on the US' National Security Council, the statutory members 
of which are the president (chairman of the body), the vice 
president, the secretary of state and the secretary of defense, the 
Japanese version of the NSC is unlikely to include the finance 
minister among its members. However since the US Constitution writes 
that the Congress has the right to decide the state budget, the 
White House negotiates with the Congress on budgetary affairs. 
Therefore, the State Department and the Defense Department hope for 
the involvement of the White House, which has influence over the 
budget, and the NSC in major policies. Since the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), which is equivalent to the Finance 
Ministry's Budget Bureau in Japan, and the Department of the 
Treasury do not have budget-drafting authority, the treasury 
secretary and OMB chief do not take part in the NSC. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
The Japanese prime minister exercises influence in drafting basic 
policies for state budgets through the Council on Economic and 
Fiscal Policy, but the prime minister cannot assign a budget 
allocation to specific policies without the help of the Finance 
Ministry. Although the Finance Ministry's authorities have weakened, 
the Budget Bureau still controls the compilation of state budgets. 
 
Given that, the Finance Ministry may oppose NSC decisions. If the 
Finance Ministry is included in the NSC membership, it would be 
difficult for the NSC to formulate foreign and security policies 
that require the endorsement of budget allocations. I assume, 
therefore, there will be no reasons for the Foreign Ministry and the 
Defense Ministry to entrust policy-making to the NSC. 
 
If the NSC does not include the finance ministry, it will likely be 
necessary to strengthen the prime minister's authority over the 
compilation of state budgets or review the principle of making 
cabinet decisions in a unanimous way. However, the possibility of 
 
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such is slim. In order to avoid negotiations on budgets with the 
Finance Ministry after the NSC decides something, the finance 
minister should be included as one of the NSC members. 
 
I highly value the establishment of a deputy chief cabinet 
secretary-level position above the assistant deputy chief cabinet 
 
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secretary in order to cooperate with the Cabinet Secretariat. The 
 
SIPDIS 
question is how the NSC will gather necessary overseas intelligence. 
There seems to be an idea that the NSC should get such intelligence 
through the cabinet intelligence director. If so, the NSC will be 
able to get only limited intelligence. The NSC should be given the 
right to get information from various government offices, and should 
be able to obtain intelligence from the Foreign Ministry and the 
Defense Ministry. 
 
(4) Bills to reform government lenders leave privatized entities' 
shareholder requirements and profitability ambiguous 
 
YOMIURI (Page 9) (Full) 
February 28, 2007 
 
A bill to merge four public financial institutions into a single 
entity in October 2008 was adopted in a cabinet meeting yesterday. 
All the planned bills related to reforming the government lenders 
are now on the agenda. Although Diet deliberations will soon start 
on these bills, many details about privatized entities have been 
left undecided. 
 
Integration 
 
The four bills are designed to streamline bloated government-backed 
financial institutions and to leave what can be done by the private 
sector in its hands. The Development Bank of Japan, which provides 
long-term funds for social infrastructure projects, and the Shoko 
Chukin Bank, which offers loans to small businesses, will be 
privatized. Under the plan, a 100% state-owned stock company will be 
established in October 2008, and over the following five to seven 
years, the government will sell all its shares in the company to 
make it completely privatized. 
 
The government will continue small-lot lending to small companies 
and international financing, because private companies find it 
difficult to undertake such services. Four entities, including the 
National Life Finance Corporation, will be merged into Japan Policy 
Finance Corporation, a 100% state-owned new stock company, in 
October 2008. 
 
The Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises, which 
provide loans for local governments' sewerage and other projects, 
will be dismantled, and corporations for municipal enterprises 
financed by the local governments concerned will undertake its 
business. 
 
Future vision 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki said in a press conference 
yesterday, "No decision has been made about what requirements will 
be set for shareholder status in a privatized Shoko Chukin Bank." 
Concerning the Development Bank of Japan, he remarked, "A business 
model in the process of pushing ahead with privatization has yet to 
be determined." 
 
The related bills stipulate that the shares in the Shoko Chukin Bank 
 
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will be transferred to organizations linked to small companies. The 
government plans to sell all its shares in the bank between 2013 and 
2015, but as noted in the bills, "necessary steps will be taken" in 
order to continue the financing function for small businesses, such 
regulations as restrictions on shareholder status might be 
maintained. 
 
The Development Bank of Japan, after privatized, intends to actively 
engage in the long-term financing business, in which the bank has 
its own know-how. Nonetheless, once it loses its government backing, 
interest rates on raising funds will inevitably rise. In this case, 
its profitability will be negatively affected. Given this, the 
possibility is being discussed of the bank joining hands with 
another financial group or becoming a subsidiary of such a group. 
 
Effect of integration 
 
Taking over 30 trillion yen worth of the four lenders' outstanding 
loan claims, the new Japan Policy Finance Corporation will be a huge 
financial institution, on par with the nation's leading bank Resona 
Group. In the new integrated company, though, an account will be set 
for each different policy, so the functions of the four companies 
will be left separate. One analyst commented, "It might be difficult 
to try to cut personnel and improve business efficiency." 
 
In appointing the new president of the Finance Corporation for Small 
Businesses this January, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
recommended a person who retired from the ministry, but the Prime 
Minister's Office rejected the idea and instead picked a person 
unrelated to government agencies. In selecting the top posts in the 
Development Bank of Japan, the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation, and the National Life Finance Corporation in late 
September, priority is likely to be given to appointments from the 
private sector. 
 
(5) Interview with ASDF's 1st Air Defense Missile Group Commander 
Kenji Yamauchi on DPRK: We will intercept missiles in instant 
judgment 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
February 28, 2007 
 
Interviewer: Tatsuya Fukumoto 
 
In order to counter ballistic missiles, a Patriot Advanced 
Capability (PAC)-3 system will be installed by the end of March in 
the Air Self-Defense Force's (ASDF) 1st Air Defense Missile Group 
(assigned to the Iruma Base), the unit that is in charge of the 
Tokyo metropolitan zone. This will be the first installation of that 
system in the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). 
 
North Korea's ballistic missiles can reach Tokyo in 10 or so 
minutes. So, we must instantly make a decision to intercept them 
once we gather information about missile launches. We are required 
to get highly accurate information and make a quick response. 
 
I have now stepped up my efforts to train my unit led by some 20 SDF 
personnel who learned how to use the PAC-3 system at a US Army base 
in Texas. 
 
I have told them: "You must not do three things: 'not shoot,' 'be 
unable to shoot,' and 'fail to shoot down.'" Unit members are 
required to shoot. It is unacceptable for them not to shoot out of 
 
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hesitation or for them to be unable to launch missiles because the 
device is broken. 
 
Computers handle the job of shooting down ballistic missiles. What 
is important on our part is to create a system for the PAC-3 unit 
that would always be ready to intercept missiles. I have prioritized 
training for the unit so that it is prepared to depart from the base 
and ready to shoot upon arrival at the location of the deployment. 
 
When the PAC-3 unit moves from one place to another, if the five 
launchers are transferred together to one location, a total of 30 
vehicles will move together. In order to intercept missiles in the 
Tokyo metropolitan zone, we need to study a number of simulations 
about where to deploy the PAC-3 unit in the center of Tokyo. 
 
We are confident that we can demonstrate our combat strength to the 
full and shoot down missiles, once we are ordered, "Go there until 
such and such a date and a time" and, "When it comes, shoot." 
 
(6) Advice to Abe administration by Shinichi Kitaoka, former deputy 
permanent representative to UN: "Moderate, conservative" diplomacy 
needed; Tough measures can't change North Korea's attitude 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Slightly abridged) 
February 28, 2007 
 
Chiyako Sato 
 
According to the recent six-party agreement on the North Korean 
nuclear issue, energy aid to be offered to North Korea in exchange 
for disabling its nuclear facilities will be a mere one million tons 
of heavy fuel oil. Meanwhile, the United States will begin the 
process of removing North Korea from its list of states that sponsor 
or support terrorism. This point is a problem. 
 
Former US Ambassador to the United Nations Bolton, who played a 
leading part when the UN Security Council adopted a resolution 
condemning Pyongyang's missile launches and nuclear test, criticized 
the agreement. It is unavoidable that President Bush is seen as 
shifting his North Korea policy. Although Japan should not be afraid 
of being isolated in the international community, complete isolation 
as a result of clinging to its principles must also be avoided. 
 
Even if Japan becomes even more hard-lined toward the North, that 
country will not change its attitude. The important thing is to 
convince North Korea first to abandon its nuclear programs and next 
to induce it to resolve the abduction issue. It should not be our 
country's goal to continue attacking North with an increasingly 
rigid stance. Such a tactic has not produced good results. 
 
I appreciated Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visits to China and South 
Korea last fall. However, I do not want him to simply revert to the 
old political style. Instead, I hope to see him follow a moderate, 
middle-of-the-road, conservative course. So far he has performed as 
I expected. It is unwise to create reasons to fight with China in 
addition to the areas of discord already lying between the two 
countries. It is a clever approach not to make Yasukuni Shrine an 
issue. 
 
Favorable relations between Japan and the US owed too much to the 
personal ties between then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and 
President Bush. As a result, there were few chances for dialogue at 
other levels. It is not healthy to think that everything would go 
 
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smoothly if only the Koizumi-Bush connection was in good shape. Now 
is time to do our best by employing various approaches. 
 
Some people may feel strong nostalgia for the Koizumi era, but I do 
not think everything then went along well. He would skip important 
issues and focus instead solely on one issue. He might have been a 
genius in playing the power game, but when it came to whether his 
way of carrying out politics was good for Japan, future historians 
may find faults with his style of doing things. I think Abe should 
demonstrate his leadership in his own way. 
 
In the 2005 Lower House election, the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party won a landslide victory. As a result, the prime minister 
cannot easily decide to exercise his right to dissolve the Lower 
House. Instead, he should make better use of the right of 
appointment. What Prime Minister Abe should do is to shuffle his 
cabinet before the Upper House election in July and bring in a 
powerful lineup to help him achieve long-term policy goals. 
 
(7) Armitage Report 2 on getting Asia right ignores burden on 
Okinawa 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Full) 
February 25, 2007 
 
A group of American bipartisan Japan policy experts, led by former 
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, has recently released a report 
 
SIPDIS 
(Armitage Report 2) titled, "The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia 
Right through 2020." The previous report produced in 2000 served as 
key guidelines for the Bush administration's Asia policy. The new 
report is attracting much attention. We asked University of the 
Ryukyus Professor Masaaki Gabe for his view on the report's possible 
impact on Okinawa and other areas. 
 
The report with its set of policy proposals came out in Washington 
on Feb. 16. It carries an exciting and contentious subtitle: 
"Getting Asia Right," which can be translated into "how to guide 
Asia in the right direction," or "for a right Asia," or "a desirable 
Asia." 
 
As can easily be imagined, the title is likely to prompt readers to 
ask: "Who would determine what is right and based on what?" and, 
"Why should the United States be the one to get Asia right?" Some 
people might even argue that Asian affairs should be left to Asia. 
The Japanese media have reported on such possible reactions. But as 
far as I know, the report has not created a stir in the United 
States or in Asia. 
 
A study group comprising bipartisan experts on Japan produced the 
report. In October 2000, the same group of experts released the 
first Armitage Report that urged Japan to exercise the right to 
collective self-defense. 
 
Richard Armitage, who served as deputy secretary of state under the 
Bush administration, and Joseph Nye, who served as assistant 
secretary of defense under the Clinton administration, played 
 
SIPDIS 
central roles in producing the report. 
 
Armitage, a former Marine officer who entered the US government 
during the Reagan administration, is a major advocate in Washington 
for a strong Japan-US alliance. He is the one who urged Japan to 
send Self-Defense Force troops to the Indian Ocean and Iraq by using 
 
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such expressions as "show the flag" and "boots on the ground." 
 
Joseph Nye, currently the dean of the Kennedy School of Government 
at Harvard University, is an expert on international politics. He 
has indicated that the United States would be able to remain as a 
world leader as long as it possesses "soft power," meaning that the 
US has the technological edge that can make the US the engine of the 
world. He has brushed aside the projection that the US' hegemony 
would decline after the end of the Cold War. In February 1995, Nye 
released a report highlighting the need to keep 100,000 US troops in 
East Asia and stressing the role of US bases in Okinawa. He urged 
Washington to think twice before reducing US troops in Japan. 
 
The latest report fundamentally urges policy-makers in Washington to 
keep the US-Japan alliance at the center of America's Asia policy at 
least until 2020. In conclusion, the report underlines the need to 
deftly manage bilateral Japan-US relations and multilateral 
relations. 
 
It puts high priority on US action for maintaining the world order, 
which may change with the rise of China. The report specifically 
focuses on the "quality" of relations among Japan, the United 
States, and China. In other words, it seeks the management of issues 
in such areas as politics, military, economics, energy, trade, and 
history. In addition, paying special attention to India, the report 
calls for enhanced relations among Japan, the United States, and 
India, as if to constrain China. 
 
Dividing the Asia-Pacific into two geographical areas, the report 
points out the importance for the United States to forge trilateral 
relations with Japan and Australia, which encompass both Pacific 
relations and Pan-Asianism, apparently with the aim of checking 
China. 
 
The direction as outlined points to a US policy shift toward Asia, 
which belongs in both areas, by laying a series of bilateral 
relations with individual countries, (such as South Korea, the 
Philippines, Thailand, China, and Japan) on top of the US-centered 
trilateral relationship. 
 
The report expects Japan to play an active role in the international 
community, including exercising the use of military power. It 
specifically calls for removing trade barriers between Japan and the 
United States to better enable the two countries to conduct joint 
military operations. That means virtually turning Japan into a 
country like the United States and integrating it into the United 
States. 
 
The privileged US military conducts daily activities in Okinawa on 
the back of Tokyo, which glorifies such "Americanization steps." Is 
Washington not aware of the danger of basing the Japan-US alliance 
on the burden placed on Okinawa? Or has it decided to turn a blind 
eye to it? 
 
DONOVAN