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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000805 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017 
TAGS: PARM PREL JA UNGA
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR TERRORISM CONVENTION: ""NUDGE"" COULD HELP 
JAPAN RATIFY; PHYSICAL PROTECTION CONCERNS REMAIN 
 
REF: 07 TOKYO 00742 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Joe Donovan for reasons 
1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (U) NOTE: This is an action request -see par. 5. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Summary:   On February 9, MEXT Nuclear Safety 
Division Officials suggested that U.S. encouragement of G8 
allies to ratify the Nuclear Terrorism Convention could 
positively impact their efforts to achieve ratification by 
the Japanese Diet.   Responding to U.S. concerns about 
physical protection of nuclear facilities, MEXT explained 
that an assessment of the local threat level did not justify 
posting armed guards at the Tokai-Mura facility, and that the 
GOJ is constitutionally prevented from requiring background 
checks of nuclear workers, due to privacy considerations (End 
Summary). 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Japan eyeing U.S. and U.K. actions on NTC 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)   In a February 9 meeting, Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) Nuclear Safety 
Division Deputy Directors Taro Hokugo and Katsuyuki Kudo 
inquired about U.S. plans for ratification of the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism (NTC).  They noted that Japanese Diet 
members are very interested in where the U.S. and U.K. stand 
on NTC ratification and that they have asked the U.K. Embassy 
in Tokyo for an update on U.K. plans for ratification.  As 
key drafters of the implementing legislation for the NTC, 
MEXT will submit draft domestic legislation on nuclear 
terrorism to the Diet in late February or early March and 
hopes for a positive decision on NTC ratification as early as 
July 2007, in time for the G8 Summit (see reftel). 
 
¶4. (C)  MEXT suggested that clear U.S. encouragement of G8 
partners to ratify the NTC as soon as possible would help to 
create a more favorable environment for the issue in the 
Diet.  They added that a U.S. &nudge8 on ratification, not 
specifically directed at Japan or any one country, and a 
clear statement by the U.S. on its own intentions regarding 
NTC ratification could tip the Diet toward speedy 
ratification of the NTC.  MEXT requested that the Embassy 
keep them closely advised of U.S. progress on NTC 
ratification. 
 
¶5.  (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests that Department advise 
on U.S. plans to encourage ratification of the NTC among G8 
partners. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Physical Protection Concerns Remain 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)   On physical protection of nuclear facilities, 
MEXT,s Hokugo and Kudo responded to U.S. questions about the 
presence of armed guards at Japanese nuclear facilities. 
They explained that the plant operator, local police and 
national police determine the threat for individual plants 
and the necessity for armed guards.  Armed national police 
are present at certain nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Japan, 
but they do not guard all facilities and contract civilian 
guards are prevented by law from carrying weapons.  Asked 
about the absence of armed guards at the Tokai-Mura facility, 
a major plutonium storage site, MEXT responded that an 
assessment of local needs and resources had indicated that 
there was not a sufficient threat to justify armed police at 
the site. 
 
¶7.  (C)   MEXT also responded to U.S. urgings to require 
pre-employment background investigations of all workers with 
access to sensitive areas at nuclear facilities.  They noted 
that while some NPP operators voluntarily conduct such 
background checks on their own employees, requiring 
background investigations of all contractor personnel with 
access to NPPs would be very difficult.  They added that the 
GOJ is constitutionally prevented from mandating such checks 
and wishes to avoid raising what is a deeply sensitive 
privacy issue for Japanese society.  However, MEXT did admit 
that GOJ background investigations may be going on 
""unofficially8. 
 
¶8.  (U) Meeting participants: 
U.S.: 
NP NE Deputy Director, Dr. Alex Burkart 
NP MNSA Senior Scientist, Dr. Stephen Adams 
EST Officer, Toby Wolf 
 
Japan: 
MEXT Nuclear Safety Division Deputy Director, Taro Hokugo 
MEXT Nuclear Safety Division Deputy Director, Katsuyuki Kudo 
MEXT Nuclear Safety Division Researcher, Keigo Maehara 
 
¶9.  (U) This message has been cleared by Alex Burkart. 
DONOVAN