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Viewing cable 07TOKYO448, MOFA PUTS POSITIVE SPIN ON CEBU ECON OUTCOMES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO448 2007-02-01 01:47 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO4251
RR RUEHCHI RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #0448/01 0320147
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 010147Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0243
INFO RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8266
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5268
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 0651
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2209
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1595
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 9723
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 2192
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 3191
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0726
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2995
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR 
GENEVA ALSO FOR USTR 
USDOC FOR OFFICE OF JAPAN - NMELCHER 
PARIS FOR USOECD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2027 
TAGS: ETRD ECIN ECON PREL JA
SUBJECT: MOFA PUTS POSITIVE SPIN ON CEBU ECON OUTCOMES 
 
 
TOKYO 00000448  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. J. Thomas Schieffer.  Reason: 1.4 (b, d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  The endorsement of Japan's 
proposal for an academic study of a free trade 
area including the 10 ASEAN states along with 
Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New 
Zealand, and India at the January 15 East Asian 
Summit was a better outcome than had been 
expected, according to an official of the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). 
Nevertheless, prospects for an agreement between 
Japan and ASEAN alone remain weak, with Japan 
seeing little to gain despite ASEAN's insistence 
on making those negotiations a priority.  Japan's 
Trade Ministry continues to be the driving force 
behind the "ASEAN Plus 6" proposal for regional 
economic integration, although officials of that 
agency did not confirm the extent of their 
involvement.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Cebu Summits Show Acceptance of ASEAN Desire for 
Regional Integration Options 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2.  (C)  The January summit meetings in Cebu 
yielded a better response than the Japanese had 
first predicted coming out of the December 
preparatory sessions, according to MOFA Economic 
Partnership Division Deputy Director Kohei Saito 
in a January 25 meeting with econoff.  In Saito's 
view, what had changed fundamentally was a new 
acceptance on the part of ASEAN's economic 
dialogue partners that ASEAN preferred to have a 
range of options on broader regional economic 
integration once all of its agreements with 
individual partners had been completed. 
 
3.  (C)  Saito, who had attended the December 
meetings, said that initially the Japanese had 
been concerned that ASEAN would insist on 
completion of a Japan-ASEAN economic partnership 
agreement before it would consider any movement 
on a "Track II" academic study of the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia 
(CEPEA, or so-called "ASEAN Plus 6" arrangement) 
put forward by Japan at the August meeting of 
economic ministers from ASEAN and its chief 
dialogue partners.  Instead, the ASEAN leaders in 
Cebu agreed to language calling for a Track II 
study on CEPEA in the joint statements of both 
the ASEAN-Japan summit and the larger East Asian 
Summit (EAS). Nevertheless the ASEAN leaders 
still stressed the need to complete the ASEAN- 
Japan agreement under negotiation as soon as 
possible.  This language, Saito noted, was 
basically a repeat of the wording that emerged 
from the August meetings and allowed progress on 
the CEPEA initiative without an absolute 
necessity to finish the Japan-ASEAN agreement. 
 
4.  (C)  Saito also noticed a shift in ASEAN's 
position on a possible ASEAN Plus 3-based free 
trade agreement.  In December, the ASEAN 
representatives had been cool to the idea put 
forward by the South Koreans to move ahead with 
an in-depth sector-by-sector "Phase II" study on 
the FTA proposal.  Nevertheless, the final 
statement from the ASEAN Plus 3 summit endorsed 
the Koreans' initiative.  In addition, neither 
the Koreans nor the Chinese -- both of whom had 
indicated reservations toward the CEPEA proposal 
and had been far more supportive of economic 
integration centered on ASEAN Plus 3 -- voiced 
further opposition to a study on the ASEAN Plus 6 
arrangement.  Although the Chinese ambassador to 
 
TOKYO 00000448  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
the Philippines, who had represented Beijing at 
the December meetings, had characterized a Track 
II study on CEPEA as "premature," no similar 
comments had emerged at the January summit. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Japan-ASEAN Talks to Center on Goods Trade Only 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5.  (C)  Regarding prospects for a Japan-ASEAN 
agreement, however, Saito acknowledged that many 
problems remained.  During the meeting of ASEAN 
and Japanese economic ministers in December, the 
ASEAN side had accepted the latest Japanese 
modality for trade in goods -- elimination of 
tariffs on 92 percent of trade by trade volume 
with establishment of a maximum tariff or a 
reduction of tariffs on the remaining eight 
percent (mostly agricultural products) -- as a 
basis for discussion.  This opened the way for 
formal negotiations, suspended since August, to 
restart.  ASEAN, however, wanted to see the 
details of the Japanese proposal, Saito stressed. 
He expected the next round of negotiations with 
ASEAN to take place in the latter part of 
February. 
 
6.  (C)  Saito also acknowledged that the 
Japanese had little interest in pursuing 
negotiations on trade in services in the Japan- 
ASEAN context beyond adding a few "endeavor 
clauses" to the agreement and establishing a 
committee with ASEAN to explore the topic. 
According to Saito, although Japan would benefit 
by having accumulated rules of origin on trade in 
goods via a Japan-ASEAN agreement, this obviously 
did not apply to trade in services.  From the 
Japanese perspective, the sections pertaining to 
services in the various bilateral economic 
partnership agreements with individual ASEAN 
states were preferable to any arrangement that 
could be achieved with ASEAN as a whole, Saito 
said.  With ASEAN and China having just concluded 
an agreement on trade in services, however, Saito 
expected that ASEAN would likely present Japan 
with a proposal similar to the recently concluded 
arrangement with China. 
 
------------------- 
The METI Connection 
------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  Interestingly, the Japanese had been 
surprised at the decision announced in the 
statement of the East Asian Summit leaders to 
task the ASEAN Secretariat to take charge of the 
CEPEA Track II study, according to Saito.  As the 
host of the EAS, the Philippines had 
responsibility for drafting the joint statement 
for the summit and did not consult with the 
Japanese on that point before the statement was 
released.  Saito stressed, however, that the real 
work on CEPEA was not going to be done by ASEAN 
but by Japan's own Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry (METI), albeit in conjunction with 
the ASEAN Secretariat. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Waseda Univesity Professor Shujiro 
Urata, an expert on regional integration in Asia 
and a participant in the Track II study on an 
ASEAN Plus 3-based free trade agreement, 
indicated to econoffs January 25 that, according 
to his understanding as well, METI remained the 
guiding force behind the CEPEA initiative despite 
the ostensible involvement of the ASEAN 
Secretariat.  In fact, there was already 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TOKYO 00000448  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
substantial discussion within METI on where to 
locate the Japanese-funded Economic Research 
Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA, billed 
initially as an Asia-only version of the OECD) 
promised as a way to win ASEAN support for the 
CEPEA proposal, Urata said.  METI officials, 
according to Urata, wanted to locate the facility 
in Thailand because of the large amount of 
Japanese investment in that country while Urata 
himself felt that Singapore would be a more 
appropriate venue. 
 
9.  (SBU)  In general, Urata believed the Cebu 
summits had signaled a much more pragmatic 
approach to economic integration than had been 
seen a year earlier.  The rhetoric on "East Asian 
Community" had largely vanished to be replaced by 
more concrete, programmatic proposals, 
exemplified by Prime Minister Abe's ten points 
for enhancing cooperation among the EAS member 
states. 
 
10.  (C)  METI officials, however, have been less 
forthcoming about the extent of the ministry's 
ongoing involvement in CEPEA.  When asked by 
econoff on January 19 regarding the outcome of 
the Cebu meetings, Tetsuya Watanabe, the head of 
METI's office charged with developing the CEPEA 
proposal, provided little additional information 
on the CEPEA study beyond what had been contained 
in the official statements.  According to 
Watanabe, it was unclear as to when the ASEAN 
Secretariat would begin work on the CEPEA study 
 
SIPDIS 
as called for in the EAS statement.  According to 
Watanabe, the ASEAN Secretary was on a break 
following the summits in Cebu and had not wanted 
to receive the tasking in the first place.  As a 
result, it was unclear as to when the study might 
actually begin, who the participants would be, 
and what timeframe it would involve.  His 
colleague from the METI Americas Division who 
attended the meeting acknowledged to econoff that 
Watanabe's briefing had been underwhelming. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (C)  For Japan, the various summit meetings 
in Cebu were successful because the Japanese won 
some endorsement of their proposals. 
Nevertheless, with Korea launching the next stage 
of preparations for an ASEAN Plus 3 FTA and the 
Chinese having come to agreement on trade in 
services with ASEAN, securing the blessing of 
ASEAN and the other EAS states to move ahead on 
the METI-driven CEPEA Track II study is small 
beer.  Even as the announced (but not binding) 
deadline of April to complete negotiations on an 
ASEAN-Japan economic partnership agreement looms, 
there remains little enthusiasm within the 
Japanese Government to make the concessions 
needed to strike a significant deal.  The 
question is whether the Japanese will find a way 
to come to a minimally acceptable arrangement 
with ASEAN that will allow a claim of partial 
success or walk away entirely, risking domestic 
political criticism for diplomatic failure.  In 
the meantime, none of Japan's initiatives in Cebu 
would seem to point the way toward a true Asia- 
Pacific Economic Community envisioned by the 
United States. 
SCHIEFFER