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DE RUEHTC #0256/01 0401557
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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8158
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 2726
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1982
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1671
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0972
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0151
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1638
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0324
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0571
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RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0342
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1743
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000256 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN, ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2017 
TAGS: PARM AORC EIND OPCW CWC CBW IR
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): UPDATE ON 
EFFORTS TO BLOCK IRAN AS OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL CHAIR 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 204 
     ¶B. STATE 11293 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative 
 to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.  Reasons 
1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
This is CWC-12-07. 
 
¶1.  (C)  On February 6, Japanese Ambassador Komachi reported 
to Ambassador Javits about his discussions with Malaysian 
Ambassador Ariffin.  Ariffin said she was aware of Iran's 
interest in becoming EC chair, but admitted that it would be 
hard to build an Asian Group consensus around an Iranian 
candidacy.  She made clear that she has no personal agenda 
with regard to this issue, and she promised Komachi that she 
would check with ASEAN colleagues about support for South 
Korean Ambassador Choi as a possible chair.  She added that 
she would also check with the Ambassadors of China and India. 
 However, Komachi received the clear impression that Ariffin 
is not particularly enthused about Choi's candidacy.  She 
admitted that she was a bit surprised by the fact that Choi 
was under consideration, adding that she was not familiar 
with his background and qualifications.  Komachi noted that 
Choi had been in New York had had extensive UN experience 
 
¶2.  (C) Komachi asked Ariffin if she might be interested 
herself in serving as the chair, and Ariffin replied that she 
would be leaving by the end of the year.  Komachi then raised 
Philippine Ambassador Arguelles as a possible candidate, and 
Ariffin said she certainly would support Arguelles.  Indeed, 
Ariffin indicated she would talk to Arguelles about that 
possibility.  Komachi informed Javits that he had already 
raised the issue directly with Arguelles and that Arguelles 
had no objection to serving as the chair.  Komachi concluded 
by highlighting the fact that Ariffin clearly prefers an 
ASEAN candidate and specifically prefers Arguelles to Choi. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Javits followed up by meeting with Arguelles, who 
indicated that he supported Choi for the chairmanship.  When 
Javits asked whether Arguelles would himself be interested in 
the job, Arguelles did not provide an explicit statement, but 
seemed to be receptive to the position in the event a 
consensus did not coalesce around the South Korean candidacy. 
 (Note: Arguelles has been in The Hague since 2002.  Should 
he become the Asian group candidate, one issue which may 
arise is asking the Philippine Foreign Ministry if Arguelles 
could remain in The Hague until mid-2008.  End Note.) 
 
¶4.  (C) Komachi also gave his personal view that at this 
time, it might not be effective to expand discussion of the 
possible Iranian candidacy to a much larger group of 
delegations.  While that may be necessary at a later stage, 
for the moment, Komachi said he has been careful not to 
indicate Japan has been demarched by the U.S. and suggested 
for the time being keeping the effort to the delegations that 
have already been brought into this discussion, other WEOG 
delegations and some selected Eastern European delegations. 
 
¶5.  (C) On February 8, FRG Ambassador Petri informed Javits 
as well as the UK and French delegations that he had raised 
the issue of the EC chairmanship with Indian Ambassador 
Sabharwal.  Petri had done this on his own initiative without 
notifying any of the other Close Allies.  Javits was 
surprised that Petri had taken it on himself to raise this 
with Sabharwal and called Komachi to both inform him and get 
 
his reaction.  Komachi said that it was the custom in the 
Asian Group that the big countries like China and India would 
not take a position like a chairmanship and that these would 
be left to others in the group.  More important, Komachi said 
that he thought the deliberations within the group were 
proceeding well and there were good alternative candidates in 
South Korea and the Philippines.  Komachi said he was not 
aware of Sabharwal even having been approached with this 
issue before Petri raised it with her. 
 
¶6.  (C) Based on the status of discussions in The Hague 
regarding finding an alternative candidate, we do not believe 
it is necessary yet to further demarche capitals in the Asian 
Group (e.g., Seoul, Manila) on this issue.  The U.S. del will 
inform Washington on an urgent basis if it believes such a 
step is needed. 
 
¶7.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL