VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0204/01 0331355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021355Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8085
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 2724
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1975
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1666
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0968
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0146
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1632
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0322
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0564
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1326
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0338
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1349
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1735
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000204 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN, ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 
TAGS: PARM AORC EIND OPCW CWC CBW IR
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SUPPORT FOR 
BLOCKING IRAN AS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL CHAIR 
 
REF: STATE 11293 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative 
 to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.  Reasons 
1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
This is CWC-10-07. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Ambassador Javits spoke with the 
Ambassadors of the UK, France, Germany, Japan and South 
Korea, as well as OPCW Director General Pfirter on the 
unacceptability of Iran as the Chair of the OPCW Executive 
Committee.  There was unanimous acceptance of that position, 
nuanced differences regarding how to address the issue, and 
initial discussion of possible alternative candidates from 
the Asian Group.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) UK:  UK Amb. Parker was very familiar with the U.S. 
objection to Iranian Amb. Ziaran as Chair of the OPCW EC, and 
agreed that it would not be possible to accept an Iranian 
chairmanship.  He noted that there were lessons that could be 
drawn from the experience of the failed Iranian attempt to 
get the chairmanship of the working group (WG) for the Second 
Review Conference, a position held by Parker.  In that case, 
it was critical that Iran heard a consistent message from 
WEOG and numerous other delegations that they could not 
accept Iranian chairmanship of the WG.  That would again be 
essential with regard to any Iranian push for the EC Chair, 
and Parker pledged that the UK will help in making that case 
to other delegations.  He would also talk to the DG about how 
the UK could assist in this matter. 
 
¶3.  (C) However, Parker candidly stated that due to his 
chairmanship of the RevCon WG, there was a limit to the 
extent to which UK fingerprints could be on the effort to 
deny Iran the chairmanship.  Particularly as Iran is the 
Asian Group representative on the WG, the UK needed to ensure 
that the EC issue was handled in a manner that ensured Iran 
would not block progress on preparations for the RevCon. 
With regard to who might be a good candidate from the Asian 
Group to serve as EC Chair, Parker's first choice would be 
the Malaysian Ambassador, second would be the Indian 
Ambassador, and third would be the Chinese Ambassador. 
 
¶4.  (C) Germany: FRG Amb. Petri expressed Germany's support 
for the U.S. opposition to Iran as EC Chair.  Javits 
emphasized that it would be important in particular for the 
UK, France and Germany to take an active role in ensuring 
that Iran did not get the chairmanship.  Petri replied that 
Germany has already done some discreet lobbying with some 
delegations from the Asian Group. 
 
¶5.  (C) France: French Amb. Gaussot said he appreciated the 
U.S. position in opposition to Iran, adding that he thought 
the best course would be to persuade Ziaran to not press to 
obtain the job.  Gaussot said that he understood the demarche 
in Paris would only be done on the afternoon of Feb. 2, so he 
could not provide more commentary at this point.  However, he 
promised to contact Javits next week after the demarche had 
been completed and Paris had given him instructions on the 
matter after some consideration. 
¶6.  (C) Director General Pfirter: The DG fully agreed that it 
would not be possible to have Iran serve as the Chair.  He 
emphasized that at this point, Ziaran has not circulated any 
written notification to the Asian Group that he seeks the EC 
Chairmanship.  Should another Ambassador from the group be 
 
first to circulate such a document, Iran would then be in the 
much more difficult position of having to challenge that 
individual.  It was therefore important to see if a suitable 
Ambassador could be found to "formally" indicate his/her 
candidacy.  The DG's personal recommendations were to first 
see if the South Korean Ambassador would be willing, then the 
Malaysian Ambassador and then the Philippine Ambassador, whom 
the DG thought would also be a well-accepted choice. 
 
¶7.  (C) South Korea: The South Koreans had already expressed 
to the U.S. del reservations about an Iranian EC 
Chairmanship.  ROK Amb. Choi told Javits the topic has not 
been discussed formally within the Asian Group, and that at 
this time no meeting had been scheduled by the Asian Group 
coordinator (Pakistan) to decide on the group nominee.  Choi 
agreed with Javits that it would be valuable to note the 
Iranian Ambassador as Vice-Chair of the cluster handling 
financial and administrative issues  already had a key 
position.  Choi stressed that it would be important to have 
an alternative candidate to Iran.  Javits asked Choi whether 
he might be willing to serve as EC Chair, and Choi clearly 
was not comfortable with the suggestion.  He made clear that 
he would not be willing to compete for the position. 
However, he indicated a willingness to serve as chair if it 
were clear that he were the consensus candidate from the 
Asian Group. 
 
¶8.  (C) Japan:  Japanese Amb. Komachi concurred on the need 
to find a good alternative candidate.  Komachi mentioned Amb. 
Choi as his preference, and Javits recounted the discussion. 
Komachi stated that Choi's reluctance could be due to the 
fact that his deputy will be returning this month to an 
assignment in the MFA.  However, Komachi promised to broach 
the issue with Choi as soon as possible. 
 
¶9.  (C) Komachi subsequently reported back to Javits that 
Choi also had made clear that he did not want to compete for 
the chairmanship but would be open to serving if he were the 
consensus candidate.  Komachi told Javits that he then had 
spoken to the Philippine Ambassador about a possible ROK 
candidacy, and the Philippine Ambassador had given his 
personal view that Choi would be acceptable to ASEAN states. 
Komachi then said that he would broach the issue of a ROK 
candidacy with the Malaysian Ambassador. 
 
¶10.  (C) Continuing on the topic of possible candidates from 
the Asian Group, Komachi thought the Indian Ambassador would 
be an excellent EC Chair, although she might be reluctant to 
accept a "neutral" position and give up an "advocacy" 
position.  With regard to the Malaysian Ambassador, Javits 
noted that she had done a good job as head of one of the key 
drafting groups that prepared for the First RevCon in 2003. 
Komachi raised the prospect of the Thai Ambassador, but then 
commented that the Thai Embassy staff was somewhat weak. 
(Note: The same could be said of the Philippine Ambassador, 
who has a thin and somewhat inexperienced staff, but is 
solid, well-liked and pro-U.S.) 
 
¶11.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL