VZCZCXRO4354
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHTV #0557/01 0530711
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 220711Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9537
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0777
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0327
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9341
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1895
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 9816
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4846
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0124
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

S e c r e t section 01 of 04 tel aviv 000557

Sipdis

Sipdis

E.o. 12958: decl: 02/09/2017
Tags: prel, knnp, mnuc, pter, unsc, ir, ru, is
Subject: iran-unsc: under secretary joseph's discussions
with israeli government officials (cable 4 of 4)

Ref: a. Tel aviv 00553
b. Tel aviv 00554
c. Tel aviv 00555
d. Tel aviv 00556

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

-------
summary
-------

¶1. (S) During his January 30 - February 2 visit to Israel,
Under Secretary Robert Joseph participated in talks with
Israeli representatives from the MFA, MOD, Israeli Atomic
Energy Commission (IAEC) and affiliated research centers, IDF
intelligence (IDI), and the Mossad. Discussions focused on
the threats posed to Israel and the international community
by Iran, North Korea, Syria, and terrorist groups operating
in Lebanon and the region. Under Secretary Joseph was
accompanied by Ambassador Jones, Assistant Secretary John
Rood, DOE/NNSA Deputy Administrator William Tobey, and T
Senior Advisor James Timbie. This cable, the fourth of four
on Iran from a three-hour interagency meeting at the MFA,
focuses on next steps in dealing with the <>
weapons threat, including a second UNSC resolution.

¶2. (S) The main points the Under Secretary's Israeli
interlocutors made are as follows:

¶A. The U.S. and Israel should continue to coordinate on
measures to be taken against Iran both within and outside the
UN and the IAEA.

¶B. Israel has some ideas to increase <> on Iran which
target senior Iranian decision-makers, Iran's bankers and
financiers, and Iran's developing trade relations with other
countries. Israel also believes steps should be taken to
fuel debate about Iran's nuclear program among younger
Iranians. It may be worthwhile to increase <> on
Iranian negotiator Larijani, who -- Israel believes -- has
been very effective in courting EU High Representative Solana.

¶C. Israel is open to a second UNSC resolution on Iran, and is
willing to support it through joint approaches to European
capitals. To stave off European eagerness to begin
negotiations with the Iranians, Israel believes it might be
worthwhile to propose a roadmap to negotiations with very
specific benchmarks for Iran and the Europeans.

¶D. The Israeli MFA will send a team to Moscow the week of
February 4 to discuss Iran and other issues, and will share
with the U.S. what it learns.

¶3. (S) In response, Under Secretary Joseph suggested that
Israel might raise the level at which it talks with the
Russians on Iran, and use stronger language. He laid out a
list of what he called obvious next steps for the USG on
Iran. END SUMMARY.

------------------
next steps on iran
------------------

¶4. (S) Under Secretary Joseph's discussions on Iran with his
Israeli counterparts at the MFA on January 30 considered the
internal situation in Iran, Iran and the IAEA, and Russia and
Iran. They then moved to a discussion of next steps, with
MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs, Miriam
Ziv, noting that there are various fora for action, including
the UNSC and IAEA. Although she thought it likely that Iran
would not suspend its enrichment activity, she wondered aloud
what should be done if Iran says that it accepts the
conditions set forth in UNSCR 1737.

¶5. (S) Under Secretary Joseph listed what he termed obvious
next steps for the USG:

¶A. Full implementation of UNSCR 1737.

¶B. Designating the entities in UNSCR 1737's annex under a WMD

Tel aviv 00000557 002 of 004


Executive Order.

¶C. Encouraging other countries to sanction the entities
listed in UNSCR 1737's annex, and those linked to the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iran's Aerospace
Industries Organization (AIO).

¶D. Continuing the process in New York of adding entities to
the <> annex.

¶E. Working within the IAEA to restrict technical cooperation
with Iran to a minimum.

¶F. Working with other states to carry out financial measures
similar to those the U.S. is executing, and consistent with
unscr 1737.

¶G. Approaching other governments about their countries'
broader commercial relations with Iran, emphasizing the
damage those relations could cause to their reputations, and
the risk factor in doing business with Iran.

¶H. Maintaining the Gulf Security Dialogue, using declaratory
policy and enhancing the Gulf states' defensive capabilities
to show them that they can make a difference and that the
U.S. is with them for the long run and committed to their
security.

¶I. Working to strengthen the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI).

¶J. Working with the IAEA to ensure that its reports reflect
the facts.

¶6. (S) Under Secretary Joseph said that the U.S. has made it
clear that it is willing to participate in discussions with
Iran only if Iran suspends enrichment and reprocessing
activities. The U.S. does not want the Europeans to start
negotiations with Iran until Iran suspends enrichment per
UNSCR 1737. The Under Secretary suggested that all parties
might consider looking anew at an arms embargo on Iran,
noting that the British favor such a sanction.

¶7. (S) CAPT Soifer from Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI)
urged:

¶A. Freezing the assets of the IRGC globally;

¶B. Freezing the assets of an expanded set of Iranian
government officials, including members of Iran's National
Security Council, Larijani, and the Supreme Leader himself;

¶C. Taking measures that hit at Iran's banks and important
people within Iran's economy;

¶D. Encouraging a coalition of like-minded countries to cut
their export guarantees to Iran, and curb economic
cooperation with Iran;

¶E. Tracking contracts and taking steps to cut commercial
negotiations, if possible. (Soifer said that the IDF is
exploring this in working groups.);

¶F. Working with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, from where Iran
imports gas;

¶G. Looking into oil swap deals, which are important to the
ruling regime in Iran, and affect how the Iranian people view
the regime's promises;

¶H. Taking steps to fuel public debate in Iran and encourage
the public to increase its demands on the regime with respect
to the economy and its nuclear policy.

¶8. (S) Ziv stressed that many of the IDF's recommendations
compliment the <> called for in UNSCR 1737. She noted
that Israel could use radio and Internet blogs to influence
the public in Iran.

¶9. (S) The Mossad representative stressed the importance of

Tel aviv 00000557 003 of 004


China and the Gulf Starts to Iran in financial terms and with
respect to trade (which he said is increasing). He said that
the UAE and Dubai are the most important outlets for Iran's
legal and illegal trade.

¶10. (S) Shmuel Limone from the MOD stressed the importance of
tying political efforts to the growing U.S. military presence
in the Gulf as part of a broader psychological operation. He
observed that in a "race against time," the U.S., Israel and
like-minded countries could also "bluff and bazaar," and
thereby turn the tables on Iran. Limone suggested that
<> and the threat of <> are more promising than
providing incentives to Iran to behave. He expressed
confidence that Western countries could broaden and deepen
internal debate in Iran over its nuclear policy.

¶11. (S) Yehuda Yaakov from the MFA said that EU High
Representative Javier Solana's office is "in denial" about
Iranian negotiator Larijani's meetings with terrorists in
Lebanon. He observed that Larijani's children are studying
in European colleges, and suggested that they could be used
in means to <> the negotiator. The IDF intelligence
analysts added that Larijani has "tricked" Solana into
believing that Larijani was ready to compromise when -- in
their view -- he never was.

¶12. (S) Gil Reich from the IAEC expressed concern that the
Iranians are using semi-official track two discussions with
the U.S. and Germany to drive wedges between Western partners.

¶13. (S) Efrat Reshev from the MFA stressed that she saw no
prospect in the near term for regime change in Iran, and
cautioned against preaching to the public. She suggested
that if the smaller Gulf states received backing in the form
of a resolution from the UN or Arab League, that this would
allow them to be more cooperative on Iran.

--------------------------------
a second unsc resolution on iran
--------------------------------

¶14. (S) The Israelis turned the discussion to a second UNSC
resolution on Iran, and <>. Yaakov urged adding back
into the mix of punitive measures those items that the
Russians removed from UNSCR 1737. In the interim, he said
that it is necessary to start behind-the-scenes, dynamic
preparations for a second resolution, and ensure that Iran
knows they are underway. Yaakov stressed the importance of
sticking to the February 23 deadline called for in UNSCR
1737, as this will demonstrate international credibility. He
called for a U.S.-Israel "pincer movement" in European
capitals prior to when the European Union meets on February
27, to urge the Europeans to add senior IRGC and AIO
officials to UNSCR 1737's annex, and adopt an incremental,
benchmark-based approach to returning to negotiations with
Iran. Such an approach should involve a roadmap that Iran
and the Europeans would have to follow to get to a starting
point for negotiations. It would have to address concrete
benchmarks that have already been reached, including uranium
enrichment, centrifuges and UF-6. Yaacov suggested that the
U.S. and Israel consider engaging EU bodies that are likely
to show a more responsible approach to the Iranian nuclear
issue, including the European parliament. He noted that
there is increased apprehension among the Europeans about a
possible Iranian-Russian alliance on gas. This might be a
point of leverage to get the Europeans to <> the
Russians.

¶15. (S) Under Secretary Joseph cautioned that all parties
need to think carefully about how to best approach a second
UNSC resolution. He said we must avoid prolongued
maneuvering that would send the wrong message to Iran. MFA
DDG Ziv observed that Iran is not isolated, receives support
from the NAM countries. and is very effective as portraying
itself as a victim. She cautioned that it is not clear how
the NAM countries would react to a second UNSC resolution,
and noted that the UNSC now includes South Africa and
Indonesia. She promised to turn over for U.S. consideration
a list of specific measures that could be included in a
second resolution.

Tel aviv 00000557 004 of 004



¶16. (S) On lessons learned from Iraq, DOE/NNSA Deputy
Administrator Tobey reminded all present of the generally
accepted view now that <> actually empowered Saddam.
All agreed that nobody knows for certain how <> will
ultimately affect Iran. Jeremy Issacharoff -- the DCM at the
Israeli Embassy in Washington -- suggested that the path to
war in Iraq began when international consensus on Iraq broke
down after UNSCR 1284 was passed. He stressed that the
Russians should be reminded of this when they are approached
about a second resolution, and should be urged to keep the
diplomatic option on the table. Ziv noted that she and the
MFA's Arms Control Department Director, Alon Bar, would
travel to Russia the week of February 4. Under Secretary
Joseph stressed that the Russians will be a determining
factor in whether there is a second UNSC resolution on Iran.
Nobody in the USG wants to see a repeat of their behavior
during the negotiations of the first resolution.

¶17. (S) Bar observed that Russia is blocking most of the
initiatives on Iran, and in doing so, gives skeptical
Europeans cover to be less helpful. He stressed that
Russia's policies contradict Israel's interests in a number
of areas. Under Secretary Joseph suggested that Israel raise
the level of its interaction with Russia and use "stronger
words." He reiterated that Israel, the U.S. and like-minded
countries cannot afford a repeat of the "performance" leading
to UNSCR 1737. The message to Russia should be that it needs
to show resolve and support the international community's red
lines on Iran.

¶18. (S) Assistant Secretary Rood cautioned that the Europeans
will want to preserve unity, and that tends to manifest
itself in the Europeans starting at the bottom line with the
Russians. He cautioned that we must all be wary of a
tendency towards the lowest common denominator in negotiating
solutions. Yaakov suggested that the Russians might be
limited in their veto capability due to UNSCR 1718. Under
Secretary Joseph stressed that it would not be in our

Sipdis
interests to allow the Europeans to draft a second resolution.

¶19. (U) Under Secretary Robert Joseph has cleared on this
cable.