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DE RUEHSV #0092/01 0361815
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051815Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3763
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0074
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1567
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 1147
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0016
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1341
RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND 0361
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0767
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0295
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SUVA 000092 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ROME FOR MFO SINAI - LAROCCO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 
TAGS: MARR PREL IQ FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI QUERIES ABOUT IRAQ DEPLOYMENT 
 
REF: A. 06 SUVA 432 
     ¶B. SUVA 67 
 
Classified By: Amb. Dinger.  Sec. 1.4 (B,D). 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (C) Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Deputy 
Commander Teleni on Feb. 6 asked the Ambassador via an 
intermediary whether the USG would approve deployment of a 
small number of RFMF officers to the headquarters detachment 
of MNFI in Iraq.  Commodore and interim-Prime Minister 
Bainimarama had raised an MNFI deployment with the Embassy 
DATT in late January, seemingly thinking of a platoon or so, 
but noting implementation could not be near-term, given the 
security situation in Fiji.  We see the RFMF request as aimed 
at regaining a USG stamp of approval at a time when 
Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and the USG have otherwise 
imposed post-coup sanctions.  U.S. interests in "democracy 
promotion" and "peacekeeping" are both at play.  Embassy Suva 
prefers to accent the "democracy" theme by not opening up a 
new PKO opportunity for the RFMF at this time.  Please 
advise.  End summary. 
 
A few RFMF officers to MNFI HQ? 
------------------------------- 
¶2. (C) Jioji Konrote, State Minister for Home Affairs in the 
Qarase Government, former High Commissioner to Australia, and 
former Chief of Staff of the RFMF, stopped by the Embassy on 
Feb. 6.  Konrote recalled the Ambassador's meeting with 
then-Home Affairs Minister Vosanibola last October 17 (ref A) 
in which Vosanibola, just back from a visit to Baghdad, had 
said he was preparing a submission to the Cabinet's PKO 
Sub-Committee recommending a deployment of three RFMF 
officers to MNFI headquarters in Iraq.  (Note: At the 
four-eyes October meeting, Vosanibola also raised whether 
MNFI might find a two-star job in Iraq for Bainimarama, to 
get him out of the Qarase Government's hair.)  Konrote said 
the lead-up to the coup diverted attention to other matters. 
Now, post-coup, RFMF Deputy Commander Teleni has asked 
Konrote to revisit with the Embassy the deployment of "a few" 
RFMF officers to MNFI headquarters. 
 
Bainimarama to DATT: maybe a platoon? Not in near term 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶3. (C) Per ref B, interim CEO of Fiji's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Mataitoga raised the question of an MNFI deployment 
with us in general terms two weeks ago.  Also, in a phone 
conversation with the Embassy DATT in late January, interim 
Prime Minister Bainimarama discussed his continuing interest 
in an MNFI deployment, seemingly of at least a platoon, 
though he added that any implementation could not be in the 
short term.  It would have to await the security situation in 
Fiji calming down.  The DATT received the impression 
Bainimarama was not talking of "onesie and twosie" numbers. 
 
Times have changed; need Washington guidance 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶4. (C) We gave Konrote the same response we gave Mataitoga: 
that the situations in both Fiji and Iraq have changed from 
when Bainimarama first floated the possible deployment just 
over a year ago, and even from last October.  We would seek 
Washington guidance for a response. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶5. (C) In January 2006, Bainimarama told us after returning 
from a visit to Baghdad that he was anxious to remove his 
"boys" from their "static defense" role with UNAMI and put 
them out on patrol with MNFI.  Last October, Vosanibola's 
vision was clearly more limited: a few officers at MNFI 
headquarters.  Based on Konrote's message today, RFMF Deputy 
Commander Teleni now foresees the latter, very limited role 
in the MNFI: a few officers on the headquarters staff. 
Konrote hinted at the possibility of a more fulsome 
deployment of troops in the future, though he mentioned twice 
in the meeting that the interim Government wants to keep RFMF 
numbers in the Middle East at below 600 total.  In that 
light, with over 320 at MFO Sinai and around 250 at UNAMI, it 
would seem any RFMF deployment to MNFI would either be small 
 
SUVA 00000092  002 OF 002 
 
 
in numbers or would have to rob MFO or UNAMI to pay MNFI. 
 
Action request 
-------------- 
¶6. (C) As noted ref B, from the perspective of promoting 
democratic themes and discouraging Fiji's "coup culture," 
Embassy Suva would prefer that the USG not open up new PKO 
opportunities to the RFMF at this time.  Bainimarama would 
surely flaunt an MNFI offer publicly here as evidence of new 
U.S. engagement with his interim government.  That image 
would run counter to the series of sanctions the USG has 
otherwise imposed on his illegal government, in step with 
similar actions by Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and 
others.  In fact, we see the RFMF's motives in re-visiting an 
Iraq deployment now to be a desire to buttress the 
interim-government's international legitimacy and to drive a 
wedge between the U.S. and Australia on sanctions, not 
Bainimarama's prior motive to get his "boys" some action in 
the field.  To us, Teleni's very limited proposal of a few 
officers for MNFI HQ confirms that judgment.  As noted Ref B, 
with both "Fiji democracy" and "Iraq PKO" interests at play, 
Washington will have to judge what response we should provide 
the RFMF, if any.  Please advise. 
DINGER