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Viewing cable 07ROME209, IO PDAS WARLICK'S ROME MEETINGS ON UNSC ISSUES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ROME209 2007-02-01 16:19 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Rome
VZCZCXRO5171
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRO #0209/01 0321619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011619Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7085
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0271
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0297
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1718
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0022
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0929
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2126
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0424
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8300
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2262
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0380
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0708
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 000209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017 
TAGS: PREL UNSC PHUM XF ZL XW IT
SUBJECT: IO PDAS WARLICK'S ROME MEETINGS ON UNSC ISSUES 
 
REF: STATE 11796 
 
ROME 00000209  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor David D. Pearce for reasons 
 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
- - - - - 
 
1. (C/NF) In January 29 consultations in Rome, visiting IO 
PDAS James Warlick discussed a broad range of upcoming UNSC 
issues including the Balkans, Middle East, and the Horn of 
Africa with Italy, a new non-permanent member.  On Kosovo, 
Warlick and the Italians agreed on the way forward, and the 
GOI thought Russia would ultimately abstain on a Kosovo 
resolution.  Warlick warned of the need to resist Russian 
pressure for delays and possible tradeoffs at the expense of 
Georgia's interests.  On the Middle East, Warlick thanked the 
Italians for their leadership in Lebanon but warned against a 
UN committee's planned conference in Rome, noting it could 
turn into an Israel-bashing exercise that would harm, not 
help, efforts to promote peace.  He urged the Italians to 
fully implement Iran sanctions, noting financial pressure 
could be key to getting Tehran back to the negotiating table. 
 The Italians said that Iran sanctions would be painful for 
Italy, but they would be implemented.  Meanwhile, it was also 
important to consider how to address Iran over the longer 
term.  On Somalia, the Italians agreed that support for the 
TFG, peacekeeping and reconstruction were necessary and said 
they would work to avoid conditioning EU assistance to the 
TFG.  Warlick also discussed Rome's upcoming committee 
responsibilities at the UNSC, and the Italians said they 
would work for results as head of the DPRK and Sudan 
sanctions committees.  They noted that, like the U.S., they 
were disappointed by the Human Rights Council, but Italy 
would become a candidate for the HRC and continue to press 
for positive change.  End summary. 
 
 
Kosovo: Avoiding Russian Tit for Tat 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (C) Warlick told Director General for Europe Laura 
Mirachian that the United States expected to consult on UN 
Special Representative Maarti Ahtisaari's recommendations and 
take up a UNSC resolution in March, working with the Quint. 
Warlick warned that the Russians would try to conflate the 
Kosovo resolution with a pending resolution on UNOMIG in 
Georgia.  The U.S. preferred, therefore, that a Kosovo 
resolution come first.  He urged that the Quint remain 
unified and firm in avoiding trading Georgia's interests for 
Kosovo's.  A new Kosovo resolution would lift the current 
1244 resolution, endorse Ahtisaari's recommendations, and 
pave the way for a Kosovar declaration of independence with a 
strong international presence.  Warlick expected that U.S. 
and EU recognition would come shortly after that.  Belgrade 
should be convinced that Serb concerns about minorities, 
religious sites and decentralization were being met.  In the 
end, if the Quint stood together in the UNSC, Qatar, China 
and others would follow suit.  Russia would likely go along 
reluctantly. If they accept the Ahtisaari plan, it would be 
much easier to get them to go along with a resolution. 
However, if the Russians sensed any weakness or split within 
the Quint, they would be much tougher on Kosovo and Georgia. 
Additionally, the US believed that the process should go 
forward whether or not a government was formed in Belgrade. 
No decision about moving forward unilaterally if the UNSC 
failed had been made by the US, though. 
 
3. (C) Mirachian stated that D'Alema had already outlined 
Italy's view of the process.  The announcement of the 
Ahtisaari plan would be followed by a UNSCR (although the 
exact phrasing of independence had not been agreed), followed 
by a declaration from the Kosovar authorities.  NATO had 
already agreed on PfP for Serbia and the EU should push for 
restarting SAA - with a conditional clause in the event of 
noncompliance with ICTY.  Mirachian agreed that Russia would 
take a tough negotiating position but thought that in the end 
it would probably agree to abstain if the scope of the 
resolution were limited.  She believed that Russia would 
 
ROME 00000209  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
accept the delinking of Kosovo from Serbia but that it saw 
independence as a separate issue to be addressed in the 
future.  Russia would not approve any resolution opposed by 
Belgrade, so Italy and the rest of the Quint should work to 
get Serbia on board.  She believed that Russia would 
eventually agree to move the international administration 
from the UN to the EU.  In the end, a resolution that had the 
support of the U.S., EU and Russia would provide the most 
stability.  The EU was united in its belief that Kosovo would 
not be a tradeoff for Georgia and that the path for the 
Balkans was through EU integration. (Mirachian confirmed 
Italy's desire to join the Friends of Georgia group in NY.) 
She worried, however, that enlargement fatigue and absorption 
capacity could be an obstacle.  The EU needed to make a 
decision on recognition but believed that an SAA agreement, 
on which there was already consensus, could serve as a de 
facto recognition or pave the way for recognition.  She 
added, however, that neither the EU nor Italy had decided 
concretely on how to proceed on recognition.  In the 
meantime, the Kosovar authorities needed to be very careful 
on any public declarations immediately after the UNSCR. 
 
4. (C) On administration, Mirachian said that the UN with its 
4,000 personnel had been ineffective and worried that an EUSR 
office with 1,000-1,500 would not be as effective as 
necessary.  Additionally, 500 million Euros, the yearly cost 
of the administration estimated by the GOI could prove a 
heavy burden on the EU.  Nevertheless, the GOI was committed 
to ensuring that a Kosovar administration was being pushed on 
standards and would work to making the judicial pillar 
successful to avoid any possible spillover effects of 
political or criminal instability - something the GOI 
believes is already happening.  Mirachian added that the new 
administration should be extended to ensure U.S. 
participation. 
 
 
Cautioning Against UN Committee's Planned Mideast Conference 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5. (C) Warlick thanked Middle East Department officials for 
Italy's its leadership on Lebanon.  Incoming Gen. Graziano 
would need to play a political role in addition to his 
military duties.  Vice Director General for the Middle East 
and Mediterranean Luca Del Balzo noted that there was a 
window of opportunity on Lebanon and the Middle East Peace 
Process, but worried about the internal situation in Lebanon. 
 Warlick and Del Balzo agreed the Paris Conference was 
successful both financially and in showing the international 
community's support for the Siniora government.  Forward 
movement on the tribunal in the UNSC was important and Italy 
was working with the Arab League on the issue.  Warlick told 
Del Balzo and BMENA Coordinator Sergio Scarantino that the 
U.S. was prepared to work for progress on the Middle East 
through the Quartet and at the UN.  While the U.S. and Israel 
were often isolated amid the posturing at UNGA, any actions 
in the UNSC need to be focused on pragmatic results. 
Unfortunately, the Qataris so far had been using the UNSC 
forum mainly to score political points.  The U.S. would look 
to Italy to help prevent Qatar from playing an unhelpful role. 
 
6. (C) Per reftel, Warlick then urged that the GOI reconsider 
its support for a conference planned in Rome March 22-23 by 
the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of 
the Palestinian People (CEIRPP).  He said that, while we 
appreciated Italy's good intentions, this meeting would be 
particularly unhelpful at a time when there are promising 
efforts to renew discussions on the Middle East, including 
the February 2 Quartet meeting in Washington and a later 
planned trilateral meeting with Secretary Rice, PM Olmert and 
PA President Abbas.  The U.S. had long opposed the Committee 
on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
People (CEIRPP) and tried to eliminate its funding.  Long 
experience with this committee suggested the conference would 
become a forum for one-sided criticism of Israel and hinder, 
not help, efforts to improve the international environment 
and move the parties towards negotiations.  Once the 
conference was launched it would be out of GOI hands.  But 
Italy would be identified with it, and this was significant, 
 
ROME 00000209  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
given Italy's high profile as a UNSC member. 
 
7. (C) Scarantino replied that, in that case, the U.S. should 
help Italy get good Israeli representation at the meeting. 
He was well aware of our views, based on reports from the 
Italian Embassy in Washington.  But there was a continuing 
need for dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians and the 
idea for the Rome CEIRPP conference had begun with a request 
from Palestinian Permanent Observer Mansur -- whom Scarantino 
considered more moderate than his predecessor.  The GOI 
understood the risks, and wished to avoid anti-Israel 
polemics, but it thought this could be done.  Scarantino 
cited the Bethlehem 2000 conference, also organized by the 
CEIRPP and GOI, as a precedent.  He felt the Bethlehem 
conference had been successful, with a consensus approach and 
a constructive final document.  So Italy was not as convinced 
as the United States that the Rome meeting would be a 
failure.  The March 22-23 meeting would take place after the 
Quartet meeting and perhaps could be a celebration if the 
Quartet session went well.  If not, well, Abu Mazen and 
Olmert would likely want to move forward in any case.  And it 
was important to help Abu Mazen show some political gains. 
Scarantino repeated that the GOI sought language on a meeting 
text that was free of recriminations and was not polemical, 
but rather contained parameters for peace, including roadmap 
language. 
 
8.  (C) Pol M/C then reinforced Warlick's message by telling 
Scarantino that we wished to be very clear:  The Washington 
view was that nothing good could come of an event in Rome 
sponsored by the CEIRPP.  This was not the way to help Abu 
Mazen.  The record suggested that the meeting would likely be 
focused on Israel-bashing and propaganda point-scoring.  We 
understood well that the Middle East was a top priority issue 
for the GOI; indeed, it was for the USG as well.  And we 
appreciated Italy's leadership and help, especially in 
Lebanon.  But this event would do nothing to advance the 
cause of peace, quite the contrary.  The conference would 
thus be seen with displeasure in Washington.  Scarantino said 
we had been abundantly clear on USG views, but Italy had a 
different view. 
 
 
Iraq and Iran: Need to Maintain Cooperation 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
9. (C) Warlick expressed appreciation for Italy's continued 
engagement in Iraq and highlighted the importance of a robust 
UN presence and engagement.  He asked Italy to consider 
contributing to the middle ring security Distinct Entity 
Trust to allow a greater UN presence on the ground.  Del 
Balzo agreed the role of the UN was essential but said (after 
checking with Italian Iraq envoy De Martino) that Italy had 
no resources for this; nevertheless, he would pass on the USG 
request.  On Iran and Resolution 1737, Warlick asked for 
Italy's thoughts on the way to proceed after the 
UNSCR-mandated 60 days expire.  Del Balzo noted that a UNSCR 
could be very costly to Italy, but that it must be 
implemented.  The international community should wait for the 
60 days and then see where to go, he said.  Italy would 
consider another resolution, perhaps with additional 
sanctions, Del Balzo added, but it was important to look at 
what we wanted to do in the longer term.  Warlick said we 
were willing to talk, but only after Iran stops enrichment 
comes into compliance with the NPT and UNSCR.  We would keep 
coming back to Iran in the sanctions committee and beyond. 
PolMinCouns noted that financial pressure was key and Italy 
could play an important role.  Warlick and Del Balzo agreed 
that UNSC consensus was important; a coalition of the willing 
would not have the same impact, but it could not be excluded. 
 
 
Somalia: Give the TFG Space for Progress 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
10. (C)  Warlick told Deputy Director General for Political 
Affairs Giacomo Sanfelice that the international community 
has to make some decisions on Somalia.  The U.S. sees three 
phases.  The first is the resolution on the IGASOM force. 
 
ROME 00000209  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
The U.S. is working to ensure two battalions from Uganda can 
deploy.  The U.S. knows that this is an essential immediate 
step, but it is not sufficient to provide longer-term 
stability for the Transitional Federal Government.  The U.S. 
will assist with logistical support.  The second phase is the 
deployment of an African Union force at the TFG's request. 
This should be done quickly.  The UK is drafting a 
resolution, which could be ready within the week, on an AU 
deployment and will include an exemption to the arms embargo. 
 The U.S. will propose language to deploy a joint UN/AU 
technical assessment mission to provide recommendations on 
peacekeeping and reconstruction options.  Based on the 
precedent of the IGASOM resolution, the U.S. does not expect 
opposition to the resolution.  The third phase is the 
deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia.  The U.S. 
hopes to see the TFG gain ground and reach out to moderate 
ICU members and civil society.  The U.S. plans to contribute 
financially to the AU force and was glad the EU could 
contribute 15 million Euros but was concerned that EU 
assistance was conditioned on TFG actions.  Warlick asked the 
Italians to work within the EU to remove conditionality. 
 
11. (C) San Felice stated that Italy was prepared to 
contribute resources.  D'Alema had called on the EU to 
provide rapid assistance and had even volunteered to host a 
donors' conference (an offer subsequently repeated by PM 
Prodi at the Addis Ababa AU meeting).   Italy was concerned 
that Somalia could become a terrorist haven and the 
humanitarian situation could deteriorate.  Nevertheless, 
Italy would like to see the deployment of international 
forces accompanied by an enhancement of the international 
dialogue process.  The TFG has to show willingness to engage 
with all elements of society. Italy will be looking for 
positive signals at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa. 
 
 
North Korea and Sudan: Making Sanctions Work 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
12. (C) Warlick said that Italy's chairmanship of the DPRK 
and Sudan sanctions committees was important.  The DPRK panel 
had been chaired by Slovakia, which had come in for criticism 
by Russia.  In reality, Russia and China wanted to stall 
activity.  The US had demarched Russia on its unhelpful 
tactics to prevent Slovakia from continuing as chair.  So 
Italy should be prepared, show resolve, and send a message on 
sanctions.  The DPRK resolution committee was already having 
an impact on Six Party Talks.  San Felice said they were in 
touch with the Slovaks and recognize the difficulties. 
Nevertheless, Italy is committed to achieving results.  The 
fact that the committee decisions are based on consensus 
could be a problem, however.  On Sudan, Warlick said the US 
wants to deploy elements of the UN heavy package to test 
President Bashir's sincerity.  In Chad, the U.S. is prepared 
to support a peacekeeping mission.  President Bush asked Ban 
Ki-Moon to take a personal role in Sudan.  San Felice pledged 
support on Sudan. 
 
 
Other Remaining UN Issues: Ethiopia, HRC, Reform 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
13. (C)  On Ethiopia-Eritrea, San Felice said the UNMEE 
mandate renewal needs to determine the size of the force. 
Italy wants the force to remain at its current size. 
Warlick said the US was prepared to argue for a ceiling that 
would allow forces to be drawn down with the ability to 
return if necessary without additional UNSC action.  The U.S. 
wanted to see the force go from 2,300 to 1.700. 
 
14. (C) Warlick stated that the Secretary has not decided 
whether the U.S. would run for the Human Rights Council.  The 
U.S. was discouraged by the performance of the HRC because it 
hadn't shown that it could address country-specific issues. 
Three out of four special sessions have been on Israel.  The 
US hasn't completely given up on the HRC and if it doesn't 
run, it would likely stay engaged as an observer.  The U.S. 
would like to see a special session on Burma.  The U.S. is 
frustrated that the most egregious human rights violators 
 
ROME 00000209  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
cannot be held accountable by the UN.  San Felice said Italy 
was also discouraged by the HRC's work, but Italy would 
continue to try to make it work and would advance its 
candidacy.  On reform issues more generally, he agreed that 
there was a need to break the G77 and NAM paradigm, but Italy 
was encouraged by the Peacebuilding Commission and countries 
needed to continue to push on reform. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
15.  (C) The Italians clearly appreciated this consultation 
and the opportunity to hear U.S. views across the board on 
the many issues they will be grappling with as a new 
non-permanent UNSC member.  Several key senior MFA officials 
indicated interest in follow-up meetings in Washington, a 
prospect Warlick welcomed.  This is a government that has a 
thin governing majority, and a small, but influential far 
left component in its ruling coalition.  Moreover, the 
foreign minister is inclined to deus-ex-machina political 
interventions on selected issues.  To manage this, it is 
extremely useful to have periodic senior-level exchanges like 
this one, not only to convey U.S. views and drill deeply with 
Italian subject experts, but also to ensure effective 
coordination on Kosovo, Russia, Iran, the Middle East, 
Africa, Afghanistan, North Korea, and UN reform as Italy 
settles into its UNSC seat for the next two years. 
 
16. (C) PDAS Warlick has cleared this cable. 
SPOGLI