VZCZCXRO4810
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHRH #0212/01 0321235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011235Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2945
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4203
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 10 RIYADH 000212 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MALVESTI AND KIFAYAT 
TREASURY FOR HEFERNAN AND GLAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2025 
TAGS: PREL EFIN CVIS KTFN PTER GCC SA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND VISIT TO SAUDI 
ARABIA, 5-8 FEBRUARY 2007 
 
Classified By: AMB James C. Oberwetter for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) Ambassador Oberwetter and the entire US Mission in 
Saudi Arabia warmly welcome you back to Riyadh.  As you have 
witnessed during the course of your many visits to the 
Kingdom, our bilateral relationship is developing into 
robust, multi-faceted cooperation.  One indication of this 
was King Abdullah's private, and FM Saud al-Faisal's public, 
support for the President's Iraq plan.  The Saudi leadership 
is deeply distrustful, however, of PM Maliki, and they cite 
Maliki's timing of Saddam's execution as willfully 
endangering Muslim pilgrims during the Hajj. The King 
appreciated Secretary of Defense Gates' visit here in 
January, on Secretary Gates' first international trip after 
his confirmation.  The Saudis are also pleased with Secretary 
Rice's intensive engagement with the Palestinians and 
Israelis on the peace process.  They agree with us on the 
Iranian threat, though as a neighbor of Iran's they have 
taken a very cautious public line on Iran.  Nevertheless, the 
Iranian threat provides another strong incentive for the 
Saudis to work closely and quietly with us on the full range 
of bilateral issues. 
 
¶2. (S) Counterterrorism cooperation includes the important 
new element of intensive engagement on energy infrastructure 
protection.  The December 2006 MOU signed by Prince Muhammad 
bin Nayef and State U/S Joseph provides a framework to 
develop, manage, and jointly implement a total-systems 
solution to improve security at Saudi Arabian petroleum 
facilities.  The Joint Working Group will meet in Riyadh on 
March 4 to move beyond assessment visits to prepare 
recommendations on procurements and site security upgrades. 
 
 
¶3. (S) On counterterrorism financing, we see little progress 
on the SAG's efforts to establish the National Commission for 
Relief and Charitable Work Abroad.  The MOI did issue a media 
campaign during the Hajj warning the Saudi public not to 
donate to unlicensed charities.  The SAG Customs has yet to 
implement and enforce their cash declaration law. 
 
¶4. (S) The Saudi leadership acknowledges privately that the 
war on terrorism will not be won for many years.  The MOI 
remains on very high alert; Prince Muhammad bin Nayef speaks 
of ongoing serious threats coming from Iraq and concerns of 
potential new threats from Iran.  Counterterorism is seen in 
the MOI and throughout Saudi society as much a campaign of 
ideas and education as it is a military intelligence and law 
enforcement offensive. The SAG continues an ambitious media 
and public education campaign to dissuade Saudis, 
particularly the young, against the extremist message. 
However, intolerant language remains in Saudi textbooks, and 
youth are still exposed to extremist ideologies through 
summer camps, in mosques and in the media. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
International Islamic Relief Organization 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) The IIRO Eastern Province branch office remains 
closed pending an ongoing MOI investigation.  The MOI 
informed U.S. intelligence sources that on approximately July 
10, 2006 Al-Mua'jjil's bank accounts were frozen and travel 
restrictions were placed on him.  According to the MOI, the 
SAG does not have enough evidence to arrest or detain him at 
this point in time.  Other than freezing Al-Mua'jjil's bank 
accounts and restricting his travel, the SAG does not plan to 
take further action. 
 
------------------------------- 
AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S/NF)  In 2004, the SAG shut down Al Haramain's 
operations in the Kingdom.  Subsequently, Al Haramain has 
reemerged worldwide under multiple names. Single source 
reporting indicates Al Haramain was renamed/replaced by Dar 
al-Salaam, and has transferred funds to an NGO in Nigeria, 
where the funds were diverted to militant groups for the 
purchase of weapons and to disrupt oil production in Nigeria. 
Dar al-Salaam, according to the same source, sent funds to 
Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) in August 2006.  One Dar 
al-Salaam senior official was reported to be former Al 
Haramain Director, Sheikh Sa'id bin Wahf al-Qahtani.  Dar 
 
RIYADH 00000212  002 OF 010 
 
 
al-Salaam also provided Hassan Dahir Aweys, leader of the 
Islamic Courts Union in Somalia and an AIAI Colonel with 
multiple ties to Al-Qa'ida, with over USD $200,000 from 
February-April 2006. In early January 2007, Mabahtih informed 
BMP that it had no information on Dar al-Sallam and could not 
locate its office or employees. 
 
--------------------- 
CHARITIES COMMISSION 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) The SAG proposal to establish a Charities Commission 
remains in the Shura Council.  Embassy has raised this issue 
in December and January meetings at the Ministries of 
Interior and Foreign Affairs, urging SAG engagement on this 
long overdue measure and noting that its establishment was 
announced publicly over two years ago.  The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs counterterrorism coordinator explained to us 
the difficulty in combining Shar'ia law and Western legal 
principles.  In a January 25 meeting with the senior 
officials of the Saudi Arabian Financial Intelligence Unit 
(SAFIU, which is part of the MOI), Embassy was told there is 
debate within the Shura Council as to whether the Commission 
should be a public or private entity.  Ultimately, according 
to the SAFIU, it will likely be a combination public/private 
commission, with mostly private sector members appointed by 
the SAG and with some government oversight. 
 
¶8.  (C) There is one recent encouraging sign of increased SAG 
supervision of charities:  the public warnings to all Saudis 
not to donate to unlicensed charities during the Hajj.   The 
MOI spokesman issued a public warning which was a  headline 
in the local newspapers during the Hajj.  Embassy Econ 
Specialist (who performed the Hajj this year) reported that 
Saudi fund raisers in Mecca during the Hajj were displaying 
their Ministry of Social Affairs license numbers to show they 
were legal.  Dr. Saad al-Jabri, MOI Advisor to Muhammad bin 
Nayef, told EconCouns that he would prepare a report to give 
to APHSCT Townsend on regulation of charities during the 
Hajj. 
 
------------- 
CASH COURIERS 
------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Saudi financiers of external terrorist/extremist 
groups are suspected of personally carrying cash outside of 
Saudi Arabia into banking or hawala centers such as Manama 
and Dubai. SAG regulations require individuals carrying funds 
in excess of $16,000 to declare the funds to Saudi customs 
officials upon entering/exiting the Kingdom. SAG Customs has 
the legal authority to enforce the cash declaration law but 
generally does not.  Officials recently reported that Customs 
will implement restrictions by this summer, following an 
extensive public information campaign (TV and billboard ads) 
and additional training. 
 
----------------------------------- 
FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION UNIT (SAFIU) 
-----------------------------------QQ(S)  QIU, and SaudQbanks continue to have 
QQapping roles and blurred responsibilities.  SAFIU - 
comprised of Mabahith, GIP, and SAMA offQQis 
responsible for investigating bank accounts associated with 
subjeQs of Mabahith and GIP terrorism investigations. 
However, the redundancy and inefficiency of these financial 
organizations often prevent salient information from reaching 
the appropriate Mabahith and GIP investigators.  In a 
terrorism case, fQ example, a MaQhith or GIP ofQcer sends 
a suspect,s name Qd/or other piece of identifying 
information to his counterpart at SAFIU for investigation. 
The SAFIU officer makes an official request to the 
appropriate SAMA representative, who sends the request to 
sixteen Saudi banks, each of which addressQ the request 
differently.  Submitting requests through the JTFTF adQ an 
additional layer to this process. 
 
¶11. (C) In December 2006, the FBI, working with the Embassy 
ECON section, conducted training for the SAFIU geared towards 
basic analytical and investigative techniques for terrorism 
finance and money laundering investigations.  The SAFIU 
investigates investment groups and investment mechanisms for 
terrorism finance as well as financial transactions stemming 
 
RIYADH 00000212  003 OF 010 
 
 
from travel agencies in the Kingdom.  The SAFIU appears to be 
in the midst of a personnel reorganization and a redefinition 
of its operations and goals. SAFIU Director Dr. Saud 
Al-Murieshd was recently removed; we do not yet know who will 
replace him. The Consultancy Division, an independent unit 
under the SAFIU tasked with getting the SAFIU on par with 
other functional FIUs, was dismantled. 
 
¶12. (C) The US Treasury FinCEN informed the SAFIU in early 
December that the USG would not able to sponsor the SAFIU for 
2007 Egmont membership, due largely to the inability of 
FinCEN to gain access to banking sector Qsentatives 
without the supervision of SAMA officials.  As a result, the 
SAFIU is even more focused in obtaining the necessary 
training to become a 2008 Egmont candidate, and Embassy 
remains engaged with it.  FinCENQemains committed to act as 
a co-sponsor in helping the SAFIU meet internQ 
standards, along with Cyprus and Lebanon. 
 
------ 
JTFTF 
------ 
 
¶13. (S) The JTFTQt tQ since yoQQ visit in November. 
 During these meetings, particQts discussed the "BridgeQaQ" case; former Al- Qa,ida operative Muhammad 
'Abdallah Abdan al-Ghamdi, who is currently in custody, ran a 
scheme with his partner Muhammad Qassim al-Ghambi to raise 
millions that were invested in the Spain-registered Bridge 
Company.  The end use of this money is unknown, but Muhammad 
'Abdallah and Muhammad Qassim are suspected of illicit 
finance activities.  In the past month, Mabahith has arrested 
a number of suspicious individuals associated with both 
al-Ghamdis but has yet to indicate whether they comprise a 
terrorism cell or planned to conduct nefarious activities. 
This information is being passed through regular liaison 
channels to ensure a thorough investigation on both the U.S. 
and Saudi sides.  FBI and BPM have not received responses to 
several request for bank account data associated with 
terrorism finance cases that have been raised though the 
JTFTF. 
 
--------------------------------- 
RADICAL INCITERS AND FACILITATORS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S/NF)  Post fully supports the aim of this Initiative 
to deter radical ideological support for terrorists by 
ensuring some of its headline exponents (who are also 
financing or otherwise facilitating terrorists) are 
sanctioned by the UN 1267 Committee.  But a USG public 
affairs posture that stresses the ideological support, rather 
than the evidence of financing or recruiting that is 
unquestionably sanctionable under current interpretations, 
could play into the hands of the extremists, and lead to a 
lessening of SAG support. 
 
¶15.  (S/NF)  The SAG has its own ongoing program to deter 
radical clerics from their radical preaching and teachings in 
the Kingdom, which the SAG sees as successful.  This program 
has three goals:  1) to monitor radical clerics; 2) co-opt 
radical clerics; and 3) remove the clerics deemed to be 
un-cooperative.  Our initiative should be closely coordinated 
with the Saudis, especially when it comes to designating 
Saudi individuals.   We fully support prioritizing extremist 
imams and inciters of terrorism, who also qualify for 
designation under the UNSCR 1217, as long as we closely 
coordinate through liaison channels with the SAG and 
coordinate with post on the public affairs aspects of this 
designation. 
 
-------------------- 
COMBATING EXTREMISM 
-------------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) During King Abdullah's national tour in June, he 
delivered a speech on tolerance to 70,000 people in the 
Qassim region that was widely seen as a rejection of calls by 
religious conservatives to slow down the reform process. This 
speech appears to have curbed the increasingly aggressive and 
open "counter-reformation" movement among certain 
conservative media and religious circles.  Since June, there 
have been no open letters to the government relating to 
domestic religious policies. 
 
RIYADH 00000212  004 OF 010 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) One of the SAG's policies to combat extremism is to 
ensure that the imams preach messages of tolerance and peace, 
not of violence and extremism.  To this end, the Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs continued with its imam training and 
monitoring programs.  The media reported in late September 
that 2,160 imams had been identified as having delivered 
intolerant sermons and sent for refresher training. 
Additionally, 2,000 imams were reportedly relieved of their 
duties due to their extremist preaching.  This training and 
the dismissals follow thousands of others during the course 
of the year.  Despite this progress, there were reports that 
extremist lecturers taught youth during the summer camps 
hosted by Islamic charities despite strict regulation by the 
Ministry of Islamic Affairs and other SAG ministries.  In 
addition, anti-Shia clerical rhetoric appears to have 
escalated over the past six months, largely in reaction to 
the Israel-Hizballah war and increasing tension with Iran. 
The charities claimed that their lecturers were prescreened 
and preapproved by the SAG, but that these types of lectures 
can still occur. 
 
¶18.  (U) The SAG also engages in reeducation programs for 
Guantanamo returnees, as well as youths returning from Iraq 
or caught trying to go to Iraq to pursue extremist actions 
there.  These government-funded programs attempt to reengage 
the individuals in a religiously positive manner.  The 
programs are for a limited time, after which the individual 
is free to seek employment, marriage, etc. as a productive 
member of society.  Additionally, psychological services are 
often provided.  When the individuals are youths, their 
family members are engaged to assist in the reeducation 
process.  The reeducation programs became popular quickly, 
particularly near border areas, and the media frequently 
reports on stories of families calling the SAG to assist them 
with their problem children. 
 
------------------------------ 
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
------------------------------ 
 
¶19.  (S/NF) In response to the February 2006 attack on the 
Abqaiq refinery, the SAG has re-energized efforts to improve 
its energy infrastructure protection.  In December 2006, 
Under Secretary of State Joseph signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Prince Muhammad bin Nayef to create a 
Joint Working Group on critical infrastructure protection. 
This JWG provide an ongoing framework to jointly develop, 
manage, and implement a total systems solution to improve 
security at Saudi Arabian petroleum facilities, including 
deploying a new MOI security force and mounting up a training 
academy. 
 
¶20.  (S/NF)  In July 2006, SAG authorized 35,000 new 
full-time positions to staff an MOI Facility Security Force 
(FSF), of which it plans to hire 12,000 personnel within one 
year.  In response to SAG requests, the USG coordinated two 
Oil Field Survey Consultation visits by Diplomatic Security 
physical security and blast experts and critical 
infrastructure experts from the Department of Energy, to 
Saudi Arabia in July 2006. The team visited and reviewed 
existing procedural and physical security at key petroleum 
infrastructure sites, including the Abqaiq oil processing 
facility, the Qatif pipeline junction, and the Ras Tanura 
port facility.  They advised on programs/systems to secure 
the facilities, structuring security in the face of multiple 
attacks, implementing credible emergency response, and 
enabling rapid recovery systems in the event of an attack. 
The team made a number of specific security recommendations 
that the MOI and national oil company ARAMCO are working to 
implement.  As part of this EIP effort, the MOI, the National 
Guard and Saudi Aramco are exploring the purchase of 
helicopters for detecting and interdicting attacks on oil 
installations. 
 
¶21.  (S/NF)   On energy security cooperation with the SAG, a 
Department of Energy expert advisor arrived on January 16 for 
a 3 to 6 month TDY, to work with the SAG in enhancing 
long-term energy security.  The MOI authorized site 
inspections for early February 2007, which will focus on the 
implementation of the July 2006 security recommendations at 
Abqaiq, Qatif Junction and Ras Tanura, as well as initial 
inspections of the industrial cities of Yanbu and Jubayl. The 
SAG agreed to host the next JWG meeting in Riyadh on March 4. 
 
RIYADH 00000212  005 OF 010 
 
 
 In additional, a Saudi delegation comprised of MOI, Ministry 
of Petroleum and Saudi Aramco officials will visit the 
Security Training and Homeland Security Technology Center at 
Sandia National Labs this April. The MOI intends to visit to 
US Coast Guard Headquarters, US Coast Guard training sites, 
oil installations, and the El Paso Intelligence Center 
(EPIC). 
 
¶22. (U) On February 7, APHSCT Townsend and her delegation 
will visit one of the Kingdom's critical energy 
installations, the Shaybah oil field, at the recommendation 
of King Abdullah.   Shaybah currently produces 550,000 
barrels per day, with an ambitiouis two-phase expansion plan: 
first, to add 200,000 barrels per day; second, to reach a 
total production of 1.2 million barrels per day, plus natural 
gas production (which will reuire building a gas pipeline 
across the Empty Quarter).  Shaybah oil is Arabian Super 
Light, very valuable because of its low sulphur content.   A 
primary attraction of Shaybah is its remote physical setting 
in Saudi Arabia,s Empty Quarter, close to the Omani and 
Emirati borders. This visit will enhance understanding of the 
challenges that went into developing this field.  The main 
camp facilities are surrounded by sand dunes that are 300-500 
feet in height, with a distinct orange/red tine due to high 
trace deposits of iron in the sand.  Embassy is separately 
sending APHSCT Townsend a scenario for this site visit. 
 
---------- 
TEXTBOOKS 
---------- 
 
¶23.  (S/NF) Intolerant language remains in Saudi textbooks 
and youth are still exposed to extremist ideologies through 
summer camps, in the mosques and in the media.  Despite 
requests from post, the SAG has not provided post with copies 
of current textbooks in order to confirm that they no longer 
contain intolerant language.  The SAG announced that it is 
engaged in a ten year effort to revise textbooks, curricula, 
and teaching methods.  An April 2006 INR-contracted report, 
based on Embassy collection of dozens of 2003 Saudi 
textbooks, indicated intolerant language.  A May 2006 Freedom 
House report based on 2005 textbooks also found that Saudi 
textbooks continued to carry intolerant language.  We also 
continue to press the SAG to be transparent with us about 
education reform and encourage them to be forthright with 
NGOs, seeking more information about their education reform 
efforts. 
 
---------------- 
FOREIGN FIGHTERS 
---------------- 
 
¶24.  (S/NF)  Saudi Arabia remains a major source of foreign 
fighters and ideological support to insurgents in Iraq. 
Foreign fighters, including Saudis, typically carry enough 
cash on their persons to pay for their travel and 
documentation for entry into Iraq. Saudi security services 
continue to aggressively pursue the support networks tied to 
the movement of fighters to Ira and South Asia. 
 
------------------- 
BORDER PROTECTION 
------------------- 
 
¶25. (S/NF) Border control remains a top priority for the SAG. 
 Saudi leaders continue to be concerned about the porous 
border with Yemen and the potential for insurgents from Iraq 
to cross into the Kingdom.  There are four initiatives at 
different stages of development. 
 
-- The Government announced on September 26 that it would 
require five to six years to complete the construction of an 
"Iraqi border fence," complete with electronic sensing 
technology, that is estimated to cost USD 12 billion. 
 
-- Another measure is the Border Guard Modernization Program, 
an MOI initiative to cover all of the Kingdom's borders.  It 
will also employ a broad range of state-of-the-art 
technological tools that will be employed from orbital 
(satellite), airborne, seaborne, and ground based platforms. 
In addition to the security concerns centered on the border 
with Iraq, this system will also address the mounting illegal 
immigration and the trafficking of contraband through the 
border with Yemen and across the Red Sea. 
 
RIYADH 00000212  006 OF 010 
 
 
 
-- The Mega-Ports program, which was well received by the SAG 
during a visit here in September, will include the employment 
of a system of radiation detection devices to monitor the 
export or import of radioactive materials into or out of the 
KSA. 
 
--  A fourth initiative is a GCC-shared remote sensing 
satellite to provide intelligence, a USD $500 million project 
called "Hudhud" and led in Saudi Arabia by a Brigadier 
General of the Ground Forces.  To date only three of the 
GCC's six members (Qatar, the UAE, and the KSA) are 
participants. 
 
--------------- 
REGIONAL ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶26. (S) While Saudi leaders share U.S. concerns about 
regional conflicts, there is marked reluctance to cooperate 
openly with the U.S. on some of these issues -- particularly 
Iran.  However, the SAG is taking an increasingly visible 
leadership role in moderating regional issues, calling for a 
revamping of the Arab League for greater efficacy, 
emphasizing Saudi Arabia,s linchpin role in regional 
politics, encouraging peaceful Muslim unity, and visiting 
leaders throughout the region.  The King has emphasized 
during every meeting with U.S. officials, including his 
December 16 meeting with Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), the 
alignment of USG and SAG interests. 
 
--Iran 
 
¶27. (S) Every senior Saudi interlocutor from the King down 
has expressed growing concern about Iranian influence in the 
region -- especially Iranian attempts to develop nuclear 
weapons.  The King has identified Iran as the "source of all 
problems" in the Middle East and along with other Saudi 
interlocutors, has urged the U.S. to take strong steps to 
address the Iranian problem.  Although the Saudis previously 
argued for a nuclear-free Middle East that would include 
Israel, the GCC announced after its December 9-10, 2006 
summit in Riyadh that it would explore the establishment of a 
nuclear program for "peaceful purposes."  Saudi leaders in 
subsequent meetings have made it clear that the Kingdom would 
be vulnerable to a nuclear-armed Iran if the Saudis did not 
also possess a nuclear capability. 
 
¶28. (S/NF) Despite Saudi concerns about growing Iranian 
influence and a nuclear-capable Iran, Saudi leadership has 
not taken any public steps or made public statements directed 
at limiting Tehran.  While urging the U.S. to adopt strong 
measures, the SAG describes its own relations with Iran as 
"normal."  The Saudis are clearly reluctant to take a public 
stand against Iran and will likely avoid making any public 
statements or taking public steps to rein in Iran's drive for 
regional superpower status, so long as they feel vulnerable 
to Tehran.  It is also possible that their reticence is 
intended to buy them time to develop an independent Saudi 
nuclear deterrent. However, publicly, the Saudi Government 
has stated it wants to develop peaceful nuclear technology in 
concert with the GCC. 
 
¶29. (S) On January 8, the Russian Embassy in Saudi Arabia 
confirmed that Russian President Putin will visit the Kingdom 
in February.  This visit builds on a concerted and 
well-planned diplomatic and economic strategy devised by King 
Abdullah, begun while he was Crown Prince and continued as 
King, to reduce the KSA's reliance on the U.S. and broaden 
and strengthen Saudi Arabia's international and regional 
contacts and influence.  The Saudis will likely prod yet 
another member of the Quartet to resolve the 
Palestinian-Israeli and Lebanese issues, as well as address 
developments in Syria.  The visit will also support the 
Kingdom's efforts to strengthen ties with all five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council and almost all of Iran's 
neighbors.  The timing of this visit is especially noteworthy 
given recent developments in Iraq and the continuing impasse 
over Iran's nuclear ambitions. 
 
--Iraq 
 
¶30. (S/NF) Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, during the January 30 
visit of Amb Khalilzad to Riyadh, stressed to Khalilzad that 
 
RIYADH 00000212  007 OF 010 
 
 
PM Maliki was not trusted by the Saudi leadership.  Maliki's 
decision to execute Saddam at the beginning of the Muslim 
eid, and during the hajj, with 3.8 million Muslims including 
35,000 Iraqis gathered in a narrow place in Mecca, could have 
easily caused riots and led to the many deaths, Prince 
Muhammad said.  He stressed that executing Saddam was right, 
but the timing and manner in which it was carried out showed 
that Maliki was a vengeful man.  "Maliki didn't respect the 
hajj or his neighbors, and we don't respect him."  Distrust 
of Maliki was also a theme of Khalilzad's January 30 meetings 
with King Abdullah and Prince Muqrin.  On the other hand, the 
Saudi leadership is pleased with the President's speech 
announcing the plan for Iraq, and the initial indications of 
US action to couinter Iranian support for the Shiite militias 
in Iraq, though we have yet to see any new public support for 
Iraq from Saudi Arabia.   The SAG has agreed to participate 
in several multilateral efforts to support Iraq, to include 
increased cooperation on border control issues and, in 
conjunction with the U.S. and other regional players, the 
development of a strategy to rein in the Sunni insurgency. 
 
¶31.  (SBU)  On January 28, Saudi Finance Ministry U/S Hamad 
Al-Baz,y told EconCouns that the SAG will send a letter of 
invitation to Iraqi Central Bank Governor Sinan Shabibi and 
Ministry of Finance Advisor Hassan Aziz to visit Riyadh to 
reconcile Iraq's USD 39 billion debt to Saudi Arabia once the 
USG has contacted Shabibi and Aziz to schedule this meeting 
which will probably be held in February.  Al-Baz,y stressed 
that the final Saudi decision on debt forgiveness is 
political and that technical terms must be resolved.  Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia are still negotiating a mutually acceptable 
figure for Iraqi debt.  Iraq's adoption of the Compact could 
provide a strong justification for Saudi action on both aid 
disbursement and debt forgiveness. 
 
¶32. (S/NF) Despite its organizational weaknesses, the GIP is 
at the center of Saudi commitments to various multilateral 
initiatives in support of Iraqi stability, which is becoming 
an integral part of its CT efforts.  These initiatives have 
entailed a cooperative effort with the UAE and Jordan to 
bolster Iraqi security, as well as a willingness to host a 
conference of Iraqi Sunni oppositionists with the aim of 
persuading them to support the elected Iraqi government.  The 
GIP has also offered to facilitate Iraqi access to Saudi 
programs aimed at rehabilitating former "jihadis."  Despite 
these good intentions, the GIP appears to remain mired in 
organizational inertia, which does not inspire confidence in 
its ability to perform on these commitments. 
 
¶33. (S) Saudi leaders are increasingly pessimistic of a 
peaceful resolution of the Iraq crisis.  As noted above, they 
see Iraq as part of a broader regional struggle with Iran for 
dominance.  Although Saudi policy on Iraq is not yet 
crystallized, some elements of the government appear 
committed to taking sides with Iraq's Sunnis should the 
situation deteriorate further.  The vulnerabilities of the 
border the Kingdom shares with Iraq's al-Anbar Province were 
primary catalysts in the Saudi decision to construct a 
550-mile fence and security boundary there.  They were also 
considerations in the proposed Border Enhancement Program and 
Saudi support for the proposed Gulf Cooperation Council 
Hudhud Remote Sensing System.  Although concerned about the 
potential for Iraq,s sectarian violence to spill over into 
Saudi Arabia, the SAG is publicly maintaining a 
"no-interference" policy and remains committed to providing 
assistance to the Iraqi people. 
 
¶34. (S) The SAG has made no progress in disbursing the USD 
one billion pledge of aid, trade credits, and concessional 
loans it made at the Madrid Donors Conference in October 
¶2003.  The SAG,s rationale for this failure has evolved over 
the last twelve months from their original concern about the 
lack of security on the ground, to the argument that the 
Saudi Development Fund cannot release project development 
funds and other aid until the Iraqi government has in place 
national development priorities that are recognized by all 
Iraqi political elements. 
 
¶35. (S) The SAG is interested in increasing Saudi-Iraqi 
cross-border trade over the long-term, but any discussion of 
a trade zone along the border now would have to address the 
Saudi concern about cross-border terrorist activity and the 
safety of Saudi nationals in Iraq.  We have not had 
discussions with the SAG about such a proposal.  Saudi import 
 
RIYADH 00000212  008 OF 010 
 
 
and customs duties are already quite minimal, so the 
attraction to the Iraqis of such a proposal would have to be 
easier customs and immigration rules, always sensitive 
security issues for the SAG.  Currently, all Saudi trade with 
Iraq transits through either Jordan or Kuwait. 
 
--Syria 
 
¶36. (S) Following the Lebanon crisis, a rift developed 
between Saudi Arabia and Syria.  SAG leaders have made 
negative, less-than-subtle statements in the press about 
Syria, chastising it for its role in the Lebanon crisis and 
ties to Iran.  The rift continues to grow, exacerbated by 
Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad's August speech in which he 
reportedly referred to Arab leaders who failed to support 
Hezbollah as "half-men."  During a September 12 meeting with 
Ambassador Khalilzad, the King indicated that the Syrian 
"problem" is secondary to Iran, that where Iran goes, Syria 
will follow.  However, the King more recently has been clear 
that Syria should not be discounted as a serious player in 
regional politics, even though it has degraded both 
economically and politically and effectively marginalized 
itself with its single party system. 
 
¶37. (S/NF) Prince Muqrin, in an expansive mood during the 
January 30 Khalilzad visit, told us the King had turned off a 
proposed visit by President Bashar al-Assad to Riyadh. 
Muqrin cited the King as saying, "since we are only 
half-grown men, maybe we should wait until we are fully 
grown."  Muqrin added that Bashar was a color-blind eye 
doctor who couldn't see red lines. 
 
--Lebanon 
 
¶38. (S) The SAG faced significant criticism -- both 
internally and externally -- resulting from the public's 
perception of the SAG,s close ties with extremely unpopular 
U.S. policies towards Israel, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and the 
Palestinians.  The SAG clearly walked back from its early 
public position on Lebanon in the face of this criticism, 
choosing to focus instead on Muslim unity and its position as 
the center of "Arabism."  There remains a strong undercurrent 
of support among the population for Hezbollah and what is 
thought by many here to be a Hezbollah victory.  The Saudis 
consistently voice concern about the possibility of renewed 
violence and continue to urge the U.S. to lead the push for 
resolution of the conflict. 
 
¶39.  (SBU) On January 28, Saudi Finance Ministry U/S Hamad 
Al-Baz,y told EconCouns that in response to Paris III the 
SAG pledged $1 billion as a concessional loan to be channeled 
through the Saudi Fund and $100 million as a cash grant for 
budget support. Al-Baz,y said that the SAG had delivered its 
pledges from summer 2006:  USD 500 million as a grant for 
reconstruction projects, and USD one billion as a long-term 
deposit in the Lebanese Central Bank.  Additionally, the Arab 
Monetary Fund had pledged USD 250 million, the Islamic 
Development Bank had pledged USD 250 million, the Arab Fund 
had pledged USD 700 million, and the UAE government had 
bilaterally pledged USD 300 million. 
 
--Hamas and Fatah 
 
¶40. (S) On January 28, King Abdullah invited Hamas and Fatah 
leaders to an emergency meeting in Mecca in order to end the 
current conflict in Gaza and the West Bank.  The King said 
that the fighting is shameful, tarnishing the image of and 
support for the Palestinians, and only serving the enemies of 
the Muslim people.  Subsequently, a SAG official said the 
meeting will most likely be held in Taif instead of Mecca so 
that Palestinian Christian leaders can attend.  He said that 
the timing of the meeting is to be confirmed but it will be 
held before the Arab League summit on March 28.  SAG 
officials have said that the Israeli/Qestinian conflict 
continues to be the linchpin of regional politics.  There has 
been some renewed discussion by the Saudis of the Arab Peace 
Initiative, which was crafted by King Abdullah when he was 
Crown PriQe. According to both the King and Foreign Minister 
Al-Faisal, Hamas has not acted in the best interests of the 
Palestinian people, nor has it convinced them that it can -- 
or would -- govern in their best interests.  However, the 
Saudis also point out that Israel's continued "aggression" 
gives Hamas the excuse it needs to continue on its current 
path. 
 
RIYADH 00000212  009 OF 010 
 
 
 
--Somalia 
 
¶41. (S) Although the Saudis continue to emphasize their 
non-interference policy regarding the internal affairs of 
sovereign nations, senior officials have indicated support 
for Somalia's provisional government and the efforts of 
Ethiopian forces to secure Mogadishu.  Advisor to King 
Abdullah and Saudi Ambassador-designee to the U.S. Adel 
Al-Jubair told DCM on December 26 that it is not in the 
Kingdom's best interest for Al Qa'eda to establish a "new 
Afghanistan" in the Horn of Africa.  On January 28, Saudi 
Finance Ministry U/S Hamad Al-Baz,y told EconCouns that 
Somalia,s security problem needed to be addressed before 
seeking new aid donations for it. Al-Baz,y recalled that in 
March 2006 the Arab League pledged USD 26 million, of which 
Saudi Arabia had contributed its portion, though he was not 
sure if this aid had been delivered. 
 
------ 
REFORM 
------ 
 
¶42. (S) King Abdullah appears committed to the incremental 
but steady implementation of a range of reforms.  On October 
20, he announced changes to the "Basic Law of 1992," which 
serves as Saudi Arabia's first written constitution, that 
will govern the selection of future kings.  Under the new 
system, a council, not the king, will chose the next ruler. 
Voting will be done by secret ballot, and talent -- not age 
-- will be the principal qualification for accession to the 
throne.  The primary purpose of the Allegiance Commission is 
to preserve the rule of the Al Saud; however, is yet another 
small -- but significant -- step towards more 
institutionalized and participatory government. 
 
¶43. (S) The judiciary appears to be increasingly aware of the 
necessity for reform and is showing some signs of willingness 
to do so.  There is increased media freedom, as evidenced by 
the recent publication in the press of a petition that was 
signed by 160 individuals (men, women, Sunni, and Shi'a). 
The petitioners were protesting an Internet campaign carried 
out by conservative elements against the Minister of Culture 
and Information for his reform efforts.  There has also been 
some notable progress on women's rights.  This includes 
recent decisions to grant women a more active role in 
business organizations, as well as access to employment 
sectors such as law and engineering.  Women's empowerment is 
a central element of the SAG's 2005 five-year plan.  While 
important changes are underway, there remains a significant 
portion of the population -- including some women themselves 
-- that is resistant to reforms in this area.  Additionally, 
the SAG has faced pressure from conservative religious 
circles, including the issuance of a May 23 open letter 
signed by 61 religious conservatives, which for the first 
time, threatened advocates of reform with possible violence. 
 
----------------- 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
----------------- 
 
¶44.  (C)  On December 29, 2006, forty nine members of an 
Ahmadiyya Muslim group consisting of 25 Indians, 23 
Pakistanis and 1 Syrian were arrested in Jeddah.  The SAG is 
in the processing of deporting the 49 plus additional 
Ahmadiyyas.  Muslim authorities consider the Ahmadiyyas to be 
heretics and apostates because they believe that a nineteenth 
century Muslim, Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was the Messiah 
and a Prophet.  Though the SAG has said that it is illegal 
for the Ahmadiyya to publicly practice their faith, this 
incident involved the religious police raiding a private 
religious gathering and subsequent pressure on the Ahmadiyyas 
to implicate and inform on other members who were not 
involved in the December 29 meeting.  These SAG actions 
contravene understandings reached previously with 
Ambassador-at-large for International Religious Freedom John 
Hanford. 
 
¶45.  (C)  On January 25, Sulaimani Ismaili Shi,a prisoner, 
Hadi Al-Mutif, tried, for the second time in ten days, to 
commit suicide by swallowing a nail.  These suicide attempts 
follow hunger strikes aimed at getting the attention of the 
King in order to receive a pardon and release from jail. 
Reportedly, the SAG has not provided adequate psychological 
 
RIYADH 00000212  010 OF 010 
 
 
counseling to Al-Mutif though it has provided medical 
treatment.  Al-Mutif was disappointed when the King did not 
pardon him along with other Sulaimani Ismaili Shi,a 
prisoners during his visit to Najran in November. 
 
¶46.  (S)  Shi,a throughout the Kingdom, but especially in 
the Eastern Province, have voiced grave concerns about 
increasing anti-Shi,a remarks because of increasing 
Sunni-Shi,a conflicts in the region, especially in Iraq. 
While insisting that the SAG does not favor any particular 
sect in Iraq, the SAG has not denounced or punished Sunni 
clerics for calling Shi,a heretics or calling on Sunni to 
fight Shi,a.  On December 7, thirty eight top Sunni Muslim 
scholars, notably Shaikh Abdul Rahman Al-Barrak, Abdulaziz 
Al-Rajehi, and Nassaer Al-Omar, issued a statement urging 
Muslims to support Sunnis in Iraq. More recently, Shaikh 
Abdullah bin Jibrin issued a statement condemning Shi,a 
atrocities against Sunnis in Iraq. 
 
------------ 
VISA ISSUES 
------------ 
 
¶47.  (C) In early August, Post discovered several student 
visa applicants had presented forged Saudi scholarship 
program award letters with their visa applications. As a 
result, consular offices added an extra "recall" back to 
theMinistry of Higher Education (MOHE) in order to recertify 
bona fides or all MOHE cadidates. The new list of student 
scholarship recipients was announced in late January 2007. 
Representatives of the consular section and DHS Visa Security 
Unit will meet with Ministry of Higher Education officials in 
early February to set the guidelines and parameters for 
student visa applications.  While fewer than last year, these 
new scholarships are said to be mainly for advanced degrees. 
 
¶48.  (SBU) Consulate General Dhahran began limited 
non-immigrant visa processing in September for visa 
referrals, as well as business facilitation cases from Saudi 
Aramco and the petrochemical sector.  Due to resource 
considerations, the Embassy is now conducting 30 to 40 visa 
interviews in Dhahran every other week, rather the 15 to 20 
every week.  A visa officer and a DHS officer go out to 
Dhahran twice a month to do the interviews and processing. 
 
¶49.  (SBU) Riyadh and Dhahran became the third and fourth 
pilot posts to begin collecting ten fingerprints from all 
visa applicants at the end of September.  We made no public 
announcement of this change, and so far have received no 
negative feedback from applicants. At the end of October, we 
plan to begin checking all 10-print collections against the 
FBI,s IAFIS fingerprint database, along with the other two 
pilot posts. Early indications are that the ten fingerprints 
are identifying problem cases not found through the older 
two-fingerprint collections. 
OBERWETTER