VZCZCXRO0258
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPG #0195/01 0591215
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281215Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8646
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1831

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/NCE FOR ERIC FICHTE, EUR/SCE FOR JOSHUA BLACK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM YI ZL EZ
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: CZECH GOVERNMENT ON AHTISAARI PROPOSAL 
 
REF: 2006 PRAGUE 0744 
 
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mike Dodman 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. The Czech government continues its firm 
support for the Ahtisaari plan.  The Czechs are concerned 
about EU unity on Kosovo, particularly if a new UNSC 
resolution fails.  The opposition CSSD, whose leader has 
expressed skepticism about Contact Group efforts, is not 
making it easy for the Czech government.  The MFA believes 
that the CSSD may be expressing criticism of the Ahtisaari 
plan at the request of the Slovak Prime Minister (CSSD 
Chairman Paroubek and Slovak PM Fico are close).  We will 
engage with the Czechs on Kosovo in the weeks ahead, and 
would strongly support possible consultations between the 
Czech government and EUR DAS DiCarlo.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Poloff met with MFA Director of South-East and East 
European Department Tomas Szunyog on February 21 to discuss 
the Czech position on Kosovo. Szunyog confirmed the Czechs 
continue to "fully support" the Ahtisaari proposal, including 
the recommended schedule and way forward. 
 
¶3. (C) Szunyog expressed hope that the proposal will move 
quickly to the UNSC for consideration (ideally in early 
March) and that a resolution expressly superseding UNSCR 1244 
and authorizing the continuing presence of NATO and EU troops 
will be approved. He said it is important to act quickly to 
keep the momentum. 
 
¶4. (C) If the UN resolution were to fail, Szunyog feared that 
EU unity could splinter. He thought that Slovakia in 
particular may move to block consensus, thereby preventing 
the EU from recognizing an independent Kosovo. Other possible 
EU opponents of unilateral recognition include Cyprus, 
Greece, Spain, and Romania, he said.  Szunyog also predicted 
that some of Kosovo's neighbors may refuse to accept Kosovo's 
independence without a UNSC resolution. For example, he 
thought Montenegro may not recognize Kosovo for fear of 
antagonizing Serbia. 
 
5.(C) Regarding Serbia's prospects for EU accession, Szunyog 
noted the February 12-13 GAERC conclusions expressly state 
that Serbia "remains welcome" to join the EU. He added this 
position is not likely to change. Nevertheless, the EU member 
states continue to disagree on the extent to which ICTY 
compliance should be required prior to resuming SAA talks. 
Restarting SAA talks will encourage Serbs to focus on their 
future, thereby minimizing the rise of nationalism and/or the 
risk of conflict (although Szunyog was skeptical about the 
possibility of violence). Other member states, such as the 
UK, are sticklers on ICTY compliance. In the GAERC 
conclusions, the foreign ministers finally agreed on text 
that requires "concrete actions" towards ICTY compliance. 
 
¶6. (C) In the Czech Republic, Szunyog foresaw increased 
debate about the Ahtisaari package.  Szunyog noted that the 
opposition Social Democrats (CSSD) have become more outspoken 
in their opposition to the Ahtisaari proposal.  Specifically, 
the Chairman of Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee Jan 
Hamacek (CSSD) recently stated that he believes final status 
should emerge from an agreement between the Serbs and the 
Kosovars, and should not be imposed on one or the other 
party. CSSD has called for further debate on the issue within 
Parliament. Szunyog believed the Slovaks had urged CSSD to 
state this position more openly than they had in the past. 
(Comment:  CSSD Chairman Jiri Paroubek has long stated this 
view openly, including when he was prime minister.  Despite 
this -- Paroubek's "personal opinions" on Kosovo -- his 
government, like the current one, supported the Contact Group 
position.  End comment). 
 
¶7. (C) Looking ahead, Szunyog was confident that Czech policy 
would not change in the immediate future.  He hesitated, 
however, on the question of what happens if the UNSC fails to 
authorize a new resolution.  Szunyog did not want to 
speculate, but did offer that the government could have to 
take into account the views of CSSD in such a situation.  In 
a separate meeting on February 27, MFA Political Director 
Martin Povejsil told DCM that the GOCR hopes that the current 
"debate" in Slovakia on Kosovo will not "spill over" into the 
Czech Republic. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Szunyog recalled the success of his bilateral 
consultations with DAS Rosemary DiCarlo and Kosovo Desk 
Officer Joshua Black last spring. He said these meetings 
helped the Czechs better align their Kosovo policy with U.S. 
policy, and he hoped that another meeting with DiCarlo might 
 
PRAGUE 00000195  002 OF 002 
 
 
be arranged in Washington or during one of DiCarlo's visits 
to Europe. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment. We will engage with the GOCR on the UNSC 
resolution and on Czech thoughts on leverage they or others 
may have with the Slovaks.  The Czech government believes it 
has little chance of turning around Slovak PM Fico; the one 
person who could -- CSSD Chairman Paroubek -- firmly believes 
that the approach Ahtisaari has recommended is wrong.  The 
MFA also appears to fear that Czech intervention in 
Bratislava could backfire domestically, giving greater voice 
to the CSSD and opponents of the deal and complicating the 
government's task of maintaining firm support for Ahtisaari. 
 
GRABER