VZCZCXRO0722
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHFR #0777/01 0591714
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 281714Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5225
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL FR EUN UNO NATO IR MNUC IS KPAL
SUBJECT: SARKOZY PRESS CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  Interior Minister and center-right presidential 
candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, appearing relaxed and confident in 
a February 28 press conference and Q-and-A session, laid out 
a foreign policy vision that focused straight-forwardly on 
strengthening Europe, preserving the importance of the 
Transatlantic relationship (including NATO as well as EU/ESDP 
and adequate defense expenditures), and promoting the 
"universal" values of human rights and liberty throughout the 
world (over stability leading to immobility).  Sarkozy 
praised President Chirac's policies on the Balkans, Iraq, 
Lebanon, climate change (where he urged the U.S. to set a 
better example), and cultural diversity, but called for a 
more critical approach toward Russia and China, and, on 
Africa, reducing France's military presence and a foreign 
policy based less on personal relationships.  (More 
generally, he argued for a foreign policy no longer 
considered purely the "private reserve" of the Presidency.) 
Sarkozy advocated for a relationship of confidence with the 
U.S. that would respect the EU's and France's freedom to 
differ and autonomy (his opposition to Turkish EU membership 
was cited as an example), and suggested indirectly it was 
perhaps time for France to extend its nuclear deterrent to 
its neighbors.  Calling Europe his number one priority, he 
reiterated his call for a "mini-treaty" focused on 
institutional reform and gradually increasing the policy 
domains subject to double majority voting. 
 
¶2.  SUMMARY CONT'D:  On the Middle East, Sarkozy stressed the 
importance of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
weapons capability and proposed an international nuclear fuel 
authority to extend economic and technological development to 
the South as insurance against terrorism.  He stressed the 
importance of supporting moderate Arabs over extremists, 
urged success in Lebanon, supported a secure Israel and 
viable Palestinian state, saw a need for "setting a horizon" 
for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, and called for French 
leadership in creating a Mediterranean Union as Europe's 
partner. 
 
¶3.  SUMMARY CONT'D:  Sarkozy repeated familiar French views 
on multilateralism and strengthening and enlarging the UN 
Security Council (NATO should not compete with the UN), with 
no references to putative U.S. unilateralism.  He defended 
the European "economic patriotism" and called for greater 
French economic and commercial engagement, particularly in 
Asia (where he suggested France also needed to move more of 
its diplomatic resources).  He welcomed competition from 
China and others, including in Africa, provided that China 
also played by the established rules.  END SUMMARY. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
¶5.  Outlining his foreign policy priorities during a February 
28 press conference and follow-up question-and-answer period 
(it was not a formal policy address), Interior Minister and 
center-right presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy stated 
that foreign policy was not a constant.  As the world 
changed, France needed to adapt.  International developments 
were important, given France,s worldwide engagements, 
including military and diplomatic presence and its two 
million French citizens residing overseas.  Two major events 
in recent time had altered French perspectives.  First was 
the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 and second was 9/11, the 
latter effectively putting an end to the post-cold war period 
and highlighting terrorism as a major threat. 
 
¶6.  Sarkozy praised the foreign policy of President Chirac, 
citing his decision to be engaged in the Balkans since 1995, 
his desire to avoid the Iraq war, ongoing support for 
Lebanon's sovereignty, climate change, and defense of 
cultural diversity.  He emphasized that foreign policy should 
be about vision and doctrine, joking that at the MFA, an 
obtuse policy is seen as one that can,t fail.  He was 
adamant that French policy would ensure that France 
maintained its freedom and independence of action. 
 
EUROPE 
 
¶7.  Sarkozy said Europeans needed to take more responsibility 
in the world.  There was general agreement on direction, but 
Europeans had not generated the power to match.  It was not 
surprising that Europe was more often a spectator, an 
executor of policy, or a financial contributor rather than an 
active player.  As a first remedy, he proposed adoption of a 
simplified Treaty to overcome the problem of the rejected 
constitutional treaty.  The aim would not be to remake 
Europe, but to get its institutions functioning and on track. 
 He called for the creation of a European Foreign Minister, 
an enlarged role for European Parliament, a reinforced 
General Council, and increasing the number of policy domains 
subject to qualified majority voting.  Sarkozy concluded by 
noting that while each of the 27 EU member states had the 
right to say "no," none should have the right to block others 
 
PARIS 00000777  002 OF 003 
 
 
from moving forward, i.e., the principle of unanimity needs 
to be done away with. 
 
SECURITY 
 
¶8.  Sarkozy stressed the importance of ensuring the security 
of France, and maintaining the independence of Europe.  On 
the latter point, he noted that France and the United States 
were old friends that needed to respect each other,s freedom 
and remain free to disagree on occasion.  It was also 
essential to maintain France,s nuclear shield.  He suggested 
the French nuclear shield might eventually be extended to its 
neighbors, given linkages between French interests and those 
of its European neighbors.  The protection of French 
interests required the continued modernization of French 
armaments, with proper oversight. 
 
¶9.  Turning to transatlantic security, Sarkozy observed that 
Americans and Europeans alike needed NATO and ESDP.  There 
was significant overlap in ESDP and NATO membership already, 
he added, but also a number of European countries that 
belonged to only one organization.  Sarkozy warned against 
NATO exceeding its defense role and seeking to become a 
competitor to the UN.  Also, given that Europe was no longer 
the center of U.S. priorities, Europe needed to be able to 
defend itself.  Sarkozy firmly stated that he would ensure 
that defense spending not drop below 2 percent of GDP -- this 
was the price of maintaining a free and influential France. 
He called on his European partners to spend more on defense, 
as it was not sustainable that the UK and France were called 
on to cover roughly 40 percent of European defense 
expenditures. 
 
¶10.  In an indirect swipe at the socialist candidate, 
Segolene Royal, who earlier advocated cuts in defense 
spending in favor of a larger education budget, Sarkozy noted 
that "it would be irresponsible to tell the French public 
that they have to choose between their children,s education 
and security."  A president had a duty to ensure both, he 
added.  Sarkozy made a plug in defense of a strong 
intelligence capability, as well as for the necessity to move 
forward on the construction of a second aircraft (Royal said 
she would cancel the second carrier).  The second carrier was 
essential to project strength and to respond to any threat to 
French interests, Sarkozy concluded.  He touched on European 
plans to construct its transport plane, the A400M. 
 
IRAN 
 
¶11.  Sarkozy termed the Iranian nuclear question as the most 
important foreign policy issue today.  A nuclear armed Iran 
was unacceptable, he emphasized.  An Iran armed with nuclear 
weapons would lead to an arms race in the region and pose a 
threat to Israel and southern Europe.  Sanctions were 
therefore important and were proving effective.  Sarkozy 
advocated the creation, under IAEA and UN supervision, of a 
world bank of nuclear materials to foreclose the need for 
states to pursue the enrichment process.  The provision of 
nuclear energy would greatly help alleviate misery in the 
underdeveloped world and preclude the growth of terrorism. 
It was important to show that energy was not just for the 
rich, he added. 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
¶12.  Sarkozy voiced support for Kyoto, however weak, as a 
good approach to protecting the environment.  The U.S. should 
lead by example.  Meanwhile, he called on China, Brazil, 
India and Russia to recognize that, to be considered world 
players, they must also abide by these same Kyoto 
restrictions.  Separately, he took note that the WTO has not 
done enough on environment. 
 
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIBERTY 
(OR TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY IN A MINOR KEY) 
 
¶13.  Sarkozy rejected the notion that some parts of the world 
"are not ready for democracy" and asserted that values and 
interests can go together in a way that combines idealism and 
realism.  "Realpolitik" was not always realistic, and a 
policy focused only on stability leads to immobility. 
Silence was a crime on issues such as Chechnya and Darfur, 
and major countries such as China and Russia could not afford 
to ignore human rights. 
 
MIDDLE EAST 
 
¶14.  Turning to the Middle East, Sarkozy said the key was to 
strengthen the hands of moderates against radicals.  In 
Lebanon, this meant also ridding the country of foreign 
interference.  He reiterated his call for a solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian crisis that would protect Israel's 
security and guarantee a viable Palestinian state, and called 
 
PARIS 00000777  003 OF 003 
 
 
for increased European engagement.  On Iraq, premature 
withdrawal would lead to chaos, but there needed to be the 
prospect of withdrawal as well as an understanding within a 
sovereign government on power and resource sharing among 
communities. 
 
MEDITERRANEAN UNION 
 
¶15.  In closing remarks, Sarkozy proposed that the European 
dream be extended to the Mediterranean under French 
leadership.  The Barcelona process was not adequate; France 
should encourage a Mediterranean Union in the areas of 
immigration, economy, human rights and the environment. 
Europe had a vital interest in forming an alliance with the 
Mediterranean. 
 
AFRICA 
 
¶16.  On Africa, Sarkozy said French youth did not understand 
the purpose of French bases on that continent.  It was time 
to build a partnership with the African Union and limit the 
French presence to a minimum.  In answer to a question, he 
welcomed the presence of the U.S., India and China, which had 
the potential for increasing job opportunities, so long as 
all parties played by the rules.  The challenges of Africa 
today would be those of France tomorrow.  He later specified 
that it was improper for China to offer assistance and 
contracts with no strings attached. 
 
PROMOTING ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 
 
¶17.  Sarkozy defended the idea of a "European preference," 
insisting that the U.S., Chinese, and Japanese had their own 
national preferences and that France would insist on 
reciprocity.  He welcomed competition, so long as it was 
based on reciprocity and equal access and anti-dumping. 
Responding to a question about France's diplomatic presence, 
he called for shifting personnel from Europe to Asia. 
 
THE VIRTUES OF MULTILATERALISM 
 
¶18. In the way of a conclusion, Sarkozy praised 
multilateralism and called for a legitimate and effective UN. 
 He advocated an enlargement of the UN Security Council, 
representative of the world's regions and based on 
considerations of population, economic contributions, and -- 
important for him -- troop contributions to peacekeeping 
operations.  Acknowledging the difficulty of reaching 
consensus, he proposed consideration of possible transitional 
arrangements for access to permanent seat status. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON