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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000688 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2017 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR CONS ASEC XY GV IV CH JA FR
SUBJECT: JAPAN/AFRICA:  JAPANESE EMBOFF DISCUSSES WEST 
AFRICA, CHINA 
 
PARIS 00000688  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political M-C Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Chie Kinumaki, an Africa Watcher at 
Japan's Embassy in Paris, on February 21 discussed efforts to 
assist 30 Japanese nationals in leaving Guinea; the impasse 
in Cote d'Ivoire; concerns about China's lack of interest in 
promoting democracy, human rights, and sound business 
practices across Africa; and Japan's participation in the 
recent Africa-France Summit in Cannes (largely ceremonial). 
Kinumaki also provided details on Japanese diplomatic 
representation in West Africa.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  We met on February 21 with Chie Kinumaki, one of 
several Africa Watchers at Japan's Embassy in Paris. 
Discussion focused on West Africa, which is currently the 
main area of concern for the Japanese, notably because of the 
unrest in Guinea and the continuing impasse in Cote d'Ivoire. 
 
Guinea 
------ 
¶3.  (C)  Kinumaki said that Japan's main concern in Guinea 
was consular.  The Japanese Embassy had drawn down to 
essential staff only.  Kinumaki said that there were some 30 
Japanese nationals present in Guinea and the Embassy's 
attention has been focused on assisting them and helping them 
leave.  However, of these 30, a small group consists of young 
Japanese adventurers who went to Guinea to study traditional 
drumming and percussion techniques.  Apparently, according to 
Kinumaki, there is a devoted group of young musicians in 
Japan strongly interested in traditional African music. 
These musicians continue to be a problem for the Japanese 
Embassy because they say they want to stay in Guinea, do not 
feel threatened by the unrest, and, in several cases, have 
nonrefundable tickets they do not want to abandon.  Even 
though they are free to remain, Kinumaki said that their 
presence was a worry to the Embassy, which viewed itself as 
partially responsible for their safety. 
 
¶4.  (C)  On the political side, Kinumaki said the Japanese 
were concerned that unrest could increase on or after 
February 23, depending on whether there is an end to the 
"state of siege," its extension, and the reaction of the 
unions and opposition. 
 
Situation in Cote d'Ivoire 
-------------------------- 
¶5.  (C)  Kinumaki said that Cote d'Ivoire remained at an 
impasse, with President Gbagbo displaying a fair amount of 
skill in retaining control, remaining one step ahead of his 
critics, and avoiding implementation of the peace process. 
Given the current lack of movement, Kinumaki was not 
confident that elections would take place in October. 
Kinumaki said that the French appeared out of ideas and were 
becoming increasingly frustrated by the high costs of 
Operation Licorne.  Kinumaki believed that French MFA and 
Elysee officials were also reluctant to press for new 
initiatives in these last weeks of the Chirac Presidency, not 
only for fear of provoking Chirac as he leaves office but 
also for fear of initiating projects that Chirac's successor 
might not welcome.  The French election cycle was thus 
hampering French thinking on Cote d'Ivoire and probably 
elsewhere, she observed.  Kinumaki predicted a thorough 
review of France's Africa policy once Chirac, the last French 
practitioner of the old-school, personalized way of doing 
business with Africa, leaves the scene. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Kinumaki remarked that Operation Licorne had 
hamstrung France in another way, by giving other concerned 
parties the impression that France was willing and able to 
shoulder  a substantial part of the international community's 
burden in Cote d'Ivoire.  The French do not want this burden; 
at the same time, however, they value recognition of their 
leadership role and fear that reducing or curtailing 
Operation Licorne could worsen the situation in Cote d'Ivoire 
and allow others to criticize France for abandoning 
leadership for selfish reasons. 
 
China 
----- 
¶7.  (C)  Kinumaki referred several times to China's growing 
 
PARIS 00000688  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
presence in Africa and the aggressiveness displayed by the 
Chinese in expanding this presence.  Notably, Kinumaki said 
at several points that the Japanese were relatively less 
worried about the economic competition the Chinese 
represented.  "What bothers us is the completely unprincipled 
way the Chinese are building these ties," she said.  "When 
they come bearing huge sums of money, offer assistance 
unconditionally, and almost deliberately ignore such issues 
as human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and other 
similar concepts, they are really appealing to the worst 
instincts of Africa's leaders," she complained. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Kinumaki said that Japan was following China's 
policies in Africa closely, but she acknowledged that Africa 
did not rank very high on the list of bilateral Japan-PRC 
concerns, with North Korea occupying the top spot.  She 
readily emphasized Japan's inability to influence the Chinese 
on Africa -- "as soon as we start mentioning to them that 
they should be more responsible partners to Third World 
countries, they immediately tell us to mind our own business 
and express outrage that Japan, which once sought to conquer 
and colonize China, should be giving lectures on good 
behavior."  Kinumaki said that the GOJ had indirectly tried 
to advise African leaders to beware of China but that these 
efforts had been largely ineffective in the face of what the 
Chinese offer, with no strings attached.  (See below, para 
10, on how pro-Chinese attitudes may have manifested 
themselves at the Africa-France Summit.) 
 
Africa-France Summit 
-------------------- 
¶9.  (C)  Kinumaki provided a read-out on the February 15-16 
Africa-France Summit in Cannes from the Japanese perspective. 
 Former PM Mori headed the delegation, whose Tokyo members 
included Director (A/S-equivalent) of MOFA's Africa Bureau 
and a number of staff.  Japan's Ambassador to France, his 
DCM, Kinumaki, and two or three others from Paris also 
attended.  Kinumaki said that Japan's participation in the 
Summit was largely ceremonial, consisting of attending the 
large group meetings, during one of which Mori made a short 
speech.  The Japanese held a brief (5-10 minutes) bilateral 
meeting with President Chirac, which consisted largely of 
small talk.  The Japanese made a short demarche asking for 
French support regarding North Korea, with Chirac responding 
with an unspecific "of course, of course, we support you 
concerning North Korea." 
 
¶10.  (C)  Kinumaki said that the Japanese delegation did not 
do much wheeling-and-dealing with others present at the 
Summit.  Much of the attendees' attention and sentiment were 
focused on Chirac and the Summit as one of his swan songs. 
She did note, however, that the French wanted to include as a 
sub-theme for one of the sessions a discussion on China's 
activities in Africa but let this drop when a good number of 
African delegations indicated that they preferred that this 
not be included as a formal discussion topic. 
 
Japanese Diplomacy in West Africa 
--------------------------------- 
¶11.  (SBU)  Kinumaki said that Japan maintained some two 
dozen Embassies across Africa, with most of them responsible 
for two or more countries.  Japan's Embassy in Senegal served 
as the regional hub for West Africa and covered Mauritania, 
Mali, and Senegal's other immediate neighbors.  Abidjan was 
responsible also for Benin, Togo, Niger, and Burkina Faso. 
The Embassy in Ghana covered anglophone countries such as 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Japan's Embassy in Nigeria 
anchored the eastern end of the West Africa region and 
covered countries to Nigeria's north, east and south. 
Kinumaki noted that Japan's Embassy in Conakry was an anomaly 
in that it was responsible only for Guinea. 
 
"Virtual" Embassy Abidjan 
------------------------- 
¶12.  (C)  Kinumaki said that Japan's diplomatic presence in 
Cote d'Ivoire had become unique -- the Embassy left Cote 
d'Ivoire about a year ago because of the unrest and 
instability and has been operating in Paris as a "virtual" 
Embassy since then.  Some personnel have been re-assigned 
elsewhere, but the Ambassador and a small staff, in offices 
 
PARIS 00000688  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
located within Japan's Embassy to France, continue to try to 
function as an Embassy to the five countries to which it is 
accredited.  MOFA has rented apartments for the remaining 
staff and a clear division of activity has developed between 
the "African" Embassy and the Paris Embassy -- for example, 
when there is a Japanese national holiday or other public 
event, the "African" Embassy will hold its own function 
separately from whatever the Paris Embassy might organize. 
Kinumaki indicated that this arrangement had created a bit of 
tension between the two missions. 
 
¶13.  (C)  One of the officers from the "African" Embassy 
travels monthly to Abidjan and perhaps one or two of the 
other capitals on a rotating basis to check on Japan's 
facilities, pay local staff, and maintain some semblance of 
personal contact with host governments.  MOFA's personnel and 
budget sections are not pleased with the continuing presence 
in Paris of the Abidjan Embassy, which is quite expensive, 
far from ideal, and no longer the quick fix once envisioned. 
Kinumaki explained that, in principle, the "African" Embassy 
is to return to Abidjan once elections take place in Cote 
d'Ivoire, but no one knows when that will occur, with the 
October target date looking less and less realistic. 
 
Bio Note 
-------- 
¶14.  (C)  Chie Kinumaki is not a Class A MOFA diplomat but 
rather a MOFA specialist who has been at the Japanese Embassy 
to France since mid-2005.  She said that she spent time in 
Madagascar, which allowed her to work on her French, which is 
good.  Kinumaki is a ready interlocutor who is often more 
available than her other colleagues who cover Africa.  She is 
also willing to talk about "in-house" matters that others at 
the Japanese Embassy may be more reluctant to discuss. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON