VZCZCXRO7733
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNC #0140/01 0451355
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 141355Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7533
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0784
RHEFNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM UNFICYP MOPS TU CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CIV-MIL RELATIONS HIT NEW LOW, TALAT 
IRREVERSIBLY WEAKENED? 
 
REF: A. 05 NICOSIA 291 
 
     ¶B. 06 NICOSIA 1345 
     ¶C. NICOSIA 21 
     ¶D. NICOSIA 126 
     ¶E. NICOSIA CY IIR 6823005107 
     ¶F. NICOSIA CY IIR 6823005607 
     ¶G. NICOSIA 74 
     ¶H. MACRIS-SILLIMAN EMAIL (2/8/2007) 
     ¶I. LIBBY-SILLIMAN EMAIL (2/7/2007) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY AND COMMENT.  Relations between the 
increasingly assertive Turkish military and the increasingly 
hesitant Turkish Cypriot civilian leadership have taken a 
definite turn for the worse in recent months.  The January 
contest of wills between "TRNC President" Talat and the 
generals over the pedestrian bridge at Ledra Street was only 
the most public manifestation of growing strain in this 
difficult relationship.  Sources close to Talat have 
expressed anxiety about the new, hard-line commander of 
Turkish forces on the island and about the AKP-led GOT's 
apparent unwillingness to "stick out its neck" for 
pro-settlement Turkish Cypriots.  For their part, local 
military brass (perhaps taking a cue from the TGS in Ankara) 
have reversed their three-year-old policy of studied 
political neutrality, openly conveying to us and others their 
contempt for the center-left Talat and the "sell-out" 
platform they feel he represents. 
 
¶2. (C) Growing political difficulties at home (polls show 
Turkish Cypriot opinion has swung sharply away from the 
pro-unification line on which the CTP was elected) and 
continued stalemate on the UN settlement track have added to 
Talat's headaches.  Although the current "TRNC government" 
will probably survive, it is caught in a three-way squeeze 
between Turkish army bullying, the Greek Cypriot 
all-or-nothing approach to settlement talks, and a gradual 
loss of domestic political support.  This has undercut 
Talat's willingness to take any pro-active steps on Cyprus. 
His reluctant transformation into an intransigent "Denktash 
II" may be irreversible, and may produce negative fallout for 
settlement talks, Turkey-EU relations, and USG interests. 
END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
THE GOOD OLD DAYS 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (C) After the 2003 elections that brought the CTP of 
Mehmet Ali Talat to power in the "TRNC," the Turkish army on 
the island kept an unprecedented low profile (ref a). 
Reversing years of overt financial and political support for 
successive hard-line "governments" under "President 
Denktash," the military largely kept its nose out of Turkish 
Cypriot politics from 2004-2006 -- opening the door for a 
series of knock-out election victories by the center-left, 
pro-settlement CTP, a resounding "yes" vote for the Annan 
Plan, and a series of confidence-building gestures toward the 
Greek Cypriots, including the opening of churches in the 
north for worship and reengagement with the Committee on 
Missing Persons (ref b). 
 
¶4. (C) According to Embassy contacts close to Talat, the 
AKP-led Turkish government -- then popular at home and 
commendably eager to remove the Cyprus irritant from 
Turkey-EU relations -- openly supported efforts such as 
these.  At the same time, "progressive" CHOD Ozkok (whom 
Turkish Cypriots say was more a "NATO man" than a "Deep State 
man") set a positive tone for Turkish forces on the island. 
Shortly after his election in 2005, "PM" Soyer told us with 
obvious astonishment how the then-commander of Turkish forces 
here, Memisoglu, had called on him in his office and said, 
"My sword is at your service, Mr. Prime Minister." 
 
¶5. (C) Although angry over perceived slights by the "TRNC" 
civilian leadership (such as when "President" Talat broke 
with years of tradition by hosting a Bayram holiday reception 
on his own, without the generals), the military on the island 
generally held their tongue.  Indeed, according to Soyer's 
private secretary, the three-star force commander continued 
to participate constructively in weekly policy meetings with 
Talat, the "PM," then-"FM" Serdar Denktash, and the local 
Turkish "ambassador."  In many cases (such as when Talat 
engaged in 2005 Luxembourg-sponsored talks on a 
Varosha/direct trade swap) the generals deferred to the 
"president" even when they disagreed over issues that came up 
in this forum -- often after being convinced by the previous 
Turkish "ambassador" that Talat could be trusted not to give 
away the store. 
 
NICOSIA 00000140  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
THEY'RE BAAACK: THE ARMY COMES OUT OF THE BARRACKS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6. (S) Several recent events, however, have suggested that 
the military has abandoned its light touch: 
 
-- Ledra Street Bridge.  Despite reports that they had agreed 
in December to Talat's proposal to take down the 
controversial footbridge at this long-delayed checkpoint, 
local commanders backpedaled, forcing Talat to make a 
humiliating trip to Turkey in January to beg the GOT and TGS 
for permission to remove the bridge.  Subsequent public 
statements by CHOD Buyukanit reaffirming the Turkish army's 
final "authority" over security matters along the Buffer Zone 
undercut Talat's "presidential" stature -- leading observers 
on both sides of the Green Line to comment that although 
Talat succeeded in removing the bridge, he had won a Pyrrhic 
victory, which only underscored the limits to what he can do 
on his own (ref c). 
 
-- Article 10.  Subsequent public debate over Article 10 of 
the "TRNC constitution" (which "temporarily" cedes security 
oversight from Turkish Cypriot civilians to the Turkish 
"Peace Forces") has been muted after Turkish army figures, 
including visiting land forces commander Basbug in January, 
made it clear they would oppose any move to restrict their 
powers.  The local rumor mill, as well as sensitive 
reporting, suggest that Turkish security forces have had a 
hand in organizing pro-Article 10 demonstrations by 
nationalist opposition parties UBP and DP. 
 
-- Green Line Shootings.  Later that month Turkish Forces 
along the Green Line instituted more aggressive rules of 
engagement, which immediately led to two live-fire incidents 
in the Buffer Zone the following day.  One high-ranking 
Turkish military officer subsequently told DATT that the new 
rules of engagement were, among other things, a responsQto 
Talat's impudence in pressing ahead with the removal of the 
Ledra Street Bridge over their objections (ref d, e, f). 
 
-- Criminal Activity.  A December shoot-out between two 
mainland criminal figures in a Kyrenia casino has embarrassed 
the hapless "TRNC government" by highlighting its inability 
to regulate the mafia-infested gambling industry.  Sensitive 
reporting and on-the-street rumors suggest that the police 
(who answer directly to the Turkish military) were aware of 
the impending mob showdown but did nothing in order to 
humiliate the Talat "government."  Allegations that the 
gangsters involved in this incident had ties to the military 
have led to rumors of a resurgent Susurluk-style alliance 
between the "Deep State" and criminals operating in Cyprus. 
 
-- Missing Persons Threats.  Credible rumors (as well as 
sensitive reporting) suggest that elements from the Turkish 
security forces played a role in recent threats against 
Turkish Cypriots working for the Committee on Missing 
Persons, the only real "bicommunal success story" of the 
post-referenda period.  The CMP had been seeking to exhume 
Greek Cypriot civilian remains from the village of Serdarli, 
where they were killed by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces 
during reprisal violence in 1974, but has since postponed its 
operations in the town (ref g, h) and may be under pressure 
to slow down new exhumations. 
 
-- Public Chest Thumping.  For months, military figures have 
stepped up their use of inflammatory public rhetoric.  In 
addition to Basbug's open political intervention over Article 
10, the military turned heads by "hijacking" November's "TRNC 
Day" celebrations.  Master of ceremonies Talat had an open 
spat with local commanders after they rearranged the 
ceremonial program without his permission, inserting a speech 
by a junior officer who repeatedly claimed that the "TRNC 
would live forever" (with the army's help, of course). 
Talat's private secretary confided to us that the "president" 
was furious and humiliated, and predicted the speech would do 
long-term damage to the dream of reunification in a bi-zonal, 
bi-communal federation. 
 
IT'S POLITICAL -- AND PERSONAL 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (S) There are several possible explanations for this 
change in tone.  In their contacts with DATT, Turkish 
military commanders on the island make no secret of their 
disdain for Talat and the reunification policies he 
represents, and sensitive reporting suggests they have made a 
conscious decision to undermine him.  But sources close to 
Talat speculate that there is also a personal element in the 
 
NICOSIA 00000140  003 OF 004 
 
 
army's "vendetta" against Talat. 
 
¶8. (S) Kivrikoglu, the new three-star general who assumed the 
Cyprus command in August, reportedly worked for military 
intelligence during a previous, Denktash-era assignment to 
the island -- and, according to "PM" Soyer's private 
secretary, was tasked with harassing the then-opposition CTP. 
 
SIPDIS 
 Talat's staff and political allies are convinced that 
Kivrikoglu is "up to his old tricks" (surveillance, 
supporting the nationalist UBP and DP, etc).  "He knows what 
we do day and night," our contact said.  Regardless of 
whether these allegations are true, the spill-over effect of 
this mutual mistrust has been significant.  The once-weekly 
coordination meetings between the "TRNC" leadership and the 
army have reportedly come to a halt.  Furthermore, the new 
Turkish "ambassador" (Turkekul Kurttekin, who took up his 
duties in January) is either too fresh in his post or too 
openly nationalistic to perform the mediating role his 
predecessor did, according to our contacts (ref i). 
 
¶9. (C) In addition to this local/personal dimension, Turkish 
Cypriot civilians express worry about fallout from the 
current civilian-military balance in Turkey.  Shortly before 
taking over from Ozkok, Buyukanit's public promise not to 
remove "a single soldier" from Cyprus sent a chill down 
spines in the pro-settlement camp.  Talat's private secretary 
told us that the "president" must "negotiate more carefully" 
with the TGS in Ankara, especially on Cyprus-related matters, 
now that Buyukanit has assumed command. 
 
¶10. (C) At the same time, the ruling AKP appears to have lost 
interest in sticking its neck out for the CTP -- or in 
support of any forward-leaning moves on Cyprus.  During the 
Ledra Street debacle, Soyer confided to us that Erdogan and 
Gul "privately" supported Talat's initiative to remove the 
bridge.  Soyer's private secretary told us, however, that Gul 
kept silent during Talat's subsequent meeting with Buyukanit, 
leaving the Turkish Cypriot to plead on his own.  Although 
AKP leaders subsequently gave Talat their public endorsement, 
CTP insiders tell us AKP has asked Talat to refrain from 
making any additional dramatic moves, at least until after 
Turkish elections. 
 
THE THREE-WAY SQUEEZE 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Continued frosty relations with the Greek Cypriots 
have compounded Talat's headaches.  The July 8 Gambari 
Agreement (which Turkish Cypriots felt was a concession since 
it made no reference to the Annan Plan), Talat's politically 
costly move to dismantle the bridge at Ledra Street, and 
other steps like the unilateral opening of a Greek school in 
Karpass were all perceived as goodwill gestures by Turkish 
Cypriots, who accuse the Greek Cypriots of failing to 
reciprocate.  Reluctantly acknowledging that his side also 
shared blame for delays in the Gambari Process, one Turkish 
Cypriot insider nonetheless complained about Greek Cypriot 
efforts to hassle Turkish Cypriots as a community and 
belittle Talat as an interlocutor -- rather than engaging 
seriously on substance.  Indeed, as UNFICYP Chief Michael 
Moller commented to us candidly, the Papadopoulos 
administration seemed intent on undercutting Talat even 
though that meant "fouling the well from which they must some 
day drink." 
 
¶12. (C) This has left Talat weakened at home.  Popular 
discontent with his pro-settlement "government" was thrown 
into sharp relief by the January publication of a survey 
suggesting that Turkish Cypriot support for a federal 
solution to the Cyprus problem had fallen sharply.  At the 
same time, support for the Denktashian "two-state" solution 
rose to 65 percent (ironically, the same proportion that 
voted in favor of the Annan Plan).  Trust in the EU, UN, and 
political parties were all low, while a whopping 95 percent 
people said they trusted the army (far more than any other 
institution).  Talat's party -- which was elected on a 
pro-EU, pro-settlement platform -- is increasingly 
vulnerable, according to one CTP insider.  Between the army, 
the Greek Cypriot full-court press, and his frustrated 
constituents, Talat is caught in a "three-way squeeze." 
 
IS TALAT HISTORY?  SO WHAT? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) COMMENT:  It seems unlikely Talat or his "government" 
will fall in the near term.  Elections are not due until 2010 
and the opposition, despite getting chummy with the security 
forces, remains in disarray.  But Talat is a much-diminished 
figure.  This is largely due to factors outside of his 
 
NICOSIA 00000140  004 OF 004 
 
 
control.  Talat's failure to live up to his pro-solution 
rhetoric has more to do with restrictive Turkish red lines -- 
and the Greek Cypriot hard line -- than with a lack of good 
will on his part.  But the end result is the same.  Hemmed in 
at home and weakened internationally, Talat has been forced 
into a defensive, nationalist crouch worthy of Rauf Denktash. 
 The resurgence of military domination of the north, and the 
resulting recrudescence of Denktash-style politics, bodes ill 
for the Gambari process, for prospects for serious 
negotiations to remove the Cyprus problem from the regional 
agenda, and for managing the next Turkey-EU accession crisis. 
 END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER