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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2022 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM CY
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SOON TO ANNOUNCE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  European Parliamentarian and former Foreign 
Minister Ioannis Kasoulides will stand in Cyprus's 2008 
presidential elections, with a formal announcement likely in 
March.  Behind the decision to run was his conviction that a 
new generation of leaders should take command in Cyprus, 
Kasoulides told the Ambassador February 12.  Cognizant that 
his DISY party remained laden with baggage from its support 
of the 2004 Annan Plan referendum, Kasoulides would run as an 
independent, albeit one with ties to the right-wing group. 
Buoying his electoral chances were the growing percentages of 
AKEL and EDEK voters unsatisfied with President Tassos 
Papadopoulos's hard-line Cyprus Problem tactics; Kasoulides 
saw them as ripe for picking.  DISY-conducted polling showed 
his current electoral support at 40 percent, six points below 
that necessary to win.  Papadopoulos remained a formidable 
candidate, Kasoulides admitted, aided greatly by his control 
of the media.  The President had other tools at his disposal 
to sway the electorate at key campaign junctures as well, 
from manufacturing movement on the CyProb to publicizing the 
onset of oil exploration.  The campaign would be long and 
hard, Kasoulides predicted, and Papadopoulos looked tough to 
defeat. 
 
¶2.  (C) Under the President's stewardship, chances for a 
Cyprus settlement had diminished, Kasoulides argued. 
"Papadopoulos is a wonderful goalkeeper," he expounded, 
referring to the leader's lawyerly, go-slow bent, "but 
keepers don't win games." To show contrast, Kasoulides 
revisited his "two-phased" approach to re-unifying the 
island, which has generated substantial media play recently. 
Were he to win office, he would pitch to both sides an 
arrangement wherein a unified Cyprus would feature a 
continued role for guarantor powers, a presence of foreign 
troops, veto powers for the communities, and controls over 
movement and resettlement, but for a fixed period of time. 
Afterward, Cyprus could "join the community of fully 
independent nations," Kasoulides asserted.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------ 
Throwing the Hat into the Ring 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Even before the ubiquitous Cypriot coffee had reached 
the table at their February 12 get-together, Euro MP and 
former Foreign Minister (1998-2003) Ioannis Kasoulides was 
telling the Ambassador of plans to contest the 2008 race. 
"I'm not subtle," he chuckled.  "I'm running."  Despite 
considering the campaign a personal gamble -- he was 
comfortable in Brussels, and had he wanted a change of venue 
or responsibilities, he could have challenged and defeated 
Nikos Anastassiades for the DISY presidency -- Kasoulides 
asserted that Cyprus needed new blood.  "Presidents 
Papadopoulos, Clerides, and Kyprianou all were followers of 
Makarios and think the same way," he charged.  The nation 
required a generational change of leadership, and Kasoulides 
believed he fit the bill. 
 
¶4.  (C) DISY continued to suffer political repercussions from 
its support of the 2004 Annan Plan.  Leader Anastassiades had 
"no credibility in Cyprus," Kasoulides argued, "much like 
Papadopoulos is ignored off of the island."  With this in 
mind, he would run as an independent.  He had no illusion or 
intention of fooling anyone and would not attempt to hide his 
past connection to the party.  Anastassiades could help 
Kasoulides's chances, however, by toning his 
anti-Papadopoulos rhetoric, which seemed counter-productive 
at this point.  (Note:  Under Cypriot electoral rules, 
Kasoulides must resign from DISY before standing as an 
independent candidate) 
 
¶5.  (C) Rather than seeking to break the coalition that 
brought Papadopoulos to power, Kasoulides would attempt to 
peel off dissatisfied voters from each component party.  AKEL 
had problems within the ranks, he was convinced, with perhaps 
one-third of its members unhappy with the President's 
management of the Cyprus Problem.  Kasoulides had begun 
contacts with the disaffected.  AKEL bosses Dimitris 
Christofias and Nicolas Katsourides would not stand idly, 
however.  Kasoulides believed the Communist leaders would 
stress to the rank-and-file that linking with Papadopoulos, 
while ideologically hard to swallow, was AKEL's only path to 
power.  As such, the party would not field its own candidate 
in 2008. 
 
¶6.  (C) Socialist EDEK also seemed split, Kasoulides 
believed, into pro- and anti-coalition ranks.  Again, perhaps 
one-third of its voters opposed the government's policies. 
Despite a clear inability to advance to the second round, 
EDEK would field a candidate in 2008, as it had in all prior 
elections.  Rather than leader Yiannakis Omirou, whose 
personal popularity trailed the party's, EDEK might run 
octogenarian party founder Vassos Lyssarides, whose numbers 
were higher.  Regardless of candidate, EDEK would shop its 
support in the second round to the highest bidder. 
Kasoulides made no secret of the fact that he was counting on 
Lyssarides's support. 
 
¶7.  (C) He also believed he could obtain backing from smaller 
parties like EUROKO.  All told, internal polling was showing 
support for his presidential candidacy at 40 percent.  Taking 
into account the historical abstention rate on the island, 
Kasoulides considered 46 percent the winning number.  Gaining 
those six points looked difficult, however. 
 
------------------------ 
Incumbent Not Lying Down 
------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) The President remained popular in Cyprus, the 
opposition candidate believed, despite the lack of movement 
toward a settlement.  Papadopoulos's hard-line message played 
well to an electorate growing ever more passive about de 
facto partition, and his control over media ensured that RoC 
policies won favorable coverage.  That said, to win 
re-election, Kasoulides thought Papadopoulos would need to 
feign progress on solving the CyProb.  "The President will 
tout some breakthrough in the July 8 Gambari Process 
negotiations," he ventured, "timed for maximum political 
effect."  Another weapon at the President's disposal was the 
bidding process to explore for offshore Cypriot oil -- 
Kasoulides expected the government to announce a winner in 
the run-up to the elections, benefiting the incumbent 
candidate. 
 
¶9. (C) Aware that not all voters were happy with the status 
quo vis-a-vis the CyProb, Papadopoulos had prepared two 
divergent messages.  To the "no" voters he would play the 
nationalist card, bashing Turkish intransigence and 
pooh-poohing the authority of Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet 
Ali Talat to negotiate in good faith.  For pro-solution 
types, however, such as the disaffected EDEK and AKEL cadres, 
he would offer (tepid) support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal 
federal solution and determination to move the July 8 process 
forward. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Solving the Cyprus Problem in Two Phases 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Unlike "goalkeeper" Papadopoulos, who could only 
"not lose" the big game, Kasoulides hoped to score the 
winning goal.  In his own approach to resolving the Cyprus 
Problem, he, too, sought to satisfy two camps.  Populating 
the first were Cypriots who, troubled by the specter of 
imminent partition, believed the RoC should ink an immediate 
deal that gave numerous concessions to the Turkish Cypriot 
community.  On the opposite side were island residents who 
had grown comfortable -- and wealthy -- with the status quo 
and thus saw no urgency in reaching a settlement.  Turkish 
Cypriots likely fell into one or the other category as well, 
he thought.  Youth from both sides tended to favor the 
latter, having had little inter-communal exposure. 
 
¶11.  (C) A two-phased solution was in order, Kasoulides 
argued.  In Phase One, the new Cyprus government would grant 
numerous protections to the Turkish Cypriot community, such 
as a continued role for guarantor power Turkey, the 
imperative of dual (Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot) 
majorities for certain legislation, and limits over refugee 
returns.  Such concessions were necessary to win T/C buy-in 
to the new state of affairs, but they could not be permanent, 
else deadlock and conflict would occur (as it did under the 
1960 Constitution). 
 
¶12.  (C) Phase Two would see great changes on Cyprus. 
Foreign troops would depart the island, for one.  Veto rights 
by community would disappear, and all displaced persons could 
return to their homes.  Cyprus would become a fully 
independent nation, not a protectorate.  Kasoulides gave no 
timelines for the transition, implying it was open for 
negotiations.  Early versions of the Annan Plan contained 
similar provisions, he claimed, but did not survive the later 
rounds of talks.  He sought the Ambassador's impressions on 
his initiative. 
 
¶13.  (C) A sound Greek Cypriot negotiating strategy must be 
flexible and not maximalist, the Ambassador responded.  The 
government should cooperate on confidence building measures 
like the Ledra Street checkpoint, which could build momentum 
and help along the July 8 process.  Finally, the RoC must 
avoid the temptation of thrashing Talat at every opportunity. 
 The Turkish Cypriot leader had taken a risky step in 
challenging the Turkish generals on Ledra, for example, and 
what was his reward?  Derision from the other side that 
weakened him further and has him playing to his own 
nationalist elements. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT: 
-------- 
 
¶14.  (C) For months if not years, Kasoulides's candidacy has 
been an open secret in Nicosia, although scuttlebutt said he 
would announce in summer, more the Cypriot norm.  With 
Papadopoulos playing "will he or won't he" regarding 
re-election and with AKEL announcing it won't show its cards 
until June, perhaps the DISY candidate saw an opportunity to 
become the man of the hour -- not a bad strategy, really. 
But can he win?  While the most popular politician from the 
opposition, respected even by his political foes, those 
distinctions mean little when the three-party governing 
coalition controls over sixty percent of registered voters. 
From our small sample of contacts, we agree a minority of 
AKEL voters are unsatisfied with the President, but that 
party is legendary at enforcing voter discipline come 
Election Day, and Christofias seems satisfied with the 
current power-sharing arrangement.  Nor is Kasoulides likely 
to win many votes on the CyProb, since, despite a clear lack 
of progress, polled citizens continue to appraise positively 
Papadopoulos's hard-line handling of the national issue. 
Taken together, the challenger's chances for 2008 seem slim. 
SCHLICHER