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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR DAS MATTHEW BRYZA, EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2012 
TAGS: PREL PARM UNIFIL CY LE TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS SKITTISH OVER POSSIBLE TURKISH ROLE IN 
UNIFIL 
 
REF: NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAIL OF 2/9/07 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and Action Request:   The MFA summoned DCM 
February 12 to voice "serious concerns" over reports from UN 
DPKO that Turkey sought to take over Germany's leadership of 
UNIFIL naval operations.  Post appreciates Department 
information on Turkey's possible role in UNIFIL naval 
operations and guidance on responding to the ROC's concerns. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) MFA Political Director (and former Ambassador to the 
United States) Euripides Evriviades summoned DCM February 12 
concerning information from the UN's Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) that Germany may relinquish 
command of UN Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) naval operations and 
that Turkey -- with a list of caveats -- had reportedly 
volunteered to take over Germany's role.  Though not a formal 
demarche, Evriviades was "under instructions from the Foreign 
Minister to approach P5 missions" about the "unacceptability" 
of Turkey taking over command from Germany.  Evriviades 
stated that the ROC PermRep in New York would also contact 
USUN (if he had not already) to pass the same message. 
 
¶3. (C) The UNIFIL naval component included Germany, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, Evriviades noted, 
and Cyprus had Status of Forces agreements with each. 
Bilateral cooperation with Germany had been excellent 
throughout the Lebanon operation.  Evriviades listed several 
problems with a Turkey-led UNIFIL naval component, many 
related to the Cyprus issue but some due to Turkey's 
operational caveats.  Supporting ground operations in south 
Lebanon from distant (six hours away) Adana was one. 
Similarly, should another non-combatant evacuation become 
necessary, Adana's distance from the Lebanese coast was 
problematic.  On the other hand, Cyprus's location "was 
crucial for an effective UNSCR 1701," allowing UNIFIL naval 
assets to intercept and later inspect ships suspected of 
arming Hizbollah. 
 
¶4. (C) Evriviades claimed that Turkey, in its offer to UN 
DPKO, continued to flagrantly disregard international law -- 
that is, UNSCRs on the Cyprus Problem -- and supposedly 
stated to UN DPKO that it would "use any place convenient" to 
conduct its UNIFIL operations, including Famagusta port and 
Ercan airport in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots. 
Using ports in the north would violate International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) regulations, he warned.  Turkey would also 
ignore Flight Information Region (FIR) rules in violation of 
Cypriot air control responsibilities, Evriviades charged, and 
possibly use "illegal" Ercan Airport in violation of 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations. 
 Last, in its offer to UN DPKO, Turkey apparently excluded 
use of Greek Cypriot-contolled ports and airports and 
reiterated its non-recognition of ROC-flagged vessels or even 
ships related to Cypriot interests, irrespective of their 
potential use in UNIFIL support ops. 
 
¶5. (C) Evriviades expressed hope that Germany would continue 
in its current UNIFIL role.  He had made this pitch to German 
Ambassador Rolf Kaiser, who committed to obtaining Berlin's 
guidance but had not yet responded with his government's 
answer.  (NOTE: In a February 13 call to German DCM Joachim 
Haidorn, the Embassy learned that the German government 
viewed with great concern Turkey's efforts to win the UNIFIL 
naval command.  The German Parliament had approved a one-year 
Lebanon mission, Haidorn revealed, and likely would extend it 
 
NICOSIA 00000127  002 OF 002 
 
 
another six months or more.  Further, his government in 
October 2006 had leased facilities in Limassol for twelve 
months, with the German command expected to last until July 
¶2007.  Turkey's eventual assumption of UNIFIL's naval command 
-- with its accompanying caveats regarding Cyprus's 
participation -- thus threatened Germany's investment and 
participation in the high-profile operation.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶6. (C) DCM replied that this was the first we had heard of 
this issue.  She noted that she therefore did not have 
guidance or instructions but that the U.S. was well aware of 
the critical role and excellent support that Cyprus had given 
to UNIFIL and its naval operations.  She agreed to follow up 
and seek further information and guidance on this potential 
issue. 
SCHLICHER