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FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
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INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0503
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NIAMEY 000123 
 
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SIPDIS 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR EAID SOCI KDEM NG
SUBJECT: ISLAM IN NIGER (3): FAITH FOLLOWS THE DOLLAR IN 
AGADEZ 
 
REF: A. NIAMEY 76 
 
     ¶B. 06 NIAMEY 1193 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER ZACH HARKENRIDER FOR REASON 1.4 (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) NOTE: This is the third in a series of cables (reftels 
A&B) reporting on the changing nature of Islam in Niger. END 
NOTE During recent travel to Agadez, Poloff and AIDoff tried 
to square an interesting circle. Traditional authorities - 
the Sultan and Grand Mosque Imam - claimed that the Nigerian 
inspired Islamic fundamentalist movement Ihiyaus Sunnah wa 
Ikhmatul Bidi'ah (Izala for short) had been all but excluded 
from the city by their tenacious stewardship of Sufi 
tradition. This seemed born out in the street, where no 
veils, beards, or other visible Izalist markings were 
evident. Yet, upon closer inspection, emboffs encountered 
other perspectives, and discovered several well financed and 
conspicuous fundamentalist mosques. The search for an 
explanation illuminated the role of traditional authorities, 
"religious entrepreneurs," and foreign money in the 
low-intensity conflict between African syncretistic Islam and 
global Islamic fundamentalism running in the world's least 
developed country. 
 
------------------------------------ 
THE SULTANATE OF AGADEZ: BUTTRESS OF 
SUFI TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWER 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Elhadj Ibrahim Oumarou dit Sofo, the 126th Sultan of 
the Air (pro. aye-air), has reigned in Agadez since January 
of 1961. His dynasty traces its roots back to 1405. By virtue 
of this lineage, the Sultanate of Agadez remains a symbol of 
the north's independence and distinctiveness and a source of 
pride for a region that often feels cut off from the 
resources and culture of a demographically and politically 
dominant south. Like the lesser traditional village and 
nomadic "groupement" chiefs who owe him allegiance, the 
Sultan of the Air is both a temporal and spiritual leader for 
the people of northern Niger. The duality of his role is 
expressed in the mud-brick architecture of Agadez's old 
quarter, where the Sultan's Palace adjoins the city's 
landmark 16th century Grand Mosque, with its hundred-foot 
tall baked-mud minaret. The Sultan stressed his dual function 
during a December 11 meeting with emboffs, in which we were 
joined by the Imam of the Grand Mosque, the Grand Khadi Malam 
Sidi. The two men stressed the importance of tradition and 
downplayed Izalist influence in Agadez. 
 
¶3. (U) The Sultan and the Grand Khadi are the paramount 
religious and moral leaders of the Agadez Region. Like 
traditional chiefs and Grand Mosque Imams throughout Niger, 
they are recognized by the government and people as 
authorities in civil disputes, family law, and in matters of 
faith. They conceive of their role as the preservation of the 
Islamic traditions brought to the region by Sufi saints 700 
years ago, and they defend those traditions through a veto 
authority over mosque construction and sermon content (reftel 
A). Their traditions are based on Sunni Islam and the Maliki 
school of jurisprudence practiced in Egypt. Both the 
Quadiriyya and Tidjaniya Sufi brotherhoods played a role in 
defining Agadez's brand of Islam in the 19th century. Indeed, 
Quadiriyya's great popularizer, the Fulani cleric and Sokoto 
Caliphate founder Ousmane Dan Fodio, studied in Agadez prior 
to launching his (1804-1808) "jihad" to purify the faith. 
 
¶4. (C) However open Agadez's Islamic establishment may have 
been to Sufi innovation in the 19th and early 20th centuries, 
the door seems to have swung closed long ago. There is little 
space in the Sultan or Khadi's worldview for a tradition as 
profoundly different and culturally disruptive as Izala. Both 
men minimized the role of Izala in Agadez, while stressing 
the disruptive aspect of its teachings on local culture. 
Bianou, Agadez's traditional 23 day carnival, is a clear 
throw-back to the animist past. The Sultan and Grand Khadi 
noted that Izalists would ban all such festivals, effectively 
"de-Africanizing" Agadez's very African style of Islam. 
 
¶5. (C) Our interlocutors drew our attention to Izala's 
resource base, while denying its influence on them. They 
speculated that the movement received funds from abroad and 
 
NIAMEY 00000123  002 OF 003 
 
 
noted that they had been approached by Izalist activists who 
wished to build mosques. Noting that "one does not speak of 
money with traditional rulers, because no matter how much you 
have, they have infinitely more," the Sultan and Khadi 
claimed that they had sent such emissaries packing. At the 
same time, they insisted that their traditional right to 
approve or disapprove of mosque construction and 
proselytizing remained effective. They cited various 
instances in which they had forced Izalists underground, and 
stressed that Agadezians had little use for the sect. They 
cited one 2005 instance in which a mob of young people burned 
down a straw Izala mosque. 
 
¶6. (C) A subsequent meeting with another mainstream Sufi 
cleric, Malam Barmou of the Nigerien Association for Call and 
Islamic Solidarity (ANASI) suggested a slightly stronger and 
more public Izalist movement, though one limited by 
demography. For the last 30 years, Malam Barmou has run a 
sort of Islamic teachers' college out of his home in the 
city's old quarter. Offering advanced education in the Koran 
and Hadith to between 100 and 200 other Islamic teachers, the 
school is open to both men and women. Barmou also preaches on 
the religiously oriented private radio network R M. Barmou is 
a spiritual advisor to the Sultan and characterized their 
relationship as mutually respectful. Like the Sultan and 
Grand Khadi, he plays a role in policing sermon content. He 
noted that he screens guest preachers for conformity with 
ANASI's principles - namely, unity of religions and 
understanding between them, and the inculcation of Islamic 
faith through the demonstration of its virtues. 
 
¶7. (C) Such moderation clashes with Izala's more 
confrontational approach. Barmou noted that Izalists had 
created "a militia of 150,000 people in Nigeria," and 
expressed his concern that some Nigeriens may have gone there 
to train too. He stressed the Hausa connection to Northern 
Nigeria's "Izala zone," noting that most of Agadez's Izalists 
were Hausas from Tessaoua (a town north of Katsina, Nigeria, 
and just west of the Nigerien city of Zinder). Few Tuaregs or 
"real Agadezians" were involved with Izala. While he conceded 
that Izalists were building a big mosque with Saudi or 
Kuwaiti money, Barmou argued that few of those who pray in 
Izala mosques are true believers. Citing plausibly prosaic 
considerations, Barmou noted that people pray in Izala 
mosques because of their location in residential 
neighborhoods, especially during the hot months when it is 
hard for people to go all the way to the Grand Mosque. 
 
--------------------- 
A SECULAR PERSPECTIVE 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) On December 12, emboffs met with local broadcast 
journalist and political activist Serge Hilpron. Half French, 
half Tuareg, western-educated and militantly secular, Hilpron 
started his private radio station, Radio Nomade, in the early 
1990s, taking advantage of the new press freedoms available 
under Niger's democratizing government. A pro-democracy 
activist, Hilpron remains a critic of corruption in public 
life and the current Nigerien government. The Sultan's thesis 
on Izala in Agadez found its antithesis in Hilpron's 
argument, which suggested that better than half of Agadez's 
Muslims were Izalists. "As with termites," Hilpron argued, 
"though the penetration may be great, little is evident on 
the exterior until the building collapses." 
 
¶9. (C) COMMENT: The choice of analogy said something about 
the way this modern, liberal, foreign-educated activist views 
the Izala. Passionately committed as he is to the 
modernization of his country and the maintenance of its 
secular democratic order, Hilpron likely exaggerates the 
extent of Izalist influence in his hometown. No one else in 
Agadez claimed that Izala enjoyed anything like the popular 
support that he suggested. Indeed, over the course of our 
visit, most interlocutors were to argue that Izalists 
comprise five-percent, maximum, of the city's population. 
However, while Serge Hilpron, a long-standing Embassy 
contact, might be guilty of alarmism he is not guilty of 
fabrication. Even while controlling for the secular 
intellectual's tendency to exaggerate reactionary influence, 
emboffs felt that his concerns suggested that the 
"penetration" might be much more extensive than the Sultan or 
Grand Khadi cared to admit. END COMMENT. 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
NIAMEY 00000123  003 OF 003 
 
 
RELIGIOUS FRAUD AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: 
IZALA THE AGADEZ WAY? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Seeking to reconcile the views of Hilpron and the 
clerics, emboffs asked other Agadez contacts about the space 
open to Izalists and the popularity of the movement. One 
answer was particularly revealing. A Tuareg ex-rebel leader 
turned UNDP staffer noted that a cousin of his was the Imam 
of a large new Izala mosque. NOTE: Izalists have five mosques 
in Agadez out of a reported total of 100 END NOTE. The Imam, 
"Hamaya," had traveled to Saudi Arabia, but had come back 
inspired more by money than theology. His cousin jokingly 
noted that Hamaya "likes money," and was probably impressed 
by Izala's association with the wealth of Saudi Arabia and 
northern Nigeria. Speaking seriously, our interlocutor then 
noted that Hamaya had used 100 million CFA ($198,000) in 
Saudi funds to build the new Izala mosque in Agadez - while 
pocketing 20% of the money for himself. 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT: While Agadez has a history as an Islamic 
center, it has an even longer and more distinguished history 
as a caravan town and smuggling center. Clean business ethics 
are not an Agadezian tradition, and, when foreign money is on 
offer, Agadezians see opportunity. The notion that Izalist 
construction is fueled by foreign money and local greed 
rather than religious belief has considerable currency on the 
Agadez "street." Coupled with the fact that one sees few 
signs of Izala on those streets - none of the beards or 
clothing so noticeable in the cities of the south - it 
appears that foreign NGOs and preachers seeking to advance 
Wahabist interpretations of the faith may be getting taken 
for a ride by some shrewd local operators. Few Islamic NGOs 
in Niger have any monitoring and evaluation controls to speak 
of, and for every true believer, there are likely to be any 
number of "religious entrepreneurs." 
 
¶12. (C) The Tuareg leader's anecdote was telling. No 
discussion of Izala got far without coming around to the 
issue of money. No one in Agadez argued that Izalists had a 
convincing or attractive theology to offer. All conceded that 
their resources and their image of wealth and connection to 
foreign sources of wealth made them attractive. Locals, we 
were told, went to Izalist mosques simply because they looked 
nice and new, or were convenient to their homes. Meanwhile, 
Izala's foreign finances seemed to be attracting "religious 
entrepreneurs" like Hamaya who embraced the movement for 
personal gain rather than spiritual renewal. Traditional 
rulers and Sufi Imams do limit the scope of Izalist activity 
in Agadez, even though they can no longer exclude it 
completely. But they may even accommodate it to satisfy the 
demands of those who stand to profit from Arab largesse. In a 
commercial town in a poor country, faith - or at least 
professions of it - follows the dollar. END COMMENT 
ALLEN