VZCZCXRO4787
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0099/01 0321204
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011204Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4885
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL PREF CD SU SCRS
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH NRF REBEL LEADERS 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 70 B. KHARTOUM 80 C. KHARTOUM 93 
 
Classified By: S/CRS Charles Wintermeyer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has 
not yet been able to convince other members of the National 
Redemption Front (NRF) to issue a statement renouncing any 
intentions of seeking to overthrow the regime in Khartoum, 
JEM's political representatives told the Ambassador January 
¶30.  Meeting with us for the first time since Special Envoy 
(SE) Natsios met with rebel leaders in Abeche on January 19 
(Ref A), Tadjadine Bechin Niam and Ahmed Tugoud Lissan also 
expressed concern that a conference of military commanders of 
the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) could hinder efforts 
to agree on a united political front.  They continue to 
maintain that the Darfur Peace Agreement cannot serve as a 
basis for future negotiations on power-sharing and security 
arrangements.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The JEM representatives met with the Ambassador and 
Emboffs January 30 in N'Djamena.  Niam, NRF Secretary for 
Reconstruction and Development, and also its representative 
to the AU, was instrumental in organizing the 19 January 
meeting between SE Natsios and the Sudanese rebels held in 
Abeche, Chad.  Togoud is Secretary for External Affairs and 
chief negotiator.  They were accompanied by Mohammed Shariff, 
head of their Cairo office.  They noted they were meeting 
with the Ambassador as political representatives, not in 
their other capacity as field commanders. 
 
¶3. (U) The team reiterated their appreciation for the meeting 
with SE Natsios.  They were pleased that SE Natsios was 
willing to come to their area, to Abeche in eastern Chad, and 
that he devoted so much time to the meeting.  They said they 
understood SE Natsios' key points and his new ideas and were 
studying them. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
No Formal Renunciation of Regime Change Yet 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Responding to SE Nasios appeal to the NRF in Abeche 
January 19 to rnounce regime change as a political goal, the 
NRFrepresentatives said the JEM members of the NRF ha 
agreed among themselves that evening to issue sch a public 
statement.  When they raised the ide with their other NRF 
counterparts the next mornng, they pointed out that their 
SLM "friends" woud object.  According to Niam and Togoud, 
some SLM members feared that such a statement would put the 
Sudanese government in a better position.  For its part, JEM 
sees no problems with such a statement because they do not 
seek regime change as long as they can obtain their goals 
peacefully.  The JEM representatives left open the 
possibility of an announcement by JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim 
in an interview or press article that JEM does not seek 
regime change.  Niam said other NRF members are not aware 
that JEM is considering this option.  JEM wants to "drive 
slowly" so that other NRF members do not feel pressured and 
will instead be more willing to reach a consensus. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Concerns about a Commanders' Conference 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Pressed for their views on the various proposals to 
hold commanders' conferences, the JEM representatives 
expressed concern that an SLM gathering would fragment the 
SLM even more.  They feared it could have the unfortunate 
result of isolating the military commanders from their 
political leadership.  Such key military leaders as Abdala 
Barda and Adam Bakhit were not intending to participate.  In 
their view, the NRF should provide the framework for any 
conference in the interest of ensuring cohesiveness and 
unity. 
 
------------------- 
Disdain for the DPA 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) In response to the Ambassador's points about the DPA 
as the basis for future negotiations, Niam and Togoud claimed 
the DPA had been overwhelmingly rejected by the people of 
Darfur and it was a "dead agreement."  They agreed  that the 
DPA's provisions on wealth-sharing are broadly acceptable and 
acknowledged that some NRF members believe the negotiations 
could start from the DPA's Declaration of Principles.  Niam 
and Togoud nevertheless saw no point in trying to work from 
the DPA on the issues of power-sharing and security 
arrangements.  Accommodating their concerns in these areas, 
they believed, would mean a new agreement.  The Ambassador 
 
NDJAMENA 00000099  002 OF 002 
 
 
pointed out some of the DPA terms were consistent with NRF 
stated goals, and advised them not to get hung up on 
semantics.  They responded that they were willing to 
compromise, but that the DPA, except for the Declaration of 
Principles, was not acceptable. 
 
-------------------- 
Darfur and the South 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  The JEM representatives observed that they had 
learned a lesson from the Abuja negotiation process, and that 
they should have had a more unified position with the South. 
They said that they had had discussions with southern leaders 
in 2005 about forging a common negotiating position.  They 
claimed that Darfur indirectly saved the CPA between the 
North and the South by diverting so much of the GoS's 
resources and attention.  On the other hand, they understood 
concerns by southern leaders that the DPA could undermine the 
stronger role the CPA had enabled southern Sudan to achieve 
in Khartoum.  Still, the JEM representatives argued, Darfur 
and the South would be in a stronger position if they could 
come together politically.  With Darfur representing 20 
percent of Sudan's population and the South 18 percent, the 
government in Khartoum fears that the two regions together 
could win national elections. 
 
----------------------- 
Time Is Not On Our Side 
----------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  The JEM representatives agreed with SE Natsios' 
point that time was not on the rebel's side because of 
Khartoum's growing economic strength, but added other reasons 
why this is of concern to them.  They expect that the South 
will vote for independence in 2011, and that afterwards 
Darfur would again be marginalized by Khartoum for another 
fifty years.  They believed that even if there is a new 
Darfur peace agreement in the next few months, the Sudanese 
government would delay signing it until the end of the year. 
Then, elections would be called without sufficient time for 
them to be properly managed, and the GOS would win them. 
 
------------- 
AU Presidency 
------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  The members had mixed feelings about Sudan President 
Bashir not becoming the next President of the African Union 
(AU).  While they despise him personally, they felt it was a 
national humiliation for Sudan.  They understood Bashir had 
wanted to withdraw Sudan from the AU if he was rejected for 
its presidency, but changed his mind when reminded that this 
would lead to the AU pulling out of Darfur and being replaced 
by UN troops. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) While the NRF genuinely appreciated SE Natsios' 
meeting with them and the other rebel groups, their positions 
have not materially changed.  Notwithstanding Minni Minawi's 
assertion that the NRF is now defunct (Refs B and C), these 
two are proceeding with efforts to consolidate the NRF as an 
umbrella group for future negotiations. 
WALL