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FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6470
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000184 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR BA BILAT OFFICIALS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH VISITS OF BAHRAINI CROWN 
PRINCE SHAIKH SALMAN AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHAIKH KHALID 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1.  (C) Crown Prince Shaikh Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa and 
Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa will both 
visit Washington in early March.  Shaikh Khalid will arrive 
first for meetings beginning on March 1 and he plans to 
remain in the Washington area for more than a week until the 
end of the Crown Prince's visit.  Shaikh Salman will be in 
Washington March 7-10 after first going to Chicago with a 
trade delegation organized by the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Bahrain.  The Crown Prince last visited 
Washington in March 2006, and he participated in events on 
the margins of the UN General Assembly opening in September 
2006 in New York.  Shaikh Khalid also attended the opening of 
the UNGA in 2006 and is a participant in GCC 2 meetings. 
 
¶2.  (C) Shaikh Salman and Shaikh Khalid will both be looking 
to strengthen the bilateral relationship during a period of 
escalating regional tensions.  Bahrain has clearly and 
publicly aligned itself with the United States in the 
international community's face-off with Iran, and the 
Bahrainis will want confirmation that we recognize the steps 
it has taken and reassurance that we will support Bahrain and 
consult closely as the situation develops further.  Bahrain 
generally supports our Iraq policy and recently hosted Abdul 
Aziz Al Hakim in Manama while he was on a regional tour and 
we understand former Prime Minister Al Allawi hopes to visit 
in mid-March.  The Bahrainis have engaged cautiously with the 
Iraqi government and are worried that sectarian violence 
could lead to heightened tensions inside Bahrain.  The CP 
will lead the Bahraini delegation in a meeting of the Gulf 
Security Dialogue (GSD) on March 8.  The Bahraini government 
expects the GSD process to lead to a further strengthening in 
mil-mil cooperation, including financial and material support. 
 
---------- 
Objectives 
---------- 
 
¶3.  (C) What we want from the visits: 
 
-- Close coordination on Iran policy and development of 
strategies that go beyond sanctions contained in UNSCR 1737. 
 
-- Public expression of support for the goals of U.S. policy 
in Iraq and a commitment for pro-active Bahraini engagement 
with Iraq's leadership. 
 
-- Continued cooperation on regional maritime operations, 
including in Coalition Task Forces in and around the Gulf. 
 
-- Enhanced commitment to political reform, including through 
serious engagement with the newly elected lower house of 
parliament Council of Representatives. 
 
----------------------------- 
Issues of Interest to Bahrain 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Shaikh Salman and Shaikh Khalid will want to hear 
from us on: 
 
-- Reaffirmation of the Navy's long-term commitment to 
Bahrain and U.S. interest in protecting Bahrain. 
 
-- Recognition of Bahrain's public and private steps to align 
with and support the United States, including participating 
in the Proliferation Security Initiative, joining the 
Coalition Task Forces (CTF), and deploying a special forces 
contingent to Afghanistan. 
 
-- Strategies to harden Bahrain's defenses and contain Iran 
while avoiding a military confrontation. 
 
-- Briefing on the way ahead in Iraq, with emphasis on the 
Iraqi government's responsibilities and ways the GCC can 
engage and assist. 
 
-- Next steps in U.S./Quartet consultations with Israel and 
the Palestinians and methods to address the plight of 
Palestinian civilians. 
 
------------------- 
Key Issues to Raise 
------------------- 
 
MANAMA 00000184  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) We suggest Washington interlocutors consider raising 
the following points: 
 
-- Recognize the long history of mil-mil cooperation with 
Bahrain, most notably through hosting NAVCENT. Reaffirm the 
commitment of the U.S. Navy to Bahrain. 
 
-- Praise Bahrain's support for OEF, OIF, and U.S. policy on 
Iran and Iraq, and for enhancing its strategic commitment to 
the United States. 
 
-- Pledge continued close engagement with Bahrain on regional 
challenges through the GCC 2 and GSD initiatives, and discuss 
the way forward. 
 
-- Emphasize the importance of continued political reform and 
participation.  Propose USG support for Bahrain's 
democratization process, including by reactivating 
programming by the MEPI-funded National Democratic Institute 
(NDI). 
 
-- Hail the implementation of the U.S.-Bahrain free trade 
agreement and almost 50 percent growth in bilateral trade in 
2006, and welcome the Crown Prince's personal support for 
expanded commercial relations through his participation in 
the AmCham trade mission to Chicago. 
 
------------------------ 
Issues Background Briefs 
------------------------ 
 
----------------- 
Dealing With Iran 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The Bahraini leadership is greatly concerned about 
the threat posed by Iran and increased tensions between Iran 
and the international community.  Crown Prince Salman has 
suggested several times that the U.S. and GCC countries hold 
a significant military exercise in the Gulf, which would send 
a strong signal to Iran.  Bahrain hosted and participated in 
Proliferation Security Initiative exercise Leading Edge in 
October, and the boarding/interrogation portion took place 
just outside its territorial waters. NAVCENT personnel were 
impressed with the Bahraini Navy's professionalism and 
aggressiveness during the exercise.  Bahrain has been an 
enthusiastic partner in the Gulf Security Dialogue and GCC 2 
initiatives. 
 
¶7.  (C) Bahrain's relationship with Iran is complex.  The 
Bahraini leadership is united in its suspicion of Iranian 
intentions regarding Bahrain and often sees an Iranian hand 
in incidents involving Bahrain's Shia community, which 
comprises some two-thirds of the country's citizens.  They 
are convinced Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons and 
assert its influence around the region.  At the same time, 
Bahrain faces the reality that it must live with its large 
neighbor across the Gulf.  Bahrain maintains "correct" but 
not warm diplomatic relations with Iran, with Bahraini 
leaders meeting with Iranian officials when they visit. 
Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid visited Tehran February 24 and 
met with President Ahmadi-Nejad and Foreign Minister Mottaki. 
 (We do not yet have a readout of his visit.)  Bahraini 
officials repeatedly assert their strong view that the 
international community should engage in diplomacy to deal 
with Iran, and not resort to a military solution.  They 
recognize, however, that a robust military posture can 
facilitate diplomacy.  Bahrain supports UNSCR 1737 but may be 
wary of implementing additional sanctions that go beyond the 
language of the resolution. 
 
------------------ 
Next Steps on Iraq 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) The GOBpublicly supports U.S. operations in Iraq, 
but a King Hamad and Crown Prince Salman have told seveal 
recent U.S. delegations, it believes Iraqi forces should be 
moving to the front lines in place of coalition forces.  This 
would force Iraqis to take responsibility for their own 
security and put the GOI into the position of requesting 
assistance from its Arab neighbors, which the Bahrainis feel 
it has not yet done in a meaningful way.  Iraqi Shia leader 
Abdul Aziz Al Hakim visited Bahrain February 8 while on a 
regional tour and met with the King.  Former Prime Minister 
 
MANAMA 00000184  003 OF 004 
 
 
Iyad Al Allawi has asked to visit Bahrain in mid-March.  The 
GOB's greatest concern related to Iraq is that sectarian 
violence could spill over into Bahrain, which has a 
Shia-majority population ruled by a Sunni-controlled 
government.  GOB officials will support long-term measures to 
reduce sectarian violence while recognizing that the 
near-term situation in Iraq is extremely difficult. 
 
------------------- 
Israel-Palestinians 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Although physically distant from the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict, the Bahraini government and 
people remain highly concerned about the lack of forward 
progress on peacemaking and the plight of the Palestinian 
people.  The GOB believes that progress on Israel-Palestinian 
relations will improve regional receptivity for U.S. 
policies.  During Bahrain's term as (rotating) president of 
the Arab League (AL) in the latter half of 2006, Bahrain took 
an unprecedented foray into peace process diplomacy.  Foreign 
Minister Shaikh Khalid was asked to present the AL's views on 
reviving Israel-Palestinian talks to the UN Security Council 
during the opening of the UN General Assembly in September 
¶2006.  Israeli Foreign Minister Livni attended that 
presentation and reportedly was pleased with Shaikh Khalid's 
handling of the issue.  Shaikh Khalid met with Livni on the 
margins of the UNGA at that time and successfully established 
a relationship with her.  After the Secretary's meeting with 
the GCC 2 on October 3 in Cairo, Shaikh Khalid made the first 
visit by a Bahraini official to Ramallah to see Palestinian 
President Abbas.  Shaikh Khalid briefed Livni by telephone 
after departing Ramallah. 
 
----------------- 
Democratic Reform 
----------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Bahrain in November/December 2006 conducted its 
second set of parliamentary and municipal elections since the 
adoption of the 2002 constitution.  Some 70 percent of 
registered voters and all registered political societies 
participated in the elections, with oppositionists winning 18 
of 40 seats in the elected lower house Council of 
Representatives (COR). Thirty-two of the 40 seats are held by 
Islamists (Sunni and Shia) and membership is marked by a 
stark Sunni-Shia divide. One woman, Lateefa Al Qaoud, ran 
unopposed and is Bahrain's first female elected member of 
parliament.  An NGO election monitoring committee released 
its findings earlier this month and, while the report does 
not clearly acknowledge that the elections were free and 
fair, it states that the committee did not uncover tangible 
evidence of the government rigging election outcomes. 
 
¶11.  (C) In the run-up to the elections, in May 2006, the 
government forced the MEPI-funded NDI project director out of 
the country.  Government officials complained privately that 
the director was too close to oppositionists.  With an 
overwhelming majority of COR members, and almost all members 
of municipal councils, being new to their positions, there is 
a great need for the type of technical assistance and 
expertise offered by NDI.  Conditions may be favorable for a 
renewed approach to the GOB for the resumption, even if 
limited, of NDI programming in Bahrain. 
 
-------------------- 
Guantanamo Detainees 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid has come under 
pressure from parliament "to do something" about the 
remaining two Bahraini detainees at Guantanamo.  He is likely 
to raise the issue in a call at the Pentagon. 
 
------------------ 
Military Relations 
------------------ 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The U.S. Navy has worked closely with Bahrain for 
more than 50 years. When the U.S. Fifth Fleet was 
re-commissioned in 1995, Bahrain took the then-controversial 
step of being the first Gulf state to provide host government 
support for regionally "home-ported" U.S. Navy forces, and 
Bahrain remains the only country in the region which hosts a 
permanent component command headquarters.  NAVCENT directs 
naval operations in the Arabian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Gulf 
 
MANAMA 00000184  004 OF 004 
 
 
of Aden in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom, CJTF Horn of Africa, as well as Maritime 
Interception Operations to enable freedom of navigation and 
prevent oil smuggling, piracy and various other operations in 
support of the Global War on Terrorism. 
 
¶14.  (C) Bahrain's relatively stable and secure political 
environment allows deployed U.S. Navy ships to stop, 
replenish supplies, and provide crews much needed onshore 
rest and recreation opportunities.  Bahrain is currently one 
of the U.S. Navy's busiest overseas ports. In direct support 
of OEF and OIF, Bahrain in 2003 deployed 1,500 troops, a tank 
battalion task force, and its frigate the RNBS Sabha to 
defend Kuwait. Bahrain also flew combat air patrols over 
Kuwait and Bahrain and continues to keep F-16s on 24-7 strip 
alert.  A special operations unit embedded in a UAE 
contingent deployed to Afghanistan in 2005.  Bahrain assigned 
three shore-based naval officers to work in the command post 
for maritime task force CTF-150, which covers the Strait of 
Hormuz to the Sea of Aden.  For CTF-152, which covers central 
Gulf waters, Bahrain has provided one frigate and two 
corvettes to participate in coalition operations.  Bahrain is 
the only GCC country to participate in the CTFs. 
 
------------------- 
Military Assistance 
------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) Bahrain has the smallest economy in the GCC and is 
quickly depleting a very limited petroleum reserve.  We have 
had active FMF and IMET programs in Bahrain for several years 
but the FMF program in particular has declined precipitously 
in recent years, from $90 million in 2003 to a budgeted $15 
million for FY 2007.  We are working closely with the 
Bahrainis to upgrade their early warning and air defense 
radar systems, an initiative that has been promoted in the 
Gulf Security Dialogue.  Future programs include the sale of 
nine Blackhawk helicopters to the Bahraini Air Force ($200 
million) and six Bell helicopters to the Ministry of Interior 
(approximately $70 million).  A proposal to provide two MK-V 
Fast Patrol Boats to the Bahraini Navy through 
counter-terrorism (1206) funding is awaiting signature by the 
Secretaries of State and Defense.  Announcing final approval 
 
SIPDIS 
of this effort during the visit of the CP to the Pentagon 
would make a significant statement about the U.S.'s 
commitment to Bahrain and the role it plays in the War on 
Terror. 
 
 
********************************************* ******** 
Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ 
********************************************* ******** 
MONROE