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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR FOR DAS DAVID KRAMER AND COLIN FURST 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 
TAGS: OSCE PREL PBTS MD RS UP SP
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA: RUSSIANS WARN AGAINST PREMATURE 
RESUMPTION OF 5-PLUS-2 TALKS 
 
MADRID 00000167  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) January 25, 2007; 11:30 a.m.- 6:00 p.m.; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Madrid, Spain. 
 
¶2. (U) Participants: 
Observers 
United States - DAS David Kramer 
European Union - Amb. Adriaan Jacobovits, EU Special 
Representative 
 
Mediators 
Ukraine - Deputy FM Andriy Veselovsky 
Russian Federation - Amb. Valeriy Nesterushkin, Special Amb. 
for Transnistria 
OSCE - Amb. Louis O'Neill, Head of Mission to Moldova 
 
Chair in Office 
Spain - Jose Maria Pons Irazazabal, DG for Europe and North 
America 
Amb. Jose Angel Lopez Jorrin, Coordinating Ambassador for 
Spanish OSCE CIO 
Amb. Fernando de Galainena, Special Ambassador for OSCE 
"frozen conflicts" 
 
¶3. (C) SUMMARY:  In a January 25 meeting in Madrid, 
representatives of the 3-Plus-2 (Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE 
plus the U.S. and EU) on the Transnistria conflict agreed to 
invite the Moldovans and Transnistrians to a full-fledged 
5-Plus-2 meeting on February 15-16.  This would be the first 
5-Plus-2 meeting since the Transnistrians announced their 
boycott over the introduction of strict Ukrainian-Moldovan 
customs rules in March 2006.  Russian envoy Nesterushkin 
warned that the Smirnov regime would reject the invitation, 
thereby "destroying" the 5-Plus-2 process.  Transnistria, he 
claimed, had no intention of returning to negotiations until 
after resolution of the Kosovo final status question; the 
"Kosovo precedent" would allow the separatists to return to 
the table with "quite different intentions."  Nesterushkin 
offered a thinly-veiled threat that the EU and the U.S. might 
not be invited to participate in future Transnistria 
negotiations if the 5-Plus-2 process broke down.  As Spanish 
Chairman-in-Office, Director General Pons expressed Spain's 
commitment to the Transnistrian settlement but promised that 
Spain would not propose a new direction for the talks.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
KRAMER CITES TIRASPOL'S INTRANSIGENCE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) DAS Kramer expressed hope that the 5-Plus-2 could move 
forward in 2007 but noted that 2006 had not seen nearly 
enough progress.  He noted that, unlike Chisinau, Tiraspol 
did not want to meet and had no interest in talking to the 
Moldovans.  He therefore said that Moldova was right to 
approach the Russians directly.  O'Neill concurred, noting 
that he had recently met with Transnistrian "foreign 
minister" Litskai, who had told him that he would not meet 
with Moldovan Reintegration Minister Sova under any 
conditions. 
 
CIO OFFERS SPANISH EXPERTISE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) DG Pons expressed the Spanish view that the final 
outcome of negotiations should respect the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Moldova.  The ultimate fate of 
Transnistria, he added, rested with Moldova.  Pons objected 
to the term "frozen conflict," saying it implied that parties 
could live with the frozen state; it failed to make clear 
that such situations are unacceptable to the parties and 
carry with them a cost.  As evidence of Spain's credentials 
in territorial disputes, he offered Spanish expertise to the 
mediators on the success of decentralization and made 
reference to the recent agreement with the United Kingdom on 
confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) in 
Gibraltar.  Pons suggested that CSBMs may be necessary to 
resume the 5-Plus-2 talks and asked the mediators what Spain 
could do to help. 
 
UKRAINE OPTIMISTIC ON 2007 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Deputy FM Veselovsky expressed optimism that the 
Madrid talks, coming as they did in early 2007, meant that 
something positive might be accomplished by the end of 
Spain's OSCE presidency.  He said that clear beacons had been 
 
MADRID 00000167  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
set by both parties to the conflict, and there was general 
agreement on how best to proceed.  Ukraine hoped that the 
5-Plus-2 could resume quickly, and Veselovsky saw no 
obstacles to reconvening the negotiations in the near future, 
either with the unfinished previous agenda or an entirely new 
agenda.  He also noted that Russian President Putin had 
called for the resumption of talks during a visit to Kyiv. 
Veselovsky said that the mediators had already made good 
progress on some CSBMs such as the railway issue and 
Transnistrian export of some agricultural products.  He 
suggested that work on integrating the two banking systems as 
well as ending extortion at the administrative border between 
Moldova and Transnistria could be areas for mutual confidence 
building. 
 
DESTRUCTION OF THE 5-PLUS-2? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Nesterushkin said resumption of the talks might have 
been possible in 2006 if not for objections to Transnistria's 
proposed transit protocol.  However, now that Transnistria 
had resolved some of its economic problems and Kosovar 
independence was on the horizon, the separatist regime could 
live with the current situation.  Nesterushkin warned that 
although the observers were ready to resume negotiations, the 
parties to the conflict were not.  He stressed the need to 
keep Transnistria in the 5-Plus-2 and to make the two sides 
talk.  Jacobovits replied that if the three mediators were to 
agree to ask the parties to return to negotiations, it would 
be difficult for them to refuse.  Nesterushkin objected, 
saying that such a plan would be doomed to failure; Litskai 
did not have Smirnov's permission to return to negotiations 
and therefore an invitation would only prove the 
powerlessness of the 3-Plus-2 and jeopardize the 5-Plus-2 
process.  Kramer and Jacobovits pointed out that the 5-Plus-2 
had not accomplished anything in almost a year, and they 
therefore had nothing to lose.  Kramer added that informal 
inquiries had yielded no success and would continue to fail, 
so a formal invitation was the proper way to proceed. 
Nesterushkin became increasingly agitated and asked why the 
observers would want to destroy the 5-Plus-2.  He suggested 
that if the negotiations were to collapse completely, the 
U.S. and the EU would surely not get a seat at the table at 
any future negotiations.  The Transnistrian leadership, he 
concluded, did not see the need for the 5-Plus-2 and felt 
that Moldova and Transnistria could resolve their differences 
in Moscow. 
 
THE BASQUE MODEL? 
----------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Nesterushkin next pointed to Spain's ongoing internal 
debates and negotiations on balancing local nationalist 
desires with the need to preserve its territorial integrity. 
By contrast, he alleged that Chisinau preferred to negotiate 
with Moscow rather than negotiating with their "countrymen" 
in Tiraspol.  However, he cited the autumn restoration of 
rail service between Moscow and Tiraspol as an example of 
Russian and Ukrainian success in the region and criticized 
Moldova for "not trusting" the Transnistrians to secure 
Moldovan trains, which take a circuitous route from Chisinau 
to Moscow bypassing Transnistria. 
 
MOLDOVA'S COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Kramer noted that the Moldovans had offered a 
comprehensive plan that deserved to be discussed.  The plan 
was significant as it represented the first effort at 
settlement by a party to the conflict; as such, it would be 
an excellent tool to resume negotiations.  Should the 
3-Plus-2 agree to meet again, he proposed that such a meeting 
ought to include the Moldovans; they should not be punished 
through exclusion from future meetings by Transnistrian 
intransigence.    Veselovsky and Jacobovits agreed that the 
Moldovan paper was a serious proposal worthy of debate. 
Jacobovits added that if the mediators agreed that the plan 
was serious, then there was no reason not to take it to the 
5-Plus-2.  Jacobovits observed that several plans already 
existed and that additional plans were not needed.  He also 
cautioned against looking to a federal solution or to the 
autonomy plans of other nations such as Spain or Belgium for 
possible solutions, since Transnistria posed a unique 
problem.  Nesterushkin refused to give his views on the 
Moldovan paper, saying that he was not authorized to discuss 
it as he had understood it was a confidential document.  He 
did say it was "unrealistic," however, and claimed that the 
 
MADRID 00000167  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Moldovans had submitted several different versions to Moscow. 
 
 
KOSOVO'S IMPACT 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Nesterushkin predicted that Tiraspol would delay its 
participation in the 5-Plus-2 until after resolution of the 
Kosovo status question.  The "Kosovo precedent" would allow 
them to return to the negotiating table with "quite different 
intentions."  O'Neill responded that the same questions of 
Kosovo, rail service, and the transit protocol had all been 
on the horizon in 2006;   Nesterushkin's argument therefore 
seemed disingenuous.  He complained that the goalposts for 
resumption of the talks keep being pushed back.  Jacobovits 
noted that authorities in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh had previously renounced comparisons of 
their situations with Kosovo and expressed their wishes not 
to be associated with the Kosovo question.  For that and 
other reasons, Jacobovits reiterated that the EU did not 
accept the idea of Kosovo as a precedent for Transnistria; 
Kramer agreed with Jacobovits. 
 
VORONIN-SMIRNOV TALKS 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Veselovsky suggested that Moldova could make progress 
by sharing some of its 1.2 billion euros in EU donor funds 
with Transnistria.  In response, Nesterushkin said that such 
financial enticements constituted "seduction" of Transnistria 
by Europe.  He reiterated that Moldova needed to direct its 
negotiations toward Tiraspol and not Moscow.  To that end, he 
recommended that the Ukrainian government arrange a bilateral 
meeting between Transnistrian "president" Smirnov and 
Moldovan President Voronin; no other figures in either 
government had the authority to make the necessary decisions. 
 Veselovsky interjected that Ukraine had already made such a 
proposal to Smirnov, who responded that if he were to attend 
a meeting with a foreign president, it would be as "President 
of Transnistria" and would be a "meeting of Presidents." 
O'Neill offered that Litskai had told him he was tired of 
small steps and wanted to deal with the final resolution of 
the conflict.  O'Neill urged Russia to force Smirnov to send 
Litskai to the negotiating table. 
 
AGENDA FOR PROPOSED 5-PLUS-2 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Attendees closed the meeting with a more amicable 
discussion of a possible agenda for a 5-Plus-2 meeting. 
Citing O'Neill's statement that the Transnistrians were tired 
of confidence building, Veselovsky suggested that the meeting 
could simply be an exchange of views followed by a discussion 
of the Moldovan proposal.  Nesterushkin cautioned that asking 
the Transnistrians to share their views could be 
counterproductive, but added that he would enjoy watching 
these "embarrassing games" at such a meeting.  DAS Kramer 
said he hoped that Nesterushkin would do more than sit on the 
sidelines in future talks.  Kramer also proposed an informal 
discussion on internationalizing the peacekeeping forces in 
Transnistria. 
 
¶13. (C) COMMENT:  Throughout the day, Veselovsky was 
consistently successful in corralling Nesterushkin and 
bringing him along, including during the drafting of the 
5-Plus-2 invitation letter which Nesterushkin reluctantly 
signed.  Nesterushkin was himself mildly more agreeable than 
during previous meetings, perhaps in an effort to make a good 
impression with the Spanish chair.  The Spaniards appeared 
somewhat caught off guard at first by the severity of the 
debate, but they warmed to the issue and handled the meeting 
with typical multilateralist charm and hospitality.  At one 
point, however, when Pons presented the attendees with a 
draft meeting protocol in English, Nesterushkin lectured Pons 
on the established agreement that all official documents and 
meetings of the 5-Plus-2 be in Russian.  Nesterushkin asked 
if Pons was trying to "break with precedent," at which point 
a shocked Pons assured him that Spain had no idea.  Spanish 
diplomats then hustled admirably to round up 
Russian/English/Spanish speakers and a Cyrillic keyboard. 
END COMMENT. 
 
¶14. (U) DAS David Kramer cleared this message. 
 
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Visit Embassy Madrid's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/madrid/ 
 
MADRID 00000167  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
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